
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MARXISM
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
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CHAPTER 1

Geography in Crisis

Geographers today are by no means satisfied with the concepts and techniques passed on to them by the preceding generation. They often feel as if their discipline is founded upon the juxtaposition of elements between which no very logical connections exist. If we look at a school textbook on human geography the first impression is one of incoherence. The sense of dissatisfaction experienced by many beginners and the doubts they feel concerning the unity, the usefulness and the function of the discipline upon which they are embarking is understandable (Claval 1972, pp. 49–51).

Often the critical awareness of beginners is more explicit than that of the old hands. For example, in 1968 students in Italy expressed themselves with unmistakable clarity on the subject of geography, emphasizing not only that they felt it to be 'a parrot-like, chaotic study', 'a fragmented, disorganized summary of ideas culled superficially from many other subjects', a discipline that was too large and ambitious, endowed with 'a methodology that has nothing to do with rigorous scientific method', but also the ultimate condemnation: 'an encyclopaedic almanac *ad usum delphini*' (Gambi 1968). Where the students had an opportunity, as they had at the Milan State School, of explaining and, more to the point, gaining acceptance for their point of view, they demonstrated even more unequivocally that they had clear ideas: taking advantage of a partial liberalization of the curricula, they deserted the geography courses *en masse*.

The French geographer Yves Lacoste has recently gone so far as to wonder whether 'geography, with its encyclopaedic

language, which even so has some curious gaps,' ought not to be defined 'as a typical form of pre-scientific knowledge, the survival of which can only be explained by the position it holds in the institutions of school or university'. He even came to the conclusion that 'geographic discourse can be considered, particularly in its scholastic forms . . . as the instrument of a vast scheme of mystification, the purpose of which is to hinder the development of political reflection upon space and to mask the spatial strategies of the possessors of power' (Lacoste 1973, pp. 251, 294).

So, then, there is a crisis in geography, a series of contradictions which, having erupted at the base, have sent their repercussions to the summit where, however, with a few exceptions, they have been received only through the filters and the opacity of an educational pyramid which, in the Italian case, is thoroughly inert. Little thought has been given to the reasons why the corpus of geography handed down by the preceding generation seems to be irremediably handicapped by a chaotic representation of reality, disorganized, lacking in logic and scientific rigour; and still less to the consequences of this inadequacy. Nor has there been much reflection on ways and means whereby the discipline can once more be brought into an *active* and *critical* relationship with society.

It is true that in some places a start has been made (against not a little opposition) on rationalizing geographical analysis, applying the methods of what is known as the 'new geography' or 'quantitative geography'. But, apart from the limitations of a 'new look' which in many cases has more to do with the language of geography than with its content and specific method, this operation is largely explainable in terms of the new requirements of economic and spatial planning. With few exceptions, it ends up in a relationship to real problems which, though certainly new at a technical level, is not critical, and in the last resort is one of dependence upon and subordination to the centres of decision. And if this is what usually happens, clearly it is subject not only to definite social conditioning but also to considerable limitations of an epistemological nature; the use and abuse of the expression

'quantitative' often conceals a lack of precision in concepts and categories. Lacoste has also observed that quantitative geography often forgets that 'it is necessary to reflect in order to measure, not to measure in order to reflect'. In this connection it is also significant that in Italy the study of the history of geography has been almost entirely abandoned, while in other countries it is becoming increasingly accepted as forming the indispensable basis for giving geography new epistemological foundations. Even more significant is the complete isolation of geography from the more relevant arguments involving the natural and human sciences more closely affecting daily life, such as ecology, anthropology, economics or history.

I envisage the present book as having a place in this scenario dominated by a crisis which in truth affects nearly all the human sciences in varying degrees. Its role is not to supply ready-made solutions (which nobody claims to have), but to urge that debates too hastily assumed to be closed should be reopened. More ambitiously, I want us to recover those historical and cultural experiences, both of the present and the past, in front of which academic geography has always erected an effective 'no-go' barrier which devitalized what it protected. Such experiences might be theoretical, as for example the Age of Enlightenment (representing the political and cultural environment in which modern human geography was born) or Marxism or historical materialism; historical experiences such as the progressive expropriation of producers from their conditions and working environment (or more generally, their *territory*) and from the resulting struggle for socialist management of territory and resources, whether at the local, regional or national level or on a global scale. Consider for example the countries on the sidelines, from the Third World to the 'forbidden nations' and to the small rural centres in our own backwoods; or again, the struggle to achieve a different sort of life in cities. We can counter the predictable objections of those geographers who are accustomed to glossing over the deep contradictions within the reality they are studying – hence to expurgate Marxism, the proletariat and the class struggle – by pointing

out that Marx's criticism of political economy not only embraces a criticism of 'geography' (and this nearly a hundred years before modern criticisms of descriptive geography) but also contains some essential elements of that 'new', more rigorous logical epistemology which many people feel to be a prerequisite of the foundation of a science of space that is neither unstructured erudition nor knowledge as apologetics.

With this in mind it is useful to refer straight away to Marx in his well-known 1857 Introduction to the *Critique of Political Economy*:

> When we consider a given country from a politico-economic standpoint, we begin with its population, its subdivision into classes, location in city, country or by the sea, occupation in different branches of production; then we study its exports and imports, annual production and consumption, prices of commodities, etc. It seems to be the correct procedure to commence with the real and the concrete, the actual prerequisites; in the case of political economy, to commence with population, which is the basis and author of the entire productive activity of society. Yet on closer consideration it proves to be wrong. Population is an abstraction, if we leave out for example the classes of which it consists. These classes, again, are but an empty word unless we know what are the elements on which they are based, such as wage-labour, capital, etc. These imply, in their turn, exchange, division of labour, prices, etc. Capital, for example, does not mean anything without wage-labour, value, money, price, etc. If we start out, therefore, with population, we do so with a chaotic conception of the whole. (Marx *1973b*, p. 44)

An uncritical approach of this kind – which immediately calls to mind the approach of *human geography* – not only gives a distorted picture of the whole, of reality, but, as Marx also observed, involves from the outset the employment of undefined abstractions or of 'very simple (conceptual) definitions . . . watered down into dull tautologies'. Hence it leads to results that are scientifically barren. Marx offers some examples of such tautologies; they are illuminating, and could be studied with profit by geographers as well. For example, the discourse on the 'general conditions of all production', which is referred to

at the outset by all classical economists, and which, as we shall see, remains the stand-by of every '*general geography of production*', boils down to the statement 'that certain races, climates, natural conditions, such as distance from the sea, fertility of the soil, etc., are more favourable to production than others. That again comes down to the tautology that the facility of creating wealth depends on the extent to which its elements are present both subjectively and objectively' (Marx *1973b*, p. 30).

But wait: precisely such tautological processes are used *to posit the eternal nature of historically determined methods of production, i.e. to make the apologia for the economic and territorial processes of the capitalistic method of production*. Traditionally, the geography of production has taken second place to that of the *land* and of the *mode of life*. For a long time geography has confined itself to these categories and concepts, thus avoiding an encounter with the specific forms of modern territorial or capitalistic organization. We can even find some confirmation of the faults of logic mentioned above when we open the textbook of general geography by R. Almagià, which is still the text in most widespread use in Italian university teaching (and the required reference point of the more orthodox academic geography), when he deals with the 'geographical conditions' of large-scale modern industry:

> Some of these conditions are of an economic and social nature, such as the presence of capital or of able, enterprising managers; but the most important of them are directly or indirectly connected with geographical factors. Of these, we shall mention as being of special importance: (1) the availability of raw materials to process; (2) energy for power; (3) labour; (4) proximity to markets for disposal of the products; (5) the existence of axes of communication. (Almagià 1955, vol. II, p. 207)

If you take as your starting-point the most generalized and tautological definition of industrial activity ('all those human activities which transform raw materials, as they are found in nature, into processed products'), and if you fall into com-

pletely tautological reasoning such as: 'industry develops more easily in proportion to the presence of conditions favouring it, such as raw materials, power, labour and so on', then the geographical conditions which favour the development of large-scale industry will also inevitably dissolve into general conditions, common to all ages and methods of production. Capital and capitalists are thereby introduced without any critical consideration (in the camouflage of 'able, enterprising managers') as conditions specific to the capitalistic mode of production. If you travel along that road you are bound to finish up by viewing capital, capitalists and wage labour – in short, the relationships of capitalistic production – as being natural and timeless conditions of production, in the same category as nature which offers mankind raw materials or sources of energy. This in fact is just what one of Almagià's pupils, O. Baldacci, does when he presents the following eloquent and succinct description of all geography of production:

I *Natural factors of the economy*
(1) the ground (for minerals and rocks)
(2) the climate (for agriculture, livestock husbandry and settlement)
(3) hydrography (for the provision of water, energy production, communications)
II *Human factors of the economy*
(1) number of inhabitants (for labour and consumption)
(2) quality of the inhabitants (for technical working abilities, for revenue)
(3) capital (for the activities of private persons, the State, or a mixture of both)

Not only is *capital* assumed to be a human factor of the economy *in general*, but the same author, after having presented the facts already mentioned regarding the siting of industrial activity as being completely general laws of geography, observes:

> The reasoning of these illustrations (such as: the juxtaposition of iron and coal deposits in Great Britain is the reason for the siting of the steel industry there) becomes greatly complicated by the

> struggle to monopolise the raw materials and the consumer markets, by the need to regulate the entry of consumer products and to counter the unremitting commercial competition. And all these problems of economic geography are further confounded by considerations of political prestige, that can change even the iron laws of economics which, as is well known, are based on supply and demand. (Baldacci 1972)

This is what we read in the most 'modern' textbook of geography widely used in Italy!

In other words, from the viewpoint of positive methodology, if it is true that more highly developed industry has some characteristics in common with less developed industry, it is equally true that we cannot leave it at that, 'that' being quite simply one of the most simplistic, tautological judgements. If we wish to reach a critical, scientific position, we must isolate just what it is about modern industry that differentiates it in terms of development from that of former times, so that the likeness – deriving from the fact that the subject (humanity) and the object (nature) are the same – does not cause us to forget the *essential difference*. '*For*,' concludes Marx, '*the failure to remember this one fact is the source of all the wisdom of modern economists who are trying to prove the eternal nature and harmony of existing social conditions*' (Marx *1973b*, pp. 28–29).

When we pass from the geography of production to political geography we find once more, and even more explicitly (if that were necessary), the very same process whereby into the laws of geography, conceived as eternal laws of nature independent of history, there are quite surreptitiously insinuated the relationships of bourgeois society. Almagià again, after taking the state for granted as an object of political geography in its role of a generic synthesis of territory and population, defines 'the dominant tendencies in the territorial development of states' as 'propensities common in general to all state organisms imbued with vitality and expansionary energy'. Now these propensities turn out to be none other than the laws of development of the modern imperialistic state (the propensity to gain for itself even larger outlets to the sea, the propensity to make itself

master of the opposite shore of the sea, the propensity for colonial expansion, and so on.) But Almagià passes all these off as natural, eternal laws – just the characteristics of 'all organisms endowed with vitality and expansionary energy'.

It is superfluous to labour the point: the apologetic bent is too obvious. One more example will suffice:

> Thus the purpose of colonization is not only to populate [the territory] with a stable nucleus of inhabitants, but also to improve the country as well as raising the level of civilization and the standard of life of the original inhabitants. (Almagià 1955, vol. 2, p. 315)

We need only remember, with Lacoste, that ever since the time of Herodotus geography was born and developed in the service of states and their imperialism, and that this traditional function is paralleled by its modern one, pursued even in the more moderate geography as taught in universities, in which the ideological role consists above all in avoiding political reflection about space and concealing the choices in the sphere of territorial policy that are made by the dominant groups.

In the first case considered – that of the geographical conditions of production – and particularly as regards geographical writing other than in the textbooks, criticism has to get to grips with a complex tradition of economic and social studies running from Max Weber and the marginalists to the most recent theorizing about the location of industry. In certain aspects this tradition represents a U-turn not only as regards *Capital* but also with respect to the starting-point of classical economy. But in the second case, that of political geography, the connection is more obvious and direct, and can be documented as follows: DARWIN → RATZEL → GEOPOLITICS.

Even for this latter case, we can find in Marx and Engels all the ammunition for a radical criticism of a view of the relationships between man and nature which nowadays not only forms one of the bases of 'general geography' but is found here and there even in some of the more recent and dynamic disciplines, such as cultural anthropology and town

planning. To put it briefly, the Darwinian concept of the struggle for existence is one of the foundations of Ratzel's human geography and that of his numerous followers, with varying degrees of explicitness. Concerning this theory Marx was moved to make the following comment:

> It is noteworthy that Darwin rediscovers in animals and plants his own English society with its social division of labour, competition, the opening up of fresh markets, invention and the Malthusian struggle for existence. This is the *bellum omnium contra omnes* of Hobbes, and is reminiscent of Hegel in his *Phenomenology*, in which he represents bourgeois society as an animal kingdom of the spirit, whereas in Darwin the animal kingdom is represented as a bourgeois society. (Letter from Marx to Engels dated 18 June 1862)

Thus it is no accident that a theory which made its entrance at a certain stage in the analysis of bourgeois or modern society turns into universal laws governing the evolution of plant and animal species. To quote Marx again: 'The gist of what Malthus says is precisely that this theory is not applied to plants and animals but, on the contrary, in geometrical progression, only to humans in contrast to the plants and animals.' But wait: 'When once this feat has been accomplished it is very easy to transfer these theories back again from natural history to the history of society, and altogether too naïve to maintain that thereby these assertions have been proved as eternal natural laws of society' (Engels *1976*, p. 308).

This is precisely what Friedrich Ratzel did in his *Anthropogeographie* (1882) dedicated to the Darwinian M. Wagner and conceived, if you please, as the 'principles of the application of science to history', in which we read: 'Human geography can never have a firm scientific basis until it possesses as cornerstones of its foundations the universal laws that govern the distribution of all organic life upon earth.' In other words, the claim of geography to be scientific depends upon *reducing man to the status of an animal*, or at any rate to the laws of vital energy common to the whole of nature. The history of mankind is absorbed into natural history, and human geography is confined within the limits

of physical geography. So here we have the origin of geographical determinism, and it has a very specific purpose about which its radical critics must not remain silent: to speak as though the social relativities that prevail under the capitalistic system belong to the order of nature is to attribute to them perennial validity. It is no accident that with Ratzel the struggle for existence becomes the struggle for living space: this is a transformation that reflects the passage of capitalism from the era of free competition to the monopolistic, imperialistic phase.

Against the method of political economy, and more generally of bourgeois science, which, as Marx said, wanders from the concrete into increasingly tenuous abstractions (and into ever more brazen apologias for the dominant social forms), Marx contrasted the method which leads from the abstract to the concrete, which he says is the only method whereby thought can correctly grasp the concrete, reality. In other words, to take the empirical, superficial approach as represented by the example already cited, or its application to the study of the economy of a country, the correct course is to begin with a rigorous use of the simplest categories such as concepts of labour, division of labour, exchange values and so on. 'This once attained, we might start on our return journey until we finally came back to population, but this time not as a chaotic notion of an integral whole, but a rich aggregate of many determinations and relations.' For example, it has to be understood that exchange value 'can have no other existence except as an abstract, one-sided relation of an already given, concrete and living aggregate' and that it therefore 'implies the existence of population, population that is engaged in production under certain conditions; it also implies the existence of certain types of family, clan or state, etc.' (Marx *1973b*, p. 45).

Such a method is based on a fusion between science and history: the transition from the abstract to the concrete presupposes a transition from the present to the past, and hence the method of historic abstraction fits in with what is known as the *regressive method*. In fact, the simplest abstraction, such as the concept of labour (or, to take an example

from geography, the concept of land), like all the more general abstractions 'only arises in the presence of the most abundant concrete development, where a single characteristic appears to be common to a large number or to a totality of elements'.

Thus the concept of *labour in general* arises in the reflection of political economists on 'a form of society in which individuals pass with ease from one kind of work to another, which makes it immaterial to them what particular kind of work may fall to their share' (Marx *1973b*, p. 49). In the same way the abstraction 'land' which has become central in the considerations of modern geography, corresponds to the very society in which *land easily passes from one usage to another without regard to its natural and historical characteristics*, and this society is precisely *the capitalist society in which land, like the labour force (the two having become separated in consequence of the expropriation of the producers and the community) have become commodities*. In other words, both these abstractions, which *in theory* express relationships that are very ancient and valid for all forms of society, are seen to be *in practice*, in this their abstract (and alienated) reality, nothing but constructs of modern society.

Hence the necessity of the regressive method: for

> Bourgeois society is the most highly developed and most highly differential historical organization of production. The categories which serve as the expression of its conditions and the comprehension of its own organization enable it at the same time to gain an insight into the organization and the relationships of production which have prevailed under all the past forms of society, on the ruins and constituent elements of which it has arisen, and of which it still drags along some unsurmounted remains. . . .
>
> The bourgeois economy furnishes a key to ancient economy, etc. This is, however, by no means true of the method of those economists who blot out all historical differences and see the bourgeois form in all forms of society. While it may be said, therefore, that the categories of bourgeois economy contain what is true of all other forms of society, the statement is to be taken *cum grano salis*. They may contain these in a developed or crippled or caricatured form, but always essentially different. (Marx *1973b*, p. 50)

We have already pointed out the close connection which the Marxist method makes between theory and history. Now we should like to drive home the point by quoting from a modern scholar who sees in it 'the authentic vital centre of modern Marxism'.

> To understand the transition M–D (goods–money), to understand how, historically, capital has developed from goods and money, is to understand modern society's *historical genesis*. But since M and D are merely the most radical simplification of contemporary or modern capital, to understand the historical genesis does not involve my transporting myself to its 'prenatal' phase but, on the contrary, demands that I immerse myself in the *scientific analysis* of the present. In other words, I do not make history of the birth of capital by turning my back on the present in order to go back to the time at which capital was on the point of appearing but had not yet done so; this would be just trudging lamely back over a chronological series. I re-create past history by *moving from the present* as from firm ground. Or on the one hand, by understanding the present in its 'givenness' and scientific unambiguousness, that is to say realizing that the present *is not* the past, but breaks with it and innovates from it; and on the other hand, as the present is not the past, neither is it to be confused with the past (which is just another way of saying the same thing): in short, understanding that the present itself is only a historical, *transitory* form. And this means, from one viewpoint, that there can be no *historical* analysis worthy of the name without conceptualization, i.e. without theory, without sociological symbolism – in brief, without empirical or scientific abstractions such as the concepts of 'capital', 'bourgeoisie', 'modern proletariat' and so on. And from another viewpoint it means that this logical development of the analysis does not cause me to fall into the abstract rationalism and finalism of Hegel and of the philosophy of history in general, in which past epochs are not shown as they were in themselves, but as preparatory steps or 'moments' before the coming of the present. On the contrary it always bears in mind the diversity and uniqueness of the past as against the present. From this it follows that there can be no history without theory, that is to say without science, nor in turn can there be science (of the 'moral' disciplines) that does not proceed from a lively sense of the diversity of different periods or which in any way leaves out the distinctions between the different historical-social configurations. (Colletti 1961, pp. xliv–xlv)

From this amalgamation of science and history there emerge categories such as, for instance, 'economic-social formation', 'social relations of production', etc., and concepts such as that of 'capital', 'wage labour' and so on, which derive not only from the cross-fertilization of economic theory and history (as Schumpeter himself recognized) but also from the interplay of nature and history, territory and society. We shall return later to these considerations, which distinguish Marxian historicism from all other kinds of historicism, and which are also more likely to interest the geographer or, more generally, any scholar devoting himself to spatial problems. For the present, however, we will simply remind the reader that when Marx speaks of capital (meaning the capitalistic relations of production and of the process of the reproduction and accumulation of capital), he does not have in mind something that relates solely to economic production or its techniques, but something which relates at the same time to society and space. In other words, capital and capitalism signify a specific relationship of production that is indeed an *economic* organization (productive forces, technology, etc.) but which at the same time is also a *social* organization, being a division of society into classes, and a *spatial* one, involving the concentration of the means of work and subsistence, of workers and production equipment, the growth of towns and the like. Confirmation of this will be found above all in the excerpts from Marx contained in Chapter 4.

In concluding this introduction it remains to emphasize one point which links up with the statement of the problems that formed our starting-point and which constitutes one of the most hotly debated themes in the theory of geography, namely the paradox of determinism and possibilism. Even today, geography is still dualistic at heart: it swings to and fro between determinism and free will, between naturalism and historical idealism, between materialistic causality and a non-determined finalism. That is to say, on the one hand it tends to consider only necessity or material causality as being real, which involves considering man as a natural being determined by his environment and human society as

reduced to the status of an anthill: or, on the other hand, only finalism or human freedom of action is held to be real, in which case the environment is regarded as the free creation of mankind. These two viewpoints do not resolve the paradox: on the contrary, they perpetuate it, because idealism, even in its own context, calls for its opposite, which is common materialism, just as determinism in turn evokes absolute indeterminism.

I believe that the only solution to this paradox is to be found in a radical escape from it by means of historical materialism, regarded as a scientific theory which overcomes the break between nature and history by considering simultaneously man's relationship with nature and the relationship of man with man. The discussion so far, and to come, is intended to demonstrate this proposition. A method that is to be quite clear cannot admit either of physical determinism or of economic determinism; in other words it cannot posit any 'base', whether it be in nature or in economics, as a structure antedating human interactions, however much followers or adversaries of Marxism may have wished to do so. It cannot admit bases of any kind upon which the human and natural sciences can be erected into a kind of pyramid such as – to cite the extremes of contemporary ideology – have been erected by dialectic materialism in the USSR or by what is known as general and synthetic geography.

The point is well made by a fine interpreter of historical materialism, K. Korsch, who was one of the first to react against the positivistic involution of Marxist historicism:

> On the other hand, Marx comprised in his materialistic formula also the natural foundation of all historical and social phenomena and, for this purpose, conceived and represented even nature itself in the terms of a strictly historical and social science as 'Industry', 'Economy', or 'Material Production'. In spite of a genuine recognition of the 'priority of external nature' he does not derive the historical development of society from any kind of extra-historical and extra-social natural factors like climate, race, struggle for existence, man's physical and mental powers, etc., but from a 'nature' which has itself been already 'modified' by an historical and social process or, more distinctly, from the

historically and socially conditioned developments of material production. The materialistic philosopher Plechanov, in supporting his contrary opinion, reminds us that 'Hegel had already noted in his *Philosophy of History* the important part played by the geographical foundations of the world history.' He did not see that the scientific advances made by Marx's historical and social materialism . . . consists just in this difference . . .

While according to Hegel 'physical nature, indeed, exerts a direct effect upon world history,' Marx started from an altogether different viewpoint from the outset. Physical nature according to him, does not directly enter into history. It does so by indirection, i.e., as a process of material production which goes on not only between man and nature, but at the same time between man and men. (Korsch 1938, p. 190–191)

We shall see in Chapter 3 how it is precisely Marx's conception of nature that can furnish the geographer with his most effective weapons for a radical criticism of, and final victory over, the traditional subordination of human geography to physical geography.

CHAPTER 2

Philosophy and Geography

To a modern (Italian) geographer the idea of bringing together geography and philosophy would seem at most to be of historical interest. For, on the one hand, philosophers display virtually no interest in geography – a circumstance due in part to Croce's refusal to regard geography as a branch of the humanities – and geographers then return the compliment not only by ignoring philosophy but, even worse, by imagining that they have no need of reflection about the rules of logic that should govern their own discipline.

> Most geographers theorize as little as possible and are content to affirm, without a trace of shame, that 'geography is a synthetic science'. . . . Such statements simultaneously betray ignorance of the equally synthetic nature of the disciplines to which the geographers resort, their isolation . . . and their virtual lack of interest in even the most elementary theoretical problems with which every science has had to come to terms, in some cases a long time ago. Furthermore, some geographers make no secret of their low regard for 'abstract considerations'; . . . in fact, they make a virtue of it and proclaim their preference for 'the concrete'. (Lacoste 1973, p. 243)

But in saying that geography is 'the science of the concrete' or 'of concrete space' geographers are simply revealing 'their arrogant ignorance' of the analysis of cognitive processes, according to one of their critics, also a geographer:

> Recent research into epistemology shows that the 'concrete' is not the 'empirical or abstract datum' but a 'construct' formed by a dialectical structuring of the elements and relationships of the

> cognitive process. . . . To say that 'the observer is part of the system he is observing' is a tautology of which geographers have always been unaware and which today is recalling them to reality. . . . To write that geographers study 'concrete space' means that they are in practice interested in everything that exists. So what then is the object of geography? It is a totality impossible to define! . . . It is as futile to follow after an object that becomes increasingly elusive as to try to define an empirical field for geography by dint of progressively excluding other aspects of reality . . . (Nicolas-Obadia 1973, p. 128)

From whichever standpoint we view the crisis of geography, we always come back to the realization that there is at its root a serious lack of epistemological reflection and that the backwardness of geography compared with other humanities and natural sciences is due first and foremost to lack of progress in elaborating and monitoring its own logic and methodology.

To this end the history of philosophy and of the development of the social sciences can provide not a few lessons for today's geographers lessons to which some of them are already beginning to pay attention. All we are concerned to do here is to point out the fruitful lessons for modern geographical discourse offered by some parts of the philosophy of the social sciences that have emerged since the age of enlightenment.

The American geographer Richard Hartshorne looked upon Kant as one of the founders of modern geography as a science of space and of spatial differentiation. And in truth Kant did initiate a scientific tradition, characterized not only by rigorous philosophical reflection on the concepts of space, position and region, but also by the establishment in 1756 of a new method of transmitting knowledge, namely the university course, the importance of which has of late been underlined by the creation of national schools of geography. Kant also reminds us, in the preface to his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, that at the University of Königsberg he had taught not only philosophy but 'for a period of thirty years . . . two courses of lectures intended as *knowledge of the world: anthropology* (in the winter semester) and

physical geography (in the summer semester). Since they were popular lectures, people of other professions also used to attend them' (Kant *1974*, p. 5 note).

This is not the place in which to set out Kant's contribution to geographical studies: that is far from easy, and can only be done within the ambit of science, more particularly of the development of the natural sciences. It may, however, be useful to refer here briefly to Kant's view of the definitions and tasks of geography, given in his introduction to *Physische Geographie* (1801–5). This will also help us to understand subsequent developments.

Kant considered geography to be one of the empirical sciences, that is to say the sciences based on *experience*, hence distinct from the *rational* sciences based upon *reason*. Its province was 'real scholarship (*real* because the objects of our experience appear to us either in *space*, one beside another, or in *time*, one after the other). This concerns in part the description of objects: *the description of the world*; and in part the narration of its changes – *the history of the world*. Both of these are either physical or anthropological.'

In this way, *knowledge of the world* too appears to be 'based either on that which exists in accordance with the laws of necessity, wherein consists the true knowledge of nature in its strict meaning; or else on the beings which act in accordance with the laws of freedom: the knowledge of man, anthropology.' Both are regarded as pragmatic sciences, not speculative ones: 'By means of these two sciences, anthropology and physical geography, we shall try to anticipate future experience.' In this connection, Kant emphasized the usefulness of geography: 'Geography is at once a cultivating and civilizing study, and is a very important part of the knowledge of the world, though less important than the knowledge of man, properly speaking.'

For our purposes it is more interesting to note which fields of investigation and which methods Kant would assign to geography: 'All natural objects in so far as they compose a *whole*, really constitute the *world*. But in a more restricted sense, we consider among all the things in the world only those with which we can have some contact, that is to say,

those with which we can interact in the way in which they interact with us. In this restricted sense the earth constitutes our world.' Two points should be emphasized:

(1) The description of the earth or the world should refer to the idea of the whole, and should 'always refer to the totality' (i.e. geography as general knowledge of the earth, as an organic, systematic body of knowledge).

(2) This totality or whole can be defined only in relation to man and to human praxis. This second point, rather than an anticipation of the most modern developments of human geography, appears to be taken in the more limited sense that geography, as distinct from astronomy, must turn its attention to 'that part of the earth which is the *habitat* of man' (as Hartshorne also wrote).

It is true that for Kant geography remains physical geography – 'a general view of nature and of nature's effects' – into which man enters only as one of the effects of nature. Elsewhere Kant says explicitly that 'physical geography forms the basis and contains the main elements' of political, commercial and even moral geography as well.

Here we reach the kernel of Kant's theory of geography: the separation between the speculative and the pragmatic sciences (i.e. reasoning and experience) and, subordinately, between anthropology and geography, between history and nature (or freedom and necessity), are so many links in a chain of reasoning which, even leaving on one side current geographical knowledge, inevitably brings with it a mechanistic or deterministic conception in so far as it pertains to man–environment relationships, and a providential or metaphysical one at the level of history and anthropology.

Now let us turn to Hegel. In Hegel's philosophy geography is treated in a completely different way: not as a naturalistic discipline but as a historical one, as a study of the possible modes of living offered by the environment to people settled in the various regions of the earth, and as one of the keys to an understanding of world history. The difference appears due, most of all, to their divergent philosophical premises. For Hegel overcomes the limitations of Kant's criticism, and in particular his separation of nature from history (between

man as a natural being and man as the subject of history). As Marx himself acknowledged in 1844, Hegel was the first to conceive of 'man's self-creation as a process' and 'objective man, true man because real, as a result of *his own work* . . . as a historical result'. (But again Marx recognizes at the same time that Hegel grasps the essence of *work* – as the interaction between man and nature – only in a unilateral way, as abstract, spiritual work, that is as an activity of the spirit, of self-consciousness.)

Secondly, the difference also becomes apparent when we bear in mind that between Kant and Hegel, or rather between Kant's lectures on physical geography and Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history, there are interposed Herder, Ritter and von Humboldt. We have to bear in mind that by Hegel's time geography had taken two sharply different directions: the Kantian physical description of the world, developed by von Humboldt; and the historical-geographical, influenced by Herder and developed by Ritter from the new chair of geography instituted at the University of Berlin in 1820. It has in fact been recently shown how 'the geographical basis of world history', which forms a significant part of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* derives directly from Ritter and that

> Only the publication of the latter's *Erdkunde* beginning in 1817–18 provides an explanation of why the affirmation of the geographical basis of the historical process, which was still absent from the original edition of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, assumes such a significant place in the writings and, above all, in the lectures of his Berlin period. Ritter's work offered to Hegel (who by that time had laid down the basic framework and, to a large extent, the content) of his own 'system' . . . a conception of the earth as the 'theatre' of the historical development of humanity, which made reference to the very mould of Herder from which he had made his reflections on the meaning of the life of nations thirty years before. (Rossi 1970, p. 393)

Hegel drew from the *Erdkunde* not only the greater part of his information but also the very same principles of interpretation which he employed for determining the physical structure of the continents and of the possibilities offered by

them for the historical development of the human race. These principles are, briefly, 'looking upon the continents as geographical "individuals", the fundamental importance of the relationship between solid shapes and fluid shapes (i.e. between the the continents and the sea), the historical and geographical importance of intercourse between East and West, and the inverse correlation between the degree of dependence on nature and the degree of civilization' (Rossi 1970, p. 389).

These principles of interpretation form part of the logical and dialectical framework of Hegelian philosophy, according to which world history is 'spirit made manifest': 'world history represents the Idea of the spirit as it displays itself in reality as a series of external forms', said Hegel. In particular this spirit is materialized in the various 'national spirits' (or spirits of 'world-historical nations') which are 'separated in time and space; and in this respect, the influence of the natural context, the relationship between the spiritual and the natural (i.e. the national temperament, etc.) makes itself felt. . . . this relationship is a purely external one; but, as the ground on which the spirit moves, it is nevertheless an essential and necessary basis' (Hegel *1975*, p. 152).

The fact that this is an outward relationship does not mean that it is unimportant: indeed, 'geographical determination' becomes a fundamental dimension of the historical process and of the 'national spirit'; and, at a certain time, a creation both of history (or spirit) and of nature. In saying this Hegel uses the postulate of the correspondence between the physical structure of the environment and 'national character', which Ritter had affirmed, and in his own way verified, when he wrote that 'the characteristic element of geographical nature is so closely connected with what is basic in the historical nature of the continents . . . as to constitute one and the same foundation' (Ritter 1822, vol. 1, p. 14).

But let us see how Hegel expresses this postulate, giving in the process an elegant definition of geography:

> In so far as man is unfree and natural, he can be described as a creature of the senses. The world of the senses, however, consists

> of two distinct aspects: that of subjectivity and that of external nature. The latter is the geographical aspect, which can be recognized at first glance as part of external nature in general. What we have to consider, therefore, are differences which are grounded in nature. They must also be seen first and foremost as particular possibilities from which the spirit germinates, and they accordingly lend it its geographical basis. It is not our business to acquaint ourselves with the nation's environment as an external locality, but merely with the natural type to which the latter belongs; for this is intimately connected with the type and character of whatever nation is rooted in this particular soil. The nation's character consists simply in the form and manner in which it appears in world history and takes up its position and stance within it. (Hegel *1975*, p. 153)

This necessary correspondence between the type of environment in a locality and the character of its inhabitants obviously poses a problem as to the freedom of the human will, and Hegel hastens to make it clear that 'we must not assume that the relationship of dependence between man and nature implies that the character of a nation is formed exclusively by the natural characteristics of its environment.' Still on this subject, Hegel takes up a principle already clearly enunciated by Ritter. This principle, which is a further illustration of the inverse relationship already referred to between degree of civilization and dependence on nature, represents history as 'a process of the progressive liberation of peoples from the conditions of their own natural environments, which correspondingly become less and less deterministic' (Ritter 1822, vol. 1, pp. 18–19). Hegel interprets this process of liberation from nature (or the emergence of spirit from nature) as an example of a dialectical relationship. Hegel had the following to say about the relationship between man and nature:

> All development involves a reflection of the spirit within itself in opposition to nature, or an internal particularization of the spirit as against its immediate existence, i.e. the natural world. The moment of naturalness is itself part of this particularization, because it is itself of a particular nature; and in this way, an opposition arises between the spirit and the external world.

> Nature is therefore the original basis from which man can achieve inward freedom. For in so far as man is primarily a creature of the senses, it is imperative that, in his sensuous connection with nature, he should be able to attain freedom by means of internal reflection. (Hegel *1975*, p. 154)

We thus arrive at the kernel of Hegel's thought about 'historical geography' or geographical history: dialectics as a method of establishing the correlations between geographical structures and the life-styles of peoples. It is therefore important to see how Hegel's dialectic works not only in respect of Kant but also as compared with Marx. Briefly, Hegel's dialectic demonstrates on the one hand his logical and methodological truth (in progressive accordance with Kant) as regards the unity of opposites (being and thought, freedom and necessity, and so on) and hence – what interests us – as regards the unity of nature and history; but on the other hand it shows his regressive, mystifying character (even with respect to Kant) in that such unity is unity in thought, in that it is not a dialectic of human labour in the sense of the concrete, historical relationship with the natural environment (as in Marx), but is essentially a dialectic of spiritual work, of ideas. As such, the Hegelian dialectic inevitably turns out to be an analytical process extrinsic to the objects, superimposed upon history and, in the last analysis, a non-critical, largely ideological method of establishing such concepts as the correlations between geographical structures and the life-styles of peoples. In other words, according to Hegel the development of history is simply the self-development of spirit coming to self-consciousness: the choice of 'receptacles' of the spirit (men and peoples in the history of the world) and the delimitation of the 'theatre' or geographical area of world history and of phases or moments of that history become so many arbitrary choices, because the empirical materials of history are introduced into the discussion without any real scientific control but in subordination to the general consciousness of the time, according to the dominant ideology of the Christian-Germanic society which Hegel was conscious of inhabiting (though this influence did not, of

course, prevent Hegel's reflections on history from occasionally reaching very interesting conclusions, of which Marx among others took due note). The reader may find confirmation of what we have been maintaining in the long section which Hegel devotes to the *situation of nature, or the geographical basis of world history* in the Introduction to his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* – though perhaps more on the negative than the positive aspects which are also present within Hegel's philosophy of history. All we need do here is to note, in returning to the subjects discussed in Chapter 1, how the 'possibilist' conception explicitly expressed by Hegel in the theoretical passages cited (and also developed during his criticism of 'the over-strict effects and influences' attributed to climate) passes into a deterministic conception according to which the possibility of a people freeing itself from the influence of the environment and of becoming a subject of history is made to depend upon the morphological and climatic structure of the various geographical regions of the world. In this way the geographical base of world history (not only past history but also the present and the future) is, out of an assumed geographical necessity, arbitrarily reduced to the area of the Old World, or more precisely to its temperate zone. This is turn means that world history begins and ends within the confines of this area, and also that the geographical centre of world history is situated within this area, represented by the Mediterranean and Europe.

Thus the 'geographical' outcome of Hegel's philosophy of history appears obvious: the dialectic of the spirit of the world takes on the air of *a definitely ethnocentric history justified on a geographical basis* and characterized by a unidirectional historical process in which the various historical periods or historico-natural phases are necessary stages in the progressive incursion of spirit into concrete reality, which in Hegel's view was consummated in Christian-Germanic or bourgeois society.

It is not our purpose to explore fully the problems posed by the relationship between philosophy and geography with reference to German idealism. However, it may be helpful to

indicate some lines of enquiry for later study, in relation both to the inception of modern human geography and to the origins of the materialist conception of history held by Marx and Engels. For example, the influence of Schelling's transcendental idealism and of German neoplatonism on Ritter's own thinking about geography has recently been clearly shown (see Nicolas-Obadia 1974). A professed disciple of Ritter is Elisée Reclus, a French geographer and militant anarchist of the First *Internationale*. The philosophy of Reclus is currently being reassessed, partly in opposition to traditional French academic geography as found in Vidal de la Blache. It is conceded that, twenty years before Vidal, Reclus had devoted ample space 'to cities, to industries and to those economic, social and political problems that have subsequently been neglected' by Vidal's school of geographers (Lacoste 1973, p. 291).

Should we consider that Marx too in some way came under the influence of Ritter? Some students of Marx have replied with an unhesitating affirmative:

> Renewing the study of geography, which up to that time had been almost wholly descriptive, Ritter, under the influence of Schelling's philosophy, looked upon the various parts of the world as living organisms, which determined the life and history of their inhabitants, and he held that the great events of history were conditioned in their essentials by geographical factors. Although he remained deeply idealistic in his general conception of the world and of history, in which he saw expression of the divine will, there appeared in his doctrine, through the correlation which he posited between human evolution and the natural environment, the outlines of a materialist conception of the world; and it is legitimate to deduce that his lecture courses did influence somewhat the process which was soon to lead Marx from Hegelian idealism to historical materialism. (Cornu 1955)

Although it has been established that Marx attended Ritter's lectures on general geography at Berlin University in 1838, Cornu's hypothesis does not strike me as being very convincing, particularly as to the part Ritter's geography is supposed to have played in the elaboration of historical materialism. However, it certainly cannot be denied that

Marx, even and perhaps mainly through Hegel, had in mind Ritter's principles of geography and that he wrestled with the products of the German school of geography even in his maturity. Hence Lacoste is wrong when he writes as follows:

> Marx's fundamental contribution to the social sciences and to political theory was in large measure inspired by his interest in the 'long term', meaning a period long enough to allow the dialectic development of the relationships and tools of production to be observed. But since Marx organizes his reasoning with constant reference to history, . . . he shows himself to be indifferent to the problems of space. This silence of Marx, which is not easy to explain, has had serious consequences lasting right to the present day, because political polemics whether at national or international level, which are expressions of the class struggle, and Marxist argumentation in particular, are essentially concerned with Time, and not with Space. (Lacoste 1973, p. 298)

I propose to show in the following pages that in historical materialism the space dimension is by no means sacrificed to the time dimension; both are indelibly present in Marx's own historicism which grew out of his radical criticism of the idealist conception of history, in particular of Hegelian idealism in which, as we have seen, even the most 'earthly' facts of geography became transmuted into the 'heaven' of the Idea.

CHAPTER 3

Historical Materialism and Geography

From Marx's criticism of speculative dialectic to the scientific dialectic of historical materialism

There is no doubt that the starting-point and necessary basis on which historical materialism was founded and developed is to be found in Marx's criticism of Hegel's philosophy, which he began to expound at the beginning of the 1840s. It could not be otherwise, since at that time Hegel dominated the scene with all the weight of his 'ultimate universal philosophy which encompasses and penetrates everything that has happened and all that has been thought'. The difficulty of escaping from this all-pervasive presence and striking out on a new path is demonstrated not only by the story of Hegelianism itself but also by the fact that several weighty volumes and nearly all Marx's philosophical and methodological texts (most of which remained unpublished for several years) are devoted to his critique of Hegel, developed mainly during the five years from 1843 to 1847 but constantly renewed. The fact that Marx's most important methodological texts only began to circulate in the present century, in the inter-war period, should be borne in mind not only as partly explaining the traces of positivism or idealism in historical materialism (and especially the fact that his version of positivism has been for too long an easy target for modern theorists and devotees of the social sciences) but also in order to understand the renewed interest being shown by many of

the social sciences in Marxism as a scientific method in very recent years, orthodox or Soviet Marxism notwithstanding.

This confrontation with Hegelian philosophy (later to be described by Marx as 'his erstwhile philosophical consciousness') was conducted both against its central core (its logic and speculative method) and against its many applications (the philosophy of religion, of right, of history, of nature and so on). Clearly this is not the place to recount the orientations and the main points of such critiques. Nevertheless, one cannot avoid mentioning the close connection between the critique of speculative dialectic and the critique of Hegel's philosophy of history – indeed of every philosophy of history – and hence between the critique of all speculative philosophy and the foundation of the *only science that we know; the science of history* (in Marx's own words).

In one passage in the *The Holy Family* Marx discloses, with a clear intent to make it widely known, 'the mystery of speculative construction', showing, with examples drawn from everyday language ('the apple is a fruit') the essential points of every philosophy or (*a priori*) speculative knowledge:

(1) The substantiation or hypostatization of the idea and the consequent transformation of the *real* subject into a predicate or attribute of the *idea*. For example, the abstract idea of 'fruit' is the *substance* of the pear, the apple, the almond, which thus become 'mere forms of existence, or modes, of fruit'.

(2) This operation necessarily entails the elimination of the difference perceptible by the senses (that which, for instance, differentiates an apple from a pear) and consequently leads inevitably to results that are merely tautological. That way [says Marx] it is impossible to arrive at the wealth of definition. 'The mineralogist, whose whole science was limited to the statement that all minerals are really *the* mineral, would be a mineralogist only in *his imagination*. For every mineral the speculative mineralogist says '*the*' *mineral* and his science is reduced to repeating this word as many times as there are real minerals.'

(3) It is therefore necessary to turn from the abstract to the empirical: 'Having reduced the different real fruits to the *one* "fruit" of abstraction – "*fruit*" – speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from "fruit", from the *substance*, to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond and so on.' It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea '*the* fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at *the opposite* of an abstraction without *relinquising* the abstraction.

(4) The speculative philosopher therefore relinquises the abstraction '*the* fruit', but in a *speculative, mystical* fashion – with the appearance of *not* relinquising it. Thus it is really only in appearance that he rises above his abstraction. This giving up is not a true renunciation: this overcoming of the speculative method only in appearance *is the dialectic* by virtue of which we consider the abstract idea (*the* 'fruit') not as 'dead, undifferentiated, motionless, but as a living, self-differentiating, moving essence', thus no longer saying, 'as one might from the standpoint of the substance', a pear is '*the* fruit', an apple is '*the* fruit', an almond is '*the* fruit', but rather '*the* fruit' presents itself as a pear, '*the* fruit' presents itself as an apple, '*the* fruit' presents itself as an almond; and the differences which distinguish apples, pears and almonds from one another are the self-differentiations of '*the fruit*', and make the particular fruits different members of the life-process of '*the* fruit', separate parts of a whole, of an 'organically linked series of members'.

(5) Thus speculative dialectic results in the mystical transfiguration of *things*: 'When you return from the abstraction, the *supernatural* creation of the mind, '*the* fruit', to real *natural* fruits you give on the contrary a supernatural significance to natural fruits and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the *unity* of "*the* fruit" in all the manifestations of its life – the apple, the pear, the almond – that is, to

> show the *mystical interconnection* between these fruits, how in each one of them "*the* fruit" realizes itself by *degrees* and *necessarily* progresses, for example, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits *no longer* consists in their *natural* properties, *but* in their *speculative* property, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of "*the* Absolute Fruit" ' (Marx and Engles *1975*, pp. 73–75).

This criticism by Marx could be summed up in the words used in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*: 'Hegel does not develop his thoughts in terms of the object; rather he develops the object in accordance with a prearranged mode of thinking.' Della Volpe has discerningly compared it with Galileo's criticism of 'Simplicio', the Jesuit scholastic astronomer Scheiner: 'This man goes on step by step imagining things as they ought to be in order to fit in with his ideas, instead of making his ideas fit in, little by little, with things as they are.' Della Volpe also has the merit of having noted in the writings of Marx when young the emergence of a new method of dialectical materialism as a method of experimental (Galilean) dialectic based on that 'specific logic of the specific object' which Marx was to apply in the historical-dialectic investigation in *Capital*, after having developed its methodological aspects in the 1857 Introduction to his *Critique of Political Economy* (Della Volpe 1962, p. 103). This 'specific logic of the specific object' was of course also contrary to the propensity of Hegelian speculative philosophy to find in individual concrete cases the corresponding abstract purely conceptual entities.

Clearly our interest lies more in the applications of Marx's materialist methodology than in its philosophical aspects, even though these cannot be altogether disregarded. In Chapter 1 we spoke of the geopolitical concept of the State (as advanced by Almagià). No radical criticism of Almagià's theory can overlook Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy of the State, summed up as follows: 'Hegel is to be censured not because he describes the modern State as it is, but because he passed off that which is as being the *essence of*

the State', i.e. because he closes his eyes to the specific, temporal characteristics of the State and therefore makes no attempt to explain to us their structure and historical causes – in other words, to give a critical interpretation of them.

This then furnishes a good example of the way in which the Hegelian dialectic (in common with all speculative philosophy) necessarily involves the uncritical approach (through the surreptitious replacement of the empirical, of common sense, of the dominant ideology) in the face of historical reality, as we have already verified when considering Hegel's philosophy of history.

Marx was unsparing in his criticism of speculative dialectics (which he described as 'a false heaven'), of the 'mystical concoction of the unity of man and nature', of the 'mystical identity of being and thought', and of practice and theory. None the less he did allow Hegel the merit (which he withheld from many representatives of the Hegelian Left) of having given 'very often a real presentation within the speculative presentation, embracing the *thing* itself', or of having given 'in spite of his speculative original sin, in many instances the elements of a true description of human relations' (Marx and Engels *1975*, pp. 76, 239).

Undoubtedly that is also true of Hegel's philosophy of history and it would be wrong to dismiss it, even and above all in connection with Marx, solely on account of its philosophical form, without reference to its *historical content*. For, as has been rightly said, it is hard to imagine that the various historical forms in which Hegel saw his 'spirit of the world' embodied (e.g. the Greek World, the Roman World, the modern era and so on) did not exercise *some* influence on Marx's conception of socio-historic forms, as for instance the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois methods of production, which Marx described as 'the epochs which mark the progress of the economic shaping of society'.

However, in this connection it has been observed by Colletti (1961) that 'what Marx owes to Hegel is also part of what Hegel in turn owed to eighteenth-century Britain and France.' The fact that Hegel made up these historical forms as objective historical *types* (i.e. valid as 'models') seems to

be in line with the illuministic historicism of Montesquieu, who in turn inspired the rich contribution made by the Scottish 'historico-sociological' school which includes the names of Hume, Adam Smith, Robertson, Lord Kames, Ferguson and John Millar, names which cannot be omitted from any consideration of Marx's *oeuvre*. For in fact the interest that the Scottish school had in common was directed precisely towards a 'natural history of society' which as 'theoretical history' was an attempt to employ concepts yielding historical classifications whereby the various epochs of history could be arranged on the basis of 'types' or 'models' of society. And that 'natural history of society' leads back, perhaps by way of Hegel, not only to Marx's concept of socio-economic forms but also to a whole nexus of problems regarding the nature of historical processes or the nature of history (as a correlative of the historicity of nature) which, as we shall see, constitutes the originality of Marxian historicism.

The concept of nature and the relationship between nature and history

In *The Holy Family* (Marx and Engels *1975*, p. 76) Marx said that a philosophy which wishes to get rid of the rational and natural dependence on the *object* by sophistry falls into the most irrational and unnatural *bondage* to the object, 'whose most accidental and most individual attributes it is obliged to construe as absolutely necessary and general'. This being so, the necessary first step, if this vicious circle of theory is to be broken, must be to restore a right relationship between the subject of the cognition and its object and, more generally, between man and nature. And this step was taken by Feuerbach in respect of Hegel, as Marx himself observed:

> Feuerbach, who completed and criticized Hegel *from Hegel's point of view* by resolving the metaphysical *Absolute* Spirit into the *'real man on the basis of nature'*, was the first to complete the *criticism of religion*, by sketching in a grand and masterly

manner the basic features of the *criticism of Hegel's speculation* and hence of *all metaphysics*.

Marx claimed to be an adherent of Feuerbach's principle of 'sense-perception as the basis of all sciences'. He also associated himself with French and British materialism, especially when it identified the materialist theory with the scientific outlook itself: 'Only when science proceeds from sense-perception in the twofold form of *sensuous* consciousness and *sensuous* need – that is, only when science proceeds from nature – is it *true science*' (Marx *1977a*, p. 105). But although the credit for restating, in Hegelian terms, that *nature* and *man* are the only magnitudes on which theory can operate, goes to Feuerbach, none the less Marx went well beyond Feuerbach's simple naturalism and limited anthropology and constructed a far more complex and fertile theory of nature and man through the critique of Feuerbach's materialism which he conducted in the *German Ideology*. Marx held that Feuerbach was mistaken in remaining in the field of philosophy and in the fact that 'in the last resort he cannot get to grips with the world of sense-data without examining it with the eyes – or rather with the 'eyeglasses' – of the philosopher'. Equally he was mistaken in not making the transition to the sphere of history and sociology:

> [Feuerbach] does not see how the sensuous world around him is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest 'sensuous certainty' are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry tree, like almost all fruit trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by *commerce* into our zone, and therefore only *by* this action of a definite society in a definite age it has become a 'sensuous certainty' for Feuerbach.
>
> Incidentally, when we conceive things thus, as they really are and happened, every profound philosophical problem is resolved,

> as will be seen later, quite simply into an empirical fact. For instance, the important question of the relations of man to nature (Bruno [Bauer] goes so far as to speak of the 'antitheses in nature and history' as though these were two separate 'things' and man did not always have before him an historical nature and a natural history) out of which all the 'unfathomably lofty works' on 'substance' and 'self-consciousness' were born, crumbles of itself when we understand that the celebrated 'unity of man with nature' has always existed in industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or greater development of industry, just like the 'struggle' of man and nature, right up to the development of his productive powers on a corresponding basis. (Marx *1977b*, pp. 62–63)

Historical materialism therefore is created as an anti-philosophy as a resolution of speculative problems that are in reality empirical ones, and as a resolution of the philosophy of history and of the philosophy of nature in the history of nature and mankind. It establishes a new relationship between nature and man. By avoiding falling into Hegel's spiritualistic monism, and into the naturalistic monism of physicalist materialism or of the positivism and determinism which followed, it places itself upon a firmly humanistic and wholly historicist plane, and as such, does not lose sight either of *the historicity of nature* and of *the naturalness of history*.

So, in order to understand the full significance of historical materialism, both at the general scientific level, and, still more, in relation to geography, we need to hold firmly to Marx's conception of nature and not allow ourselves to be impressed by a terminology that is not always consistent. As Schmidt (*1971*) has stressed:

> Marx described extra-human reality which is both independent of men and mediated or, at least, capable of being mediated with them, by using the following synonymous terms: 'material', 'nature', 'stuff of nature', 'natural thing', 'earth', 'objective moments of labour's existence', 'objective' or 'material (*sachlich*) conditions of labour'. Since men contribute a component of this reality, the concept of 'nature' is identical with the 'whole of reality' in the Marxist view. This concept of nature as the

> whole of reality did not result in an ultimate *Weltanschauung* or a dogmatic metaphysic but simply circumscribed the horizon of thought within which the new materialism moved. Materialist philosophy consists, in the words of Engels, in explaining the world from the world itself. . . .
>
> The sensuous world and finite men in their existing social setting (the essence and the appearance at the same time) are the only quantities taken into account by Marxist theory. At bottom, there existed for Marx only 'man and his labour on the one side, nature and its materials on the other'. (Schmidt *1971*, pp. 29–30)

But if Marx recognized 'the primacy of external nature' he hastened nevertheless to say that this distinction between a pre-social nature and nature mediated by society 'has meaning only in so far as man is considered to be distinct from nature'; and that, 'for that matter, the nature that preceded human history . . . is nature which today no longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral-islands of recent origin)' (Marx *1977b*, p. 63). In essence, Marx was not interested in nature as a philosophical, ontological problem (as a *philosophia prima*), and hence something abstract and metaphysical, but only at the level of the so-called universal history which, as 'the product of man by human labour and the development of nature for man', is the only ground on which 'the *real existence* of man and nature has become evident in practice, through sense experience, because man has thus become evident for man as the being of nature and nature for man as the being of men' (Marx *1977a*, pp. 107–108).

In other words, nature interests Marx primarily as an aspect of human activity, because 'nature taken in the abstract, *per se*, cut off from man, is *nothing* to man.' Therefore he could calmly state in *German Ideology*, as a thesis in which the whole of his historical materialism was summed up, that '*we know only one science, the science of history*.' History, Marx goes on, 'can be considered from two different aspects, the history of nature and the science of men. Yet these two aspects cannot be separated; as long as men exist, the history of nature and the history of man condition one another.' We can speak of conditioning in the sense that 'a

particular behaviour of man towards nature is conditioned by the form of society, and vice versa.' Again, 'the identity of man and nature appears also in the fact that *the limited behaviour of man towards nature conditions the limited behaviour between men and men, and the limited behaviour between men and men conditions their relations with nature*' (Marx *1977b*).

We are now in a position to appreciate the wide gulf not only between historical materialism and Feuerbach's materialism (and every other materialism in which the movement of history and nature do not coincide) but also between historical materialism and all the other philosophies in which nature enters into the consideration of history. Whether such concepts have a materialist or determinist orientation, as is the case with all the environmentalistic or naturalistic theories of history from Montesquieu to the varieties of social Darwinism (which are all ultimately based on the theory of man's adaptation to the conditions of nature or his environment, conceived as mechanically acting, external factors), or whether they are of the idealist type such as Hegel's notion of the 'geographical basis of world history', historical materialism is distinguished by its view of nature as a historically determined stage of social production. Even Engels, who was by no means free from glaring contradictions as regards man–environment relationships, severely criticized the theory of geographical environmentalism (which none the less held sway among the principal Marxist theoreticians of the Second *Internationale*, particularly Kautsky and Plechanov):

> The naturalistic conception of history as found, for instance, to a greater or lesser extent in Draper and other scientists, as if nature exclusively reacts on man, and natural conditions everywhere exclusively determined his historical development, is there one-sided and forgets that man also reacts on nature, changing it and creating new conditions of existence for himself. There is devilishly little left of 'nature' as it was in Germany at the time when the Germanic peoples immigrated into it. The earth's surface, climate, vegetation, fauna, and the human beings themselves have infinitely changed, and all this owing to human activity, while the changes

> of nature in Germany which have occurred in this period of time without human interference are incalculably small. (Engels *1976*, p. 231)

This of course does not mean that Marx and Engels underestimated the changes that have occurred in historical times due to the action of natural forces alone, and overestimated the subjective human factor. The fact is that not only were they well aware of them, but they also always held that they should not be viewed in isolation from the changes produced by human intervention, as the following typical extract from a letter written by Marx to Engels on 25 March 1868 shows:

> The book by Fraas (1847) *Climate and Flora over time. A contribution to their history* is very interesting because it shows that in *historic* times the climate and flora are changing. He is a Darwinist before Darwin and holds that even *species* have evolved in historical times. But he is also an agronomist. He believes that there occurs, *pari passu* with the intensity of cultivation, a loss of that 'humus' so dear to countrymen (which is why plants migrate from south to north) leading in the end to the formation of steppes. The effects of cultivation are at first beneficial but ultimately destructive owing to deforestation, etc. This author is a very learned philologist and an equally learned chemist, agronomist and so forth. The conclusion is that cultivation, if carried on *naturally and not consciously controlled*, results in the formation of deserts. (Naturally, as a bourgeois, he does not see that.) Take as example Persia, Mesopotamia and Greece, etc. Here again, then, an unconscious plug for socialism!

In this passage Marx reaffirms the historicity of nature and of the interaction of man with nature as an essential process; even those parts of the natural environment as yet untouched by human production, such as the virgin forest or the Pacific atoll, can in the last resort only be perceived within the categories of nature already appropriated by man. But he goes further; for the conclusion contains an element that must not be lost in that it introduces us into the heart of the other basic principle of historical materialism: *the naturalness of historical processes*.

When Marx speaks of the naturalness of history, as the counterpart of the historicity of nature, he means not only that human activity is in the last resort a part of nature (because men too are a part of the nature with which they interact), and that therefore nature is shaped simultaneously as an aspect of human activity and as the sum of everything that exists – a fact which has particular relevance against temptations to idealism. He also meant (as he said, for example, in the Preface to the first edition of *Capital*) that 'the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history.' This statement in turn has a double meaning. On the one hand, Marx meant that his scientific point of view (that of historical materialism) considers historical processes in their strict necessity, without falling into *a priori* constructions or psychological explanatory principles. On the other hand, there is another, more subtle, meaning, which besides being connected with the preceding one, renders it more definite. Marx also meant that 'the economic laws of every anarchic production, *without a plan*, stand over against men as objective laws on which they can have no influence, and hence in the guise of *laws of nature*.' Here we have the central core of Marx's analysis of capitalist society, and the thread running through every theoretical, historical, sociological, economic or other investigation by Marx, from his youthful writings up to *Capital*. It is the problem which Marx confronted, for example, in Book I of *Capital*, in the section entitled *The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof*, where in fact he says that in a fully developed (system of) goods production private work activities 'carried on independently of each other, turn out to be dependent on one another on every side as spontaneously developed branches of the social division of labour', and that in the exchange-relations between the products resulting from such labour, 'accidental and ever-fluctuating, the labour-time socially necessary for their production forcibly asserts itself, like an overriding *law of nature*', just as 'the law of gravity asserts itself when a house falls about our ears.' In other words,

the individual labours of the independent producers become links in the overall work of society only spontaneously and naturally, i.e. without the producers having a conscious plan, and the social relationships between the producers are concretized only in the exchange between the products as goods, values, and hence in the objective form of specific quantities of equal, abstract labour. In this way 'the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations . . . but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things' (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 78).

Here Marx comes back to the concept, which he adopted early on, of estrangement or alienation, which expresses the domination of the objects and institutions of society, produced by people, over the people themselves, who therefore become slaves of their own powers which, objectivized, have become uncontrollable forces of *nature*, more uncontrollable than the real forces of nature. This paradoxical spill-over of nature into history and of history into nature takes place in capitalist society which, whilst it enlarges the sphere of scientific and technological control over the forces of nature, creates a *social nature* or a *natural society* which sets itself against people and rules them more than *natural nature* would have dominated pre-capitalist societies. And it is precisely by its specific difference from the ancient social forms of production, so strikingly simpler and more transparent than the bourgeois sytem, that Marx defines the latter as 'a state of society in which the process of production has the mastery over man, instead of being controlled by him'.

We have no space adequately to develop the dual meanings of the naturalness of history which we have just formulated, as they are connected with some of the greatest themes of Marxism and with old and new philosophical and scientific debates, which would require at least as much space as we have so far covered. We can only list them here: the concept of the fetishism of goods and the concept of alienation or estrangement; the concept

of communism as the true reconciliation between nature and history (from the *Manuscripts* to *Capital*); the analysis of the relationships between nature and history in pre-capitalist societies and in capitalist societies; and lastly, from the methodological aspect, the debate about the neo-Kantian distinction between natural sciences and social sciences based on the denial of the possibility of formulating laws in the sphere of historico-social phenomena. The connection between these themes may appear tenuous, but in reality they belong to that complex of problems which we had to mention when referring to the natural character of human history. There is no space, either here or in the succeeding chapters, adequately to develop this theme.

Let us then pause briefly to consider methodology in general. Nothing can better illuminate Marx's conception of laws of history and laws of nature (laws of history operating naturalistically in history and vice versa) than his critique of Malthus's population theory. As was said earlier, this theory not only found a basis and confirmation in Ricardo's theory of diminishing returns (law of decreasing productivity) but also enjoyed wide acceptance in a version that combined in one 'natural law' the Darwinian *struggle for existence* with Malthus's theory of *overpopulation*. Marx denied, first of all, that there could be any scientific value in a general law of population:

> By producing the accumulation of capital, and to the extent to which it succeeds, the working class would thus of itself produce the means for its own pensioning-off or of its relative overpopulation. This is the *law of population* that is typical of the capitalist era and reflects its particular method of production. In fact, every method of production in history has its own law of population, applicable only to itself, dying with it and therefore having no value for history. An abstract, immutable law of population exists only for plants and animals and *only so long as they do not come under the influence of man.* (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, ch. 23)

So, then, there are no abstract, immutable laws either for the world of humans or for the world of nature since, as

Marx realized then, and we can say with greater certainty now, there are no longer any closed natural 'ecosystems' that are not in some way or another modified by man.

In the *Grundrisse*, in the course of a detailed examination of Malthus's theory, Marx observes that Malthus's mistake was to regard the multiplication of the human species (demographic development) and the reproduction of vegetative plants (means of subsistence) as *merely natural processes*. These processes exist in an abstract form which 'does not rest either on particular natural laws or on particular laws of history' and which 'abstracts from these particular laws of history movements of population, which, on the contrary, are the history of man's nature, are the *laws of nature*, but only laws of the nature of man at a particular point of historical development, with a development of the means of production determined by his own historical process.' In other words, by abstracting from the concrete laws of history, Malthus also abstracts from the concrete laws of nature or of the biology of man, which are inseparable from the particular development of the means of production brought about by the process of human history. In this way, by giving the natural increase of population an organic place in social production, Marx was anticipating the modern dictum that 'demographic changes are definitely not a biological "datum" with an independent variable' (Vilar 1970).

Marx, Engels and geography

It would be foolish to claim that the founders of historical materialism were the forerunners of geography; nor would such an accolade, even if merited, be of great honour. Endeavours so to interpret philological history are not justified either in the case of Marx or of Marx's contemporaries such as, say, Cattaneo. It is quite wrong to connect Marx's *oeuvre* with a fragmentation of science which took place predominantly towards the end of the nineteenth century and in a spirit which neither Marx nor Cattaneo

would have shared. This fragmentation resulted in 'an edifice of the sciences . . . which, with its terminology and definitions ever striving for innovation and with its scaffold-like frameworks of principles and of logical systematic essays having only a self-reference, is to a greater or lesser extent the fruit of what we may term the jesuit tradition' (Gambi 1973, p. 74).

We cannot therefore enclose and imprison Marx's thought within these narrow categories of economics, sociology, geography, anthropology and the like. Neither can we identify it with what is nowadays known as the interdisciplinary approach, since this is no more than a research method which attempts to counteract the disadvantages of the fragmentation of scientific studies by resorting to the formation of *teams* of scholars of different specializations. At best, this ends up by being what we might call a *non-disciplinary approach*, adumbrating a science of man no longer modelled on artificial, authoritarian disciplinary lines of demarcation but only on the problems of human societies.

Marx, then, was not a geographer, in the same way as he was neither a historian nor a sociologist, but in Marxism just as there is a theory of history and an analysis of society, there is also a geography, provided that by geography we primarily mean, with Gambi, the history of the cognitive conquest and regional development of the earth, *as a function of how society has come to be organized*.

We shall see in the rest of this chapter, and even more in the later ones, how there are in Marxism not only innumerable pointers to research but also a theory of geography and of the limits of geographical factors and conditions. It is therefore pertinent to sum up Marx's attitude (partly shared by Engels) towards that cultural and scientific material *which at that time constituted the sciences of the earth and of territory*.

The correspondence between Marx and Engels shows the interest with which they both followed the progress of scientific research, particularly during the thirty years between the middle of the nineteenth century and the 1880s. During this period the theory of evolution became accepted

in biology, zoology, geology and palaeontology; organic chemistry was born and the increase of productive capability advanced ever more closely in step with the progress of the natural sciences such as agrochemistry and the industrial applications of electricity, to name but two fields.

Between 1850 and 1860 it was chiefly Marx who studied the natural sciences, such as physics, cosmology, geology and physiology. Up to that time Engels had limited his scientific interests to physics and mathematics. But after 1870, partly on the suggestion of Marx, he began studying geology and gradually collected the materials for the *Anti-Duhring* and the *Dialectic of Nature*: the theoretical essays in which the Marxism of the Second *Internationale* was to find the strongholds of the socialist concept of the natural sciences (see Lefebvre, ed., 1973). Here I do not intend to embark on a detailed analysis of the attitude of Marx and Engels towards the natural sciences and to geography in particular. Suffice it to mention a few points which may shed light on some of the unresolved questions raised in Chapter 1, such as the problem of geographical determinism.

In this respect it was Darwin's *Origin of Species* which, by opening up new perspectives, stimulated the thinking of Marx and Engels. The latter, who read Darwin's book only a few days after it was published, realized at once how important it was and told Marx it was the most significant attempt yet made 'to prove that nature too undergoes historical development' (letter to Marx, 11 or 12 December 1859). About a year later Marx agreed that 'in spite of the very English want of elegance in the exposition, in this book is to be found the basis in natural history for our idea' (letter to Engels dated 19 December 1869). A few months later Marx went back to Darwin, whom he studied even more closely than Engels did, and made those pregnant remarks to Engels about the relationship between Malthus's theory and that of Darwin, and its significance for their ideology, which we quoted earlier. We can now underline those remarks with words by Engels, taken from a letter to Albert Lange, since they bring out the difference between a historian's and a

natural scientist's approach to the problems of society, including its geographical problems:

> I too was fascinated, on a first reading of Darwin, by the striking similarity between his description of plant and animal life and the theories of Malthus. I drew therefore only one conclusion different from yours, namely that the least admirable feature of the development of contemporary bourgeois society is the fact that it has not yet risen above the level of the economic patterns of the animal kingdom. For us, what are described as 'economic laws' are not permanent laws of nature, but historical laws that appear and disappear; and the law of modern political economy ... for us is only a résumé of the totality of laws and conventions by which bourgeois society continues to exist. ... That is why, for us, none of these laws, in so far as they express *purely bourgeois social relationships*, can be more ancient than modern bourgeois society. The laws which more or less faithfully reflect all previous history merely express social relationships that are common to all social situations based on class domination and exploitation ... (Letter from Engels to Lange, dated 29 March 1865)

This historical approach of Marxism also explains Marx's somewhat critical judgement concerning Auguste Comte. Comte's *synthetic, encyclopaedic* philosophy impressed his contemporaries, but was not enough to convince Marx that he had 'risen above' Hegel's encyclopaedism, considered better than 'all this positivist crap' (letter to Engels dated 7 July 1866). But Marx had a better opinion of P. Tremaux's book *Origine et transformations de l'homme et des autres êtres* (1865), stating that he represented 'a very big step forward from Darwin' both in the theory of natural evolution and because he provided many more illustrations from history and anthropology. Marx quoted with approval some theories of national character based on geology which are reminiscent of Hegelian determinism, as in the following passage: 'Tremaux maintains that on the basis of the predominant geological formations in Russia it is the Slav who becomes a tartar or a mongol . . .'; or this passage from Tremaux cited by Marx: 'Outside the great laws of nature, the efforts of men are simply calamitous, as witness the attempts of the Tsars to make Muscovites of the Polish

people: the same nature and the same abilities will reappear if the soil is the same' (letter to Engels dated 7 August 1866).

If this concession to geological determinism, which was politically motivated, can be interpreted as a residuum of Hegelianism, then we must beg to disagree. Our disagreement necessarily stems from the different ideas on the man–environment relationship which Marx had already worked out and was proceeding to apply in *Capital* (as we shall see later on) and which were in part expressed by Engels himself, who moreover on other occasions showed a much greater leaning towards geographical determinism than Marx.

Engels in fact appears firmly convinced that 'all Tremaux's theories are worthless' and he certainly pointed out how arbitrary were some of Tremaux's deductions regarding the history of mankind: 'It's funny to attribute the differences between a Basque, a Frenchman, a Breton and an Alsatian to the geological formation – is that why they speak four different languages as well?' (letter to Marx dated 2 October 1866). Marx eventually revised his own opinion on the matters most germane to this debate:

> I consider that Tremaux's basic idea on the *influence of the soil* is one which only needs stating to be accepted as fully scientific, quite independently of the way in which Tremaux expounds it. This is of course true even though Tremaux did not take into account certain possible historical modifications of this influence, among which I would equally include chemical changes brought about in the upper layers of the soil by agriculture, etc., and, more generally, the different influences exerted under various methods of production by natural features such as coal deposits and so on. (Letter to Engels dated 3 October 1866)

As we shall see shortly, this idea has not gained full acceptance even today. The last word has not yet been spoken on the subject of Marx's relations with the natural sciences and with Darwin. Anybody familiar with Marx's writings will know how, even in *Capital*, he often drew comparisons between his methodology and that of Darwin, so much so that it may not be inappropriate to speak of an influence of Darwin on Marx, provided, however, that we distinguish

Darwin from Darwinism and, in particular, from positivistic environmentalism. In the aspect which here concerns us most, that of geographical determinism, it has to be recognized that Darwin did not share Lamarck's theory of a direct influence by the environment. He noted that similar variations could be observed in individuals placed in different locations, and different variations in individuals placed in similar conditions.

The same applies to Morgan, one of the fathers of modern social science, and regarded as such by Marx and Engels. Undoubtedly Morgan was influenced by Darwin, but he too denied geographical determinism, which is to anthropology what 'Lamarckianism' is to zoology (cf. Terray 1972).

Starting with the *Paris Manuscripts*, in which geological knowledge is used for essentially philosophical purposes, Marx and Engels did in their scientific work constantly refer to the naturalists and study them attentively; in fact Engels later on even tended towards a speculative use of such material. But it is also true that the founders of historical materialism often made use of the accounts of travellers (though without marked enthusiasm for this kind of geographical literature), as did Adam Smith before them. 'In general', wrote Marx in a letter to Engels dated 13 February 1866, 'I never read descriptions of voyages except from a sense of professional duty.'

The occasion of that remark was the possibility of gaining some information about Japan in connection with Marx's researches into land revenues. In fact Marx and Engels had examined and evaluated the literature on the geography of Asia as early as 1853 and had exchanged in correspondence observations of great interest, on which their *theory of the method of production in Asia* is based. We can now introduce these observations as an example of Marxist reformulation of a 'typecasting' or 'historical creation' – *Asiatic despotism*. In the seventeenth century this was widely diffused and interestingly developed both by the French illuminists and the Scottish school of sociological historians. After that it received a far from superficial historical treatment in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, especially in relation

to China. Not until 1853, when he dealt with the problem because of the urgency of the political question of the British possessions in India, did Marx give proof of having gone one better. The epistolary exchange of comments on the history of Asia begins with Engels' reading of *The Historical Geography of Asia* by C. Forster, which contained some interesting information on the religious and social history of the Jews and the Arabs. Marx returned to these in a letter to Engels dated 2 July 1853, referring also to notes he had made on books he had read in 1851:

> I found your letter very interesting on the subject of the Jews and Arabs. Moreover it can be shown that
> (1) in all oriental peoples, as far back as history relates, there is a general relationship between the stable *settlement* by part of them and the rest who remain nomads;
> (2) at the time of Mohammed the flow of commerce from Europe to Asia had undergone a significant change and the cities of Arabia, which had taken a large part in trade with the Indies, etc., were commercially in decline, a fact which, in any event, helped to spur things on;
> (3) with regard to religion, the question can be resolved into one which is more general and therefore easier to answer: why does the history of the Orient *look like* a history of religions? On the formation of oriental cities no-one has written with greater clarity and conviction than the old François Bernier (who was for nine years Aureng-zebe's physician): *Voyages contenant la description du Grand Mogol, etc.* Bernier was right in considering the basic characteristic of all the phenomena of the East (he speaks about Turkey, Persia and Hindustan) to be that they knew *no private ownership of land*. This is the real key to oriental religion as well.

Engels in turn (having meanwhile begun to learn Persian) took up the question of the historical key to the East where Marx had left it, and advanced a hypothesis which clearly harks back to the *geographical determinism* of the eighteenth century:

> The absence of land ownership is in reality the key for the entire East. This is the seat of political and religious history. But why was it that the orientals never developed a system of land owner-

> ship, even a fuedal one? I believe that the reason has to do primarily with the climate, together with the conditions of the soil, and especially with the great desert areas which extend from the Sahara through Arabia, Persia, India and Tartary as far as the highest plateaux of Asia. In these areas artificial irrigation is the prime necessity for agriculture, and this can only be organized at the level of the commune, the province or by central government. In the East, government has always had only three ministries: finance (internal plunder), war (internal and external plunder) and *public works* to ensure reconstruction. In India the British government has dealt in a somewhat Philistine manner with the first two, and has completely put aside the third, and agriculture in India is falling into ruin. There, free competition is a complete failure. This artificial fertilization of the land, which stopped as soon as the water channels fell into ruin, explains the otherwise inexplicable fact that today areas that once were beautifully cultivated are utterly squalid and deserted. Such as Palmyra, Petra, the ruins of the Yemen, very many parts of Egypt, Persia and Hindustan. It explains the fact that a single war of devastation could depopulate a country for thousands of years and rob it of its entire civilization. This I believe to be the cause of the disappearance of trade in Arabia before Mohammed. . . . (Letter to Marx dated 6 June 1853)

We may note in passing that Engels' climatic determinism did not go so far as to explain the decline of the oriental civilizations by assuming climatic changes (as some American environmentalist geographers suggested later on) but leaves a wide margin of action to the *events* of history.

Meanwhile Marx was beginning to view the matter no longer in purely scientific terms but also in the political terms that had emerged during the debate in the Houses of Parliament on the British administration in India. He reached the conclusion that 'the annihilation of the indigenous industry by the action of the British' should be considered as a 'revolutionary' fact. He was able to reach this conclusion because he dissociated himself from Engels' climatic determinism and held that 'stagnant Asiatic despotism' was caused not only by the conditions of climate and soil which favoured large-scale public works as a basis for central government and a *sine qua non* of agriculture and trade, but also by

a rural population dispersed into small economically self-sufficient centres based on a domestic type of agriculture and manufacture. Both these circumstances – irrigation works controlled by the central government and the dispersion of the population into self-supporting villages – are thought to account for 'a unique social system . . . the so-called village system'. Since Marx did not attribute exclusive influence to abstract environmental factors, he saw, in the destruction by British commerce of the small-scale domestic industry on which the village system's economic equilibrium depended, the dissolution of the entire social system of Asian despotism.

In other words, by sticking to an analysis of Indian territorial organization (perhaps fortunately suggested by his sources), Marx did not overtly share the conception of Engels in which *climatic determinism and the events of history, or political history*, are closely intertwined; rather he centred his investigations upon the *socio-economic structures of the population* of the Indian countryside, without neglecting the role of the colonial powers, the forms of land ownership or the political and economic bonds linking the country to the cities, to the central government and to the markets of the world. All these are themes which Marx continued to treat in his writings, not only in relation to India but also to China, and which, on a wider and more theoretically committed canvas, he was to pursue in the *Grundrisse* and in *Capital*, drawing illustrations from Russia as well and producing a well-chosen series of observations, notes and hypotheses. It is only in recent times that these have awakened interest among students of social systems outside Europe. Geographers, with the sole exception of Yves Lacoste (see his *Géographie de sous-développement*, 1965), have still not turned their attention to the thoughts of Marx and Engels about modes of production in Asia.

The same could be said about the failure so far of geographers to appreciate the historical and geographical implications about another pre-capitalist social system – that of the Germanic community, which Marx described in detail in 1868 and which, having also its village system, linked up

with the reflections on Asiatic social forms, as this letter from Marx to Engels dated 14 March 1868 shows:

> At the British Museum, by the by, I made a detailed study of the last writings on the constitution of the German districts, villages, etc., by old Maurer . . . He gives abundant proof that private ownership of land emerged only later. The idiotic opinion of the Junkers of Westphalia, such as Möser, that the Germans settled each on his own, that is in isolated farms, and that they only later set up villages, regions and so on, is thoroughly discredited. It is interesting, at the present time, that the *Russian* way of redistributing land at certain intervals (in Germany it was once a year at first) was preserved in certain parts of Germany up to the eighteenth century and even the nineteenth. *My thesis that all over Europe the initial forms of land tenure followed the Asian or Indian pattern finds fresh confirmation here* (even though Maurer knew nothing of this thesis). . . . I also saw in Maurer that the change of opinion about the history and development of 'German' ownership, etc., started from the Danes, who, it seems, are going in for archaeology like mad things . . .

This passage, which really should be read after the more elaborate one quoted below, should be headed by the following comment from Engels (putting Marx's name with that of Maurer): 'Old Maurer's works are very nice; it is really surprising how much material already exists on this subject and how little the Herr Professors have been able to make of it.' The backwardness of academic science is indeed amazing. Faced with research findings pointing explicitly to a common theme in the history and archaeology of rural populations, they took nearly a century before doing anything about it. It is equally amazing to discover how hard it has been for researchers in Europe to free themselves from *ethnic prejudices*, in that they deterministically attributed forms of rural settlement to the original ethnic or racial groups. This residual ethnocentrism in their cultural outlook coloured their view of history and of the associated physical determinism, imagining races as virtually immutable and determinative natural conditions. This view is also found in Hegel's philosophy of history which Marx criticized and superseded. It is not surprising that Marx put so much scientific effort

into these parts of his inquiry. Although they are marginal with respect to *Capital*, i.e. to the project of a global analysis of the capitalist method of production, Marx was sufficiently endowed with a sense of history to realize that the social reality confronting him had many intertwined historical strands. His 'model' of capitalist society must make room for survivals from even the remote past, and must therefore be so constructed that it could explain the main features of rural population and agrarian systems – in other words, the history of the relations of production characteristic of pre-capitalist social systems. For this purpose he worked on *specific differences* by the *regressive method*, which was not applied until much later to the same subjects by historians such as M. Bloch. This is how Marx put it in a letter to Engels dated 25 March 1868:

> The same thing happens in the study of human history as happens in palaeontology. Some obvious matters are not examined even by first-class minds through a certain preconception-induced blindness. Later on, when the time is ripe, people are amazed to find traces everywhere of what they were not disposed to see. The first reaction to the French Revolution and to the illuminism associated with it was the natural one of seeing everything as medieval and romantic . . . The second reaction – which is in line with socialist thinking although the Herr Doktors simply could not see the connection – is to turn the gaze back beyond the Middle Ages, to the first age of any people. Then they are surprised to find, in the earliest things, the most recent ones . . . How blinded we all are by preconceptions! Even in my own district, on the Hunsruck mountains, the ancient German system persisted right up to a few years ago. I now remember that my own father spoke to me about it in connection with his law practice.
>
> Here's another example: just as the geologists, even the best of them, misinterpreted certain *facts*, so philologists of Grimm's calibre mistranslated the simplest Latin *phrases* because they were under the influence of Möser (who, I recall, noted with enthusiasm that among the Germans 'freedom' has never existed, but rather the fact that 'the air creates masters'). There is, for example, the well-known passage from Tacitus: *arva per annos mutant et superest ager*, which means that they exchange their

> fields (*arva*) – by drawing lots, whence the first that *sortes* (lots) appear in all the *leges barbarorum* – while the common land remains (*ager* in contrast to *arva*, as in *ager publicus*). But Grimm and the others translated it thus: 'Each year they cultivate fresh fields and there always remains some (uncultivated) land.'
>
> In the same way the passage *Colunt discreti ac diversi* was supposed to prove that the Germans have always lived like Westphalian landed gentry on individual estates. But in the same passage it says later on: *Vicos locant non in nostrum morem connexis et cohaerentibus aedificiis: suum quisque locum spatio circumdat* (they live in villages, in houses not adjacent and joined together as is customary amongst us: each family surrounds its abode with space), and such primitive villages exist to this day, just as described, here and there in Denmark.

The examples chosen are by no means out of the ordinary, nor do they indicate that Marx's research was directed to very recondite subjects. For, in fact, the theme of the relationship between society and nature, that is to say the theme that should be fundamental to the scientific edifice of human geography, surfaces in a more or less explicit or developed way whenever a basic problem is raised in *Capital*. Take the problem of land rent, which Marx had already taken up in 1846, in his *Poverty of Philosophy*, in relation to Ricardo's theories, which he castigated as being anti-historical and paying too little attention to geographical conditions:

> The location of the land, its closeness to the city and many other circumstances influence the lease and modify the rent . . . On the other hand, rent cannot be a *constant* index of the land's fertility . . . Modern chemistry is constantly being used to alter the nature of land, and in our own times geographical knowledge is beginning to *turn all former conceptions of relative fertility upside down*. . . . Fertility is not such a natural attribute as might be imagined; it is very closely bound up with social relationships.

Here we must again emphasize that Marx, in conformity with his idea of nature, regarded the fertility of the land as being 'closely bound up' with, and in fact largely determined by, social relationships and in particular by the application of scientific knowledge. This contrasts with the view of contemporary economists that it was a natural attribute,

unchangeable and determinative in explaining the movements of rents (the theory of decreasing fertility and rents). So strongly was Marx convinced of the correctness of his own interpretation that he continued his study of writings on agronomy and agrarian chemistry which, he said flatly in 1866, 'were of more importance than all the economists put together' (obviously as regards the agrarian question). He extended his researches from the British 'model' to the American one, and later on to the Russian one; indeed, to facilitate his researches he learned Russian in 1870. He reached very interesting conclusions both as regards the geographical dynamics of agrarian colonization and in relation to the historical and social dynamics of the development of capitalism in rural areas. These are points that cannot be fully developed here: they are simply mentioned to show how Marx and Engels were interested in geography.

On the first point – the geographical dynamics of agrarian colonization – Marx reached the conclusion that both Ricardo's theory, based on a transition from good land to bad land, and the contrary theory of Carey were in error as abstract laws because they were historically indeterminate. For in the course of history it is impossible to deny that 'unequally fertile types of land are always under cultivation at the same time.' Because of this, Marx noted that 'among the Germans, the Slavs and the Celts an extremely accurate distribution of portions of land of different fertility types was practised among the members of the community, which discouraged subsequent disputes about land allocation.'

As regards the specific question of whether, during the course of history, cultivation moves from more fertile to less fertile areas or vice versa, it is apparent that 'sometimes movement is taking place simultaneously in both directions, according to the combination of circumstances, while at other times one direction, or the other, may predominate for long periods' (letter from Marx to Engels dated 26 November 1869). Marx devoted a long passage to the various circumstances that explain the historic dynamics of the movement of cultivation in the section of *Capital* dealing with the *transformation of surplus profit into land rents*, i.e. when

analysing the capitalist mode of production; but, as always, he gives some interesting historical sidelights too on the pre-capitalist past. We shall confine ourselves to a few extracts by way of example of a typical 'Marxist' dissertation on geography.

Marx begins by explaining that equal amounts of capital invested in different parcels of land produce different results even if the parcels are equal in area:

> The two general causes of these unequal results – quite independent of capital – are:
>
> (1) *Fertility*. . . . (2) The *location* of the land. This is a decisive factor in the case of colonies [agricultural colonization] and in general determines the sequence in which plots of land can be cultivated. Furthermore, it is evident that these two different causes of differential rent – fertility and location – may work in opposite directions. A certain plot of land may be very favourably located and yet be very poor in fertility, and vice versa. This circumstance is important, for it explains how it is possible that bringing into cultivation the land of a certain country may equally well proceed from the better to the worse land as vice versa. Finally, it is clear that the process of social production in general has, on the one hand, the effect of evening out differences arising from location as a cause of ground rent, by creating local markets and improving locations by establishing communication and transportation facilities; on the other hand, it increases the differences in individual locations of plots of land by separating agriculture from manufacturing and forming large centres of production, on the one hand, while relatively isolating agricultural districts, on the other. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, pp. 650–651)

We shall return in later chapters to some of the specific problems raised in this analysis; for the moment we simply stress the part played by social production in bestowing value on the position of land parcels, and which can operate towards either greater equality or greater inequality in terms of geographical location. Similar considerations apply also to the fertility of the land:

> However, assuming the chemical composition and natural fertility in this respect to be the same for two plots of land, the actual effective fertility differs depending on whether these elements

> of plant nutrition are in a form which may be more or less easily assimilated and immediately utilized for nourishing the crops. Hence, it will depend partly upon chemical and partly upon mechanical developments in agriculture to what extent the same natural fertility may be made available on plots of land of similar natural fertility. Fertility, although an objective property of the soil, always implies an economic relation, a relation to the existing chemical and mechanical level of development in agriculture, and, therefore, changes with this level of development. Whether by chemical means (such as the use of certain liquid fertilizers on stiff clay soil and calcination of heavy clayey soils) or mechanical means (such as special ploughs for heavy soils), the obstacles which made a soil of equal fertility actually less fertile can be eliminated (drainage also belongs under this head). Or even the sequence in types of soil taken under cultivation may be changed thereby, as was the case, for instance, with light sandy soil and heavy clayey soil at a certain period of development in English agriculture. This shows once again that historically, in the sequence of soils taken under cultivation, one may pass over from more fertile to less fertile soils as well as vice versa. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 651)

Basing himself upon that premise, Marx was in a position to criticize 'the first presupposition wrongly attributed to differential yields (to which West, Malthus and Ricardo fully subscribed): namely, that they necessarily result in progressively downgrading the soil cultivated, leading to constantly decreasing agricultural yields.' More generally, he also made a place for the soil in human history and pointed out to historians the importance of those 'relationships between the spread of agriculture and the nature of the soil which are of exceptional interest to whoever wishes to get to the heart of the precise role of the land in the historical development of a nation.' But even this thesis of Marx has so far had little success in breaking the silence of historiographers regarding the 'land' factor; and that applies to geographers as well. The result is that 'there is still no such thing. . . . as systematic research on the subject which might illuminate this particular aspect of the interdependence of man and the land, with the consequence that no firm conclusions are yet possible' (Haussmann 1972, p. 73).

As regards the second point – the development of capitalism in the countryside – when Marx was urged, first by the criticisms of the economists, and then by the Russian revolutionaries, to say whether Russia would have to follow through the same stages already traversed by the more advanced nations in Western Europe, especially in relation to the overthrow of the traditional social order, he furnished in his reply the best proof of the anti-philosophical, anti-determinist and multidirectional nature of this theory of history and of the development of economic and social systems. In a letter to the editor of the *Orev-estvenniye Zapiski* he wrote:

> All I am trying to do in the chapter on *original accumulation* is to show the way in which the capitalist economic order issued forth from the womb of the feudal economic order. It followed the movement that produced the separation of producers from the means of production, transforming the former into a wage-earner (a proletarian in the modern sense of the word) and the latter into capital. In this whole story any revolution which serves as a lever for the advance of the capitalist class on its upward way is an epoch-making event. But this development is based on the expropriation of the workers. . . .
>
> Well then, what application to the case of Russia could my critic deduce from my historical sketch? Only this: if Russia aspires to become a capitalist nation to the same extent as the nations of Western Europe, and in recent years a lot of work has been put to that purpose, she will be unable to do so without first having transformed a large part of her peasants into proletarians: whereafter, caught in the whirlpool of the capitalist system, she, like the other non-communist nations, will have to bow to its inexorable laws. That's all. But for my critic, it isn't enough. He feels an irresistible urge to *change my sketch of the birth of capitalism in Western Europe into a theory of the philosophy of history about the universal course inescapably imposed on all peoples in whatever historical situation they are*, to arrive at last at the economic system which, with the greatest amount of social productive power, will ensure the utmost development of the whole man.

CHAPTER 4

From the 'Natural Societies' to 'Historical Society'

The history of the expropriation of man from nature, or the history of man's rule over nature?

The lengthy quotation which ended the preceding chapter is of more than merely methodological interest, for it introduces the concept of *original accumulation* in connection with the historical development of Russian peasant society. Thus it links up with the themes just touched upon of the evolution of pre-capitalist society, which allows us in turn to refer to one of the most brilliant and thought-provoking of Marx's writings, about a materialist basis for the history of geography as 'the story of how man moulds and reshapes the earth in human terms to re-create it as his own handiwork'.

I refer to the chapter in the *Grundrisse* entitled 'Forms preceding capitalist production'. If this is read as an introduction to the well-known chapter in *Capital* on *original accumulation*, it affords a coherent and, in my estimation, a completely fresh view of history as the story *of the separation of the producer or worker from his means of production and from his conditions of work*, or, in other words, *history as the story of man's expropriation from nature and from the primitive, natural community*. In geographical terms this can be expressed as the progressive dissociation of man from his environment or territory, following the transformation of the land from its use value to its exchange or commodity value.

In fact, as Marx also noted in the letter quoted at the end

of the last chapter, the capitalistic relationship of production can arise and be perpetuated only when there are in the market first producers, transformed into *freelance workers* (i.e. in free possession of their labour power and only in possession thereof because they have also been *'freed' beforehand from ownership of the objective conditions for implementing their work*); and secondly *capital*, as the owner of these conditions and means of work. The principal condition for capitalist production is precisely that both the labour force and the conditions and means of work and subsistence should become commodities and as such should be exchanged in order to produce new exchange values, reproducing on an ever-increasing scale the relationships of capitalism.

Besides that, land and increasingly large areas of the country become commodities, and exchange values are created from use values, that is to say they acquire that abstract, alienated existence that belongs to the world of commodities, in which labour appears not as the producer of use values (as specific labour), but, as a general measure of things, of products (as equal, abstract labour), in which social relations do not appear as personal relations but as relations between things.

Marx clearly expresses the historical significance of this separation of man from nature or from the natural conditions of production, which forms the negative, or contradictory, side of the history of society's scientific, technological and productive conquest over nature (or of the development of productive forces), when he writes:

> It is not the *unity* of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the *separation* between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this active existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital. (Marx *1973a*, p. 489)

In fact, as Marx further observed in the unpublished Chapter VI of *Capital*:

> Only when the working population has itself ceased to form part

> of the objective conditions of work, or to have access to the market as a producer of commodities, and instead of the products of its labour sells its labour itself, or rather its own capacity for labour – only then does production become, in all its length, breadth and depth, the production of commodities; only then does every product become commodities and the very material conditions of every individual sphere of production come into it as commodities.

In other words, only on the basis of capitalistic production can commodities be universalized and the use value be everywhere mediated by exchange value. Thus Marx is not contradicting himself when, bearing in mind not only history as the expropriation or separation of man from nature and from the community, but also the history of the progressive enlargement of man's technological and productive power over nature, he bases his distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist societies on the fact that in the former the relationship with nature prevails through *ownership of land*, whereas in the latter 'the social element, historically produced, is predominant' through the control of *capital*. In fact:

> In all these forms – in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economic order, and where the economic aim is hence the production of use values, i.e. the *reproduction of the individual* within the specific relation to the commune in which he is its basis – there is to be found: (1) appropriation, not through labour, but presupposed to labour; appropriation of the natural conditions of labour, of the *earth* as the original instrument of labour as well as its workshop and repository of raw materials. The individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being his; [relates] to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the latter realizes itself; the chief objective condition of labour does not itself appear as a *product* of labour but is already there as *nature*; on one side the living individual, on the other the earth, as the objective condition of his reproduction; (2) but this *relation* to land and soil, to the earth, as the property of the labouring individual . . . is instantly mediated by the naturally arisen, spontaneous, more or less historically developed and modified presence of the individual as *member of a commune*. . . . (Marx *1973a*, p. 485)

As regards the last-named relationship, Marx offers some further aids to a more accurate definition of these societies based on nature:

> These *natural conditions of existence*, to which he relates as to his own inorganic body, are themselves double: (1) of a subjective, and (2) of an objective nature. He finds himself a member of a family, clan, tribe, etc. – which then, in a historic process of intermixture and antithesis with others, takes on a different shape; and, as such a member, he relates to a specific nature (say, here still, earth, land, soil) as his own inorganic being, as a condition of his production and reproduction. As a natural member of the community he participates in the communal property, and has a particular part of it as his possession . . . His property, i.e. the relation to the natural presuppositions of his production as belonging to him, as *his*, is mediated by his being himself the natural member of a community. (Marx *1973a*, p. 490)

Now what does all this mean? Essentially, two things. Parimarily it means that in pre-capitalist forms derived from the primitive community, territory, the land, man's storehouse and workplace, is so organically linked to man as to constitute *his own inorganic nature* – 'an existence *presupposed* to his activity, and not merely as a result of it, a presupposition of his activity just like his skin, his sense organs, which of course he also reproduces and develops, etc., in the life process, but which are nevertheless presuppositions of this process of his reproduction'. Secondly it means that man does not enter into this relationship with the earth as an isolated individual but as a member of a community, and that his appropriation or ownership of land is mediated through a community: 'his relation to the objective conditions of labour is mediated through his presence as a member of the commune; at the same time, the real presence of the commune is determined by the specific form of the individual's property in the objective conditions of labour' (Marx *1973a*, p. 486).

In this way Marx also lays the foundation for that original, concrete historical dialectic between nature, forms of appropriation (or production) and community which explains the various social economic forms (and their

particular histories) which precede the formation of the capitalist relationship:

> These different forms of the commune or tribe members' relation to the tribe's land and soil – to the earth where it has settled – depend partly on the natural inclinations of the tribe, and partly on the economic conditions in which it relates as proprietor to the land and soil in reality, i.e. in which it appropriates its fruits through labour, and the latter will itself depend on climate, physical make-up of the land and soil, the physically determined mode of its exploitation, the relation with hostile tribes or neighbour tribes, and the modifications which migrations, historic experiences, etc., introduce. (Marx *1973a*, p. 486)

The 'natural conditions' of labour and production

For the present we will refrain from pursuing a sequential 'descriptive history' of the separation of man from nature and from the primitive community, and the outlines of the historical sequence of pre-capitalist societies which Marx provides in the *Grundrisse*. However, if only to avoid misunderstandings, let us pause at the passage just quoted and clarify that dependence on climate and the elements of the soil which Marx regards as factors conditioning the exploitation of the land *in pre-capitalist societies*. It is clear that here too Marx sees the natural, environmental factors as conditions among other conditions, variables among other variables, and not as overriding, unchangeable factors as geographical determinism would have them; that is to say, he sees them not abstractly but as historically determined. It is no accident that Marx emphasizes the influence of the factors of climate and soil *in relation to pre-capitalist societies*, i.e. in relation to agrarian societies, in which *the relation to nature* is more dominant than the *historico-social* factor, which is decisive in capitalist society. Engels did too, though in him we detect dangerous leanings towards determinism.

To understand what Marx means by relationship with nature and the specific difference, from this point of view,

between pre-capitalist societies and capitalist society, we have to refer to the examination of the connection between nature and work, and of the natural conditions of productivity, which Marx conducts in *Capital*.

At the very beginning of *Capital*, when analysing the concept of a commodity and of its two factors, use-value and labour-value, Marx introduced the concept of the 'productive power of labour' as one of its determining factors. This can be reduced to the more general concept of productive powers in the fundamental dialectic: productive powers — relations of production:

> The value of a commodity would therefore remain constant, if the labour-time required for its production also remained constant. But the latter changes with every variation in the productiveness of labour. This productiveness is determined by various circumstances, amongst others, by the average amount of skill of the workmen, the state of science, and the degree of its practical application, the social organization of production, the extent and capabilities of the means of production, and by physical conditions. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 47)

Vilar has commented upon this passage, drawing attention to a number of points which are very germane to the topic of this book:

> I wish to stress that with his last statement, bringing in *natural situations*, Marx introduced a number of suggestions, which he rapidly defined, about the observation of *short-term changes of productivity* (when speaking about agricultural production heavily influenced by changes in the weather). In this way he came up against the whole socio-economic problem of the 'irregularity of yields' in the course of history. He also touched upon the problem of the differential productivity of mines, on which the history of monetary equilibria and the movement of prices rests. In the last resort this introduces, as historical factors at a more general level, the problem of resources, of distances, *in fact the whole of geography*. (Vilar 1970, p. 221)

By *natural situations* Marx meant not only weather and its effects on harvests, important though these are in the study of agrarian pre-capitalist societies, as we shall see later on.

Neither did Marx refer just to the natural conditions of mine productivity. In fact, *the whole of geography* finds a place in Marx's scientific conspectus, inseparable from history and from the history of technology. 'Technology reveals man's active behaviour towards nature'; and, as such, not even technology can be thought of as having a special history, independent of the geography and history of work and of the relationships of production:

> A critical history of technology would show how little any of the inventions of the eighteenth century are the work of a single individual. Hitherto there is no such book. Darwin has interested us in the history of Nature's Technology, i.e. in the formation of the organs of plants and animals, which organs serve as instruments of production for sustaining life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of all social organization, deserve equal attention? And would not such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the former, but not the latter? Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 352 note)

After addressing the problem by way of an analysis of the components of a commodity, Marx embarks determinedly upon the study of the relationships between nature and labour in the course of his analysis of the production of surplus value. In order to get at the 'specific difference', the historically determined way in which the nature–labour complex occurs in capitalist production, Marx begins, using a method habitual to him, by isolating the *simple process of labour*; that is to say, he considers labour 'independently of any particular form of society'. Here is the resulting definition of labour:

> Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates and controls the material reactions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural

> forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers, and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 173)

Marx first distinguishes human labour from animal and instictive forms of labour by the criterion of purposiveness and suitability to its purpose. This is an interesting distinction for a 'philosophical' definition of the unity-in-difference of man and nature. He then singles out the 'moments' or simple factors of the process of labour as being the *object of labour* and the *means of labour*. The world, or the globe of land and water, is the original *universal object* of labour, both because it offers *directly* objects of work and ready-made means of subsistence, and because it offers *indirectly* objects of work *filtered through previous labour*, already reduced to starting materials (such as mineral already extracted, ready for the washing process). In general the relation between man and nature is not a direct object–labour relationship, but rather an indirect one mediated by the *means of labour*, precisely because 'leaving aside the provision of ready-to-eat means of subsistence such as fruit, in which the only working instruments he uses are the organs of his body, the labourer does not directly take possession of the object of labour, but of the means of labour.' Thus it is that:

> Nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his own bodily organs, adding stature to himself in spite of the Bible. As the earth is his original larder, so too it is his original tool house. It supplies him, for instance, with stones for throwing, grinding, pressing, cutting, etc. The earth itself is an instrument of labour, but when used as such in agriculture implies a whole series of other instruments and a comparatively high development of labour. No sooner does labour undergo the least development than it requires specially prepared instruments. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 175)

Here then we find, in real terms, the concept of the necessity of human mediation of nature on the earth; of the active role of labour in the creation and use of the means of

labour. But we have also something that seems to me even more interesting for our present purpose. In making this fundamental distinction between the object of labour and the means of labour (or between *what* is worked on and *how* it is worked on), Marx opens up new avenues of research which have only in recent years engaged attention. And with the rediscovery of the *history of material culture* has come the reappraisal of the archaeology of the instruments of labour, of which Marx himself laid the foundations by taking account of the first scientific results of prehistoric archaeology in Denmark:

> Relics of bygone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economic forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 175–176)

This is a field of research as yet largely untouched, at least as regards historic times and in particular in pre-industrial rural societies. The lesson which Marx drew from prehistoric archaeology and the invitation to historians which it contained are still of topical importance:

> However little our written histories up to this time notice the development of material production, which is the basis of all social life, and therefore of all real history, yet prehistoric times have been classified in accordance with the results, not of so-called historical, but of materialistic investigations. These periods have been divided, to correspond with the materials from which their implements and weapons were made, viz., into the stone, the bronze, and the iron age. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 175 footnote)

Among the means of the work process in a wider sense, Marx included all *objective conditions* of the same process: 'Once more we find the *earth itself* to be a universal instrument of this sort, for it furnishes a *locus standi* to the

labourer and a *field of employment* for his activity.' Marx included workshops and other work buildings, canals, roads, etc., as being essential to the execution of work even though not direct parts of the work process: all of them are, nevertheless, the fruits of previous human labour.

At this point the work process culminates in its result – *the product*, defined as 'a use value, natural material appropriated to human needs by means of a change of form'. If the work process is looked at from the viewpoint of the product, then the *means of production* include not only the means of work and the object of work, but also the input of the *products* of previous work processes. This latter proposition contains a concept that is of prime importance for us and which Marx was never tired of emphasizing: the conditions and means of production of material life are not natural gifts but, save for a few limited exceptions, have already been produced by human labour even when at first sight this appears not to be so:

> With the exception of the extractive industries (in which the material for labour is provided immediately by Nature), such as mining, hunting, fishing and agriculture (so far as the latter is confined to breaking up virgin soil), all branches of industry manipulate raw material, objects already filtered through labour, already products of labour. Such is seed in agriculture. Animals and plants, which we are accustomed to consider as products of Nature, are in their present form not only products of, say, last year's labour, but the result of gradual transformation, continued through many generations, under man's superintendence, and by means of his labour. But in the great majority of cases, instruments of labour show, even to the most superficial observer, traces of the labour of past ages. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 177)

We can omit the further definitions regarding other aspects of productive labour such as raw material, productive consumption, etc., and check them again through Marx's comments, because we have to go beyond the necessary but still abstract study of the process alone in order to pose the relationship of man to nature or of nature to work in a historically determined way:

> The labour-process, resolved as above into its simple elementary factors, is a human action with a view to the production of use-values, appropriation of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature; it is the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, or rather, is common to every such phase. It was, therefore, not necessary to represent our labourer in connection with other labourers: man and his labour on one side, Nature and its materials on the other, sufficed. As the taste of the porridge does not tell you who grew the oats, no more does this simple process tell you of itself what are the social conditions under which it is taking place, whether under the slave-owner's brutal lash, or in the anxious eye of the capitalist, whether Cincinnatus carries it on in tilling his modest farm or a savage in killing wild animals with stones. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 179)

We know by now the limitation of geography. The fundamental flaw in the logic and ideology of so many geographical studies, both regional and general, on *Man and the Earth* consists in a failure (often a wilful failure) to see the need to overcome the abstraction not tied down to place and time. In these studies, relationships of people to territory which are historically determined (because they generally refer to the capitalist method of production) are passed off as natural perennial conditions of the organic interaction between man and nature, of human life. This is an inevitable result, seeing that even if all the active, creative value of labour were gathered in, and the limitations of a deterministic conception of the relation between man and nature were rejected, even then 'this definition of productive labour as seen from the viewpoint of the simple work process [would not] suffice to [define] the capitalist process of production,' or of any other mode of production.

Therefore the prime necessity is to view the forces of production in the social relationships of production – that is within a socio-economic set-up in which all the components of nature, past labour, present labour, social classes, the state, legal relationships, the market, etc., are integrated and combined in a dialectic of which, as Marx explicitly taught,

the limits must be defined each time. This dialectic should not abolish the real difference of each situation but must take into account the unequal relationship of material production with the development of the relationships of production and with cultural, artistic and other such factors (for example the relationship of Roman private law with modern production).

We now see the type of relationship between nature and society in the specifically capitalist process of production, which is defined by Marx as the production of *surplus value* for the capitalist who owns the means of production. The definition of productive labour 'deduced from the nature of the material production itself is no longer adequate to that kind of production'. In fact, whereas on the one hand the definition is enlarged to take account of the co-operative nature of the work process, on the other hand it is narrowed down because in capitalist production 'only the workman who *produces surplus value for the capitalist* is productive.' This is because, as already explained, the concept of a productive worker cannot imply 'merely a relation between work and useful effect, between labourer and product of labour, but also a specific social relation of production, a relation that has sprung up historically' (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 177).

None the less, to understand the formation of *surplus value* we have to start from *surplus labour*, i.e. from a certain level of productivity which allows the worker to produce more than he needs himself 'for the preservation of himself and his species'. But this does not mean that the possibility of surplus labour is to be thought of as a fact or a gift of nature. It involves definite historical and social conditions. Only after labour has attained a certain degree of 'sociability' can relationships emerge in which one person's surplus labour becomes the means of existence for another. And conversely, the proportion of the members of society living from the labour of others increases in step with the progress of the productive power of society.

> Apart from the degree of development, greater or less, in the form of social production, the productiveness of labour is fettered

> by physical conditions. These are all referable to the constitution of man himself (race, etc.,) and to surrounding Nature. The external physical conditions fall into two great economic classes: (1) natural wealth in means of subsistence, i.e. a fruitful soil, waters teeming with fish, etc., and (2), natural wealth in instruments of labour, such as waterfalls, navigable rivers, wood, metal, coal, etc. At the dawn of civilization, it is the first class that turns the scale; at a higher stage of development, it is the second. Compare, for example, England with India, or in ancient times, Athens and Corinth with the shores of the Black Sea. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 480)

Here, in addition to the usual suggestions for that history of the economic conquest of the Earth which Marx did not have any plans to write, we again encounter the invitation to consider the natural conditions of productivity as historically and socially conditioned. Take as an example *natural requirements*, a concept by which Marx means that amount of the means of subsistence that is needed to sustain the labourer, meaning therefore food, clothing, heating, shelter, etc. Although these will clearly 'vary according to the climatic and other physical conditions of his country', it is wrong to disregard, as geographers tend to do, the fact that:

> The number and extent of his so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore to a great extent on the degree of civilization of a country, more particularly on the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which, the class of free labourers has been formed. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 168)

In much the same vein Marx corrected the ancient chronicler and geographer Diodorus Siculus, who based a mechanical deduction as to the population density in Egypt on a consideration of the ease of production of the essential means of subsistence there, owing to the favourable environment, and proceeded to explain therefrom the huge works of architecture. Marx, by contrast, approached the subject by linking together the level of the natural needs in the society, the environmental conditions, and the *minimum necessary work* for survival, and deduced the possibility of the

monumental buildings of Egypt not on the basis of the population density but on that of the availability of a workforce for these projects:

> Just as the individual labourer can do more surplus labour in proportion as his necessary labour-time is less, so with regard to the working population. The smaller the part of it which is required for the production of the necessary means of subsistence, so much the greater is the part that can be set to do other work. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 480)

Lastly we come to the part played by the natural conditions of production in capitalist production. 'Once we take as our starting-point capitalist production, all other circumstances remaining equal, and given the length of the working day, the amount of the surplus labour will vary with the natural conditions of work, and, in particular, with the fertility of the soil', as happens in every type of production. But this universal common factor (taking no account of the specific capitalist economic and social organization) cannot be turned into a determinisitic principle or into a deterministic geographical explanation of the rise of capitalist production:

> But it by no means follows from this that the most fruitful soil is the most fitted for the growth of the capitalist mode of production. This mode is based on the dominion of man over Nature. Where Nature is too lavish, she 'keeps him in hand, like a child in leading strings'. She does not impose on him the necessity to develop himself. It is not the tropics with their luxuriant vegetation, but the temperate zone that is the mother-country of capitalism. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 481)

Here we may note in passing that Marx partly stands on its head the idea, expressed by Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, that 'in places where nature is too luxuriant, the liberation [of man] is made more difficult . . . in those zones need can never cease, never be far away: man is perpetually obliged to turn his attention to nature.'

We saw earlier, in connection with the absolute fertility of the soil, the importance Marx attached to the mastery of man over nature. Moreover, in the same paragraph of *Capital* Marx gives many examples designed to show 'the need for

social control of a natural power' defined as 'the most decisive feature in the history of industry'. We would however stress the way in which Marx viewed the natural characteristics of the environment as a function of the organization of society which *mediates the abstract relationship* between man and the environment: 'It is not the mere fertility of the soil, but its differentiation, the variety of its natural products and the changes of the seasons, which form the physical basis for the social division of labour, and which, by changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on to the manipulation of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of labour.'

We shall return later to the social division of labour as a factor in the spatial organization of society. Here we must hasten to record the conclusion of Marx's discourse in which, be it noted, the geographical difference never conceals the historical difference:

> Favourable natural conditions alone give us only the possibility, never the reality, of surplus-labour, nor, consequently, of surplus-value and a surplus-product. The result of difference in the natural conditions of labour is this, that the same quantity of labour satisfies requirements, consequently, that under circumstances in other respects analogous, the necessary labour-time is different. These conditions affect surplus-labour only as natural limits, i.e. by fixing the points at which labour for others can begin. In proportion as industry advances, these natural limits recede. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 482)

Marx's final conclusion under this head is tinged with irony: for the polemical charge which he laid against philosophers and economists who 'thought that it was an innate quality of human labour to furnish a surplus product' can be turned against the old and new adherents of geographical determinism – and the latter are more numerous than might be thought:

> Suppose . . . an eastern bread-cutter requires 12 working hours a week for the satisfaction of all his wants. Nature's direct gift to him is plenty of leisure time. Before he can apply this leisure time productively for himself, a whole series of historical events is

> required; before he spends it in surplus labour for strangers, compulsion is necessary. If capitalist production were introduced, the honest fellow would perhaps have to work six days a week, in order to appropriate to himself the product of one working day. The bounty of Nature does not explain why he would then have to work 6 days a week, or why he must furnish 5 days of surplus-labour. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 482–483)

The heart of the matter from the viewpoint of the specific capitalist mode of production is that 'not only does the historically developed social productiveness of labour, but also its natural productiveness, appear to be productiveness of the capital with which that labour is incorporated' (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 483).

Marx also stated clearly in the section of the second volume of *Capital*, devoted to the *circulation of capital*, that natural conditions never operate outside a given mode of production and that therefore their consequences can be understood only when they are considered as components or variables forming part of a given set of productive relationships. Indeed, he remarked that particularly in agriculture, though sometimes in industry too, natural conditions necessitate certain work cycles which, because they cannot be shortened by the use of machinery or of more workers, prolong the circulation-time of capital as compared with industry in general, or with certain sectors of industry. This brings about a whole chain of disadvantageous circumstances in agriculture, and a considerable waste of the productive forces of society. In this connection Marx quoted the example of farm tenants in England, producers of beef cattle, who, finding themselves in need of liquid funds and unable to speed up the turnround of time of the cattle, are compelled to sell them or slaughter them 'before they have reached the economically normal age, to the great detriment of agriculture'. He also speculates upon the even worse difficulties that such a state of affairs may bring about for the small farmers on the Continent, for the same reason (Marx *1965*, vol. 2, p. 239).

Natural conditions also give rise to a difference, which is sometimes substantial, between the work time and the

production period. This happens whenever the production period exceeds the work time because the work process is interrupted and the unfinished product is left to the action of natural processes, such as drying. Whereas in industry this difference is often overcome (at least in part) by means of technological improvements, thus speeding up the circulation-time of capital, in agriculture it remains a stumbling-block, putting it at a disadvantage compared with industry, especially when the latter has done away with the ancient defences which rural pre-industrial societies had erected against the resultant underemployment particularly in the winter months.

> The difference between production time and working time becomes especially apparent in agriculture. In our moderate climates the land bears grain once a year. Shortening or lengthening the period of production (for winter grain it averages nine months) itself depends on the alternation of good and bad seasons, and for this reason cannot be accurately determined and controlled beforehand as in industry proper. Only such by-products as milk, cheese, etc., can steadily be produced and sold in comparatively short periods. On the other hand, working time data are as follows: 'The number of working days in the various regions of Germany, with due regard to the climatic and other determining conditions, will for the three main working periods presumably be: for the spring period, from the middle of May, about 50 to 60 working days; for the summer period, from the beginning of June to the end of August, 60 to 80; and for the autumn period, from the beginning of September to the end of October, or the middle or end of November, 55 to 75 working days. For the winter, only the jobs customary for that time, such as the hauling of manure, wood, market goods, building materials, etc., are to be noted.' (Marx *1965*, vol. 2, p. 244)

Having derived average labour times from F. Kirchof, a German agronomist whose work he made considerable use of and was quoting here, Marx could now see the influences of climate and how traditional peasant societies, in particular that of Russia, brought about the forced shortening of the agricultural work cycle.

> The more unfavourable the climate, the more congested is the working period in agriculture, and hence the shorter is the time in which capital and labour are expended. Take Russia for

> instance. In some of the northern districts of that country field labour is possible only from 130 to 150 days throughout the year, and it may be imagined what a loss Russia would sustain if 50 out of the 65 millions of her European population remained without work during the six or eight months of the winter, when agricultural labour is at a standstill. Apart from the 200,000 peasants who work in the 10,500 factories of Russia, local domestic industries have everywhere developed in the villages. There are villages in which all the peasants have been for generations weavers, tanners, shoemakers, locksmiths, cutlers, etc. . . . By the way, this domestic industry is being pressed more and more into the service of capitalist production. The weavers for instance are supplied with warp and woof directly by merchants or through middlemen. . . . We see here that the divergence of the production period from the working period, the latter being but a part of the former, constitutes the natural basis for the combination of agriculture with subsidiary rural industries, and that these subsidiary industries in turn offer points of vantage to the capitalist, who intrudes first in the person of the merchant. When capitalist production later accomplishes the separation of manufacture and agriculture, the rural labourer becomes ever more dependent on merely casual accessory employment and his condition deteriorates thereby. For capital, as will be seen later, all differences in turnover are evened out. Not so for the labourer. (Marx *1965*, vol. 2, pp. 244–245)

Marx concludes by quoting the views of the English economist T. Hodgskin concerning the dependence into which agriculture falls compared with the greater part of industry proper (mining, transport and so on), characterized by a more regular and rapid circulation of capital. Then, in a reference to E. De Laveleye, he adds:

> All methods by which in agriculture on the one hand the expenditure for wages and instruments of labour are distributed more evenly over the entire year, while on the other the turnover is shortened by raising a greater variety of crops, thus making different harvests possible throughout the year, require an increase of circulating capital advanced in production, invested in wages, fertilizers, seed, etc. This is the case in the transition from the three-field system with fallow land to the system of crop rotation without fallow. It applies furthermore to the *cultures dérobées* of Flanders. (Marx *1965*, vol. 2, pp. 246–247)

Here we encounter a whole series of problems, also typically geographical; for example, the relationship between rotations, systems of agriculture and quality of farmland, to which we have already referred when commenting on M. Bloch. There is no lack of writings on these problems by Marxist theorists (K. Kautsky's *Agrarfrage* springs to mind, in which he has a chapter on the three-field system). I shall therefore confine myself to a brief reference to just two different but equally important avenues worthy of further research.

The first one relates to the populists in Russia, who took their stand on the economic inferiority and subordination of agriculture compared with modern industry when rejecting or condemning the spread of capitalism in rural Russia. N.F. Danielson and V.P. Vorontsov in particular claimed that the worsening of the conditions of rural people, the contraction of the internal market and the dissipation of the productive powers of society were due to what was known as the 'liberation of the winter season' of agriculture, traditionally occupied in domestic manufacture and industry. (Both Danielson and Vorontsov were very well acquainted with Marx's works; indeed, the former had translated *Capital* and corresponded with Marx.) This theory was criticized by Lenin in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (in which, incidentally, he makes a point of commenting on the territorial changes brought about by capitalism in the whole of the Russian region). Lenin linked Marx's statements which, as was said above, were used by the Russian populists, with Marx's theory of capitalistic surplus population. He also referred to the opportunity that only capitalism could provide for agriculture in Russia of overcoming the handicaps arising from the short and irregular periods of work and production. Marx had taken the Flemish model as his example.

The second avenue of research that I would like to mention has recently been reopened by the Polish economic historian W. Kula who, following Marx and Lenin, has reconstructed a historical model of the feudal economic system. We can make use of it here both to introduce the problems with which we shall be dealing in the next chapter

and also to verify and develop the principle already laid down that natural conditions and climatic influences are always historically determined, or that they take on a profoundly different meaning according to the mode of production in which they occur.

We have already seen how Marx opened up interesting themes of research on the relationship between climate and agricultural production, both in a passage in *Capital* highlighted by Vilar and quoted near the beginning of this chapter, and also on the subject of the time of production which has just been discussed. A recent book by Kula (*1976*) intelligently follows up these clues, yielding findings of considerable interest both to historians and to geographers. In substance, Kula demonstrates that on a typical feudal agricultural estate it was the climate, or more particularly seasonal weather patterns, which exercized in the short run a more decisive influence than either the market or the trend of prices, not only on the overall volume of production but also on the amount of marketable surplus. In the feudal world, both the lord's reserve and the demesne servant working the glebe were dependent not on the level of prices but on the size of the harvests and hence, in the final analysis, on the *climate*, for weather is the cause of any large differences between one year's harvest and the next, and these may be more sudden and marked than price changes. In the world of capitalism, on the other hand, it is the ups and downs of prices, which are primarily due to the 'economic cycle', that decisively influence the return to producers. This in turn means that on a feudal farm, unlike a capitalist one, the 'good' years for the peasant are those in which prices are low, because harvests are more abundant. In such years the peasant may be encouraged to invest in the reserve of the lord of the manor. The peasant's opportunities for investment do not, therefore, depend on the market situation.

There is no space to quote all the passages by which Kula reaches these conclusions by reasoned deduction: the reader is recommended to read the Polish historian's excellent works (*1972a* and *1976*). Here I can only emphasize how these

deductions are linked in a logical sequence which results in a Marxist definition of feudal society as a 'natural society', meaning one in which 'dependence on nature' is dominant, in contrast to a capitalist society in which 'the historically produced social element' prevails. In Kula we find this contrast expressed in the transition from the element *climate* to the *economic cycle* as factors governing the same processes in two different epochs of the economic formation of society. In fact, Kula reconstructs an entire logical sequence as affecting the feudal peasant: standard of living – surplus product – volume of production – area under cultivation – balance of manpower – topography, according to which each variable is dependent upon the next factor in the sequence. On the assumption of an upward trend of manpower, the standard of living comes to depend principally on the climate (this being the major determinant of the volume of production), and on *topography* as governing the extent to which the area under cultivation can be enlarged, this in turn being the chief means whereby productive powers can be increased in an extensive rural economy. It should be pointed out that Kula means by topography, or rather by topographical potential, 'proximity, especially the immediate proximity of uncultivated land: unused communal pasturage, woodland, or forest, etc.'.

Let us straightaway admit that, expressed in these terms, Kula's model looks like a deterministic one. But in reality it is not, because the elements in the logical sequence do not automatically follow from one another in the neat way in which we listed them. Kula sees the 'economic system' in more general terms as 'a structure, a whole the parts of which are determined interactively'. Hence it is quite possible for some of the topographical and geographical factors to be socially mediated. From this aspect Kula has both pointed out the defences erected by society against the periodic recurrence of lean years, and also indicated fresh avenues of research, such as the influence of weather patterns on social history. But beyond these observations on method, which although legitimate are in some danger of becoming tautological, we have to recognize that Kula's model, like all good

models, accounts for the working of the feudal economy and its adaptation to certain independent variables, one of the most important of which is the 'cycle of harvests', a factor which is replaced in the capitalist economy by the 'business cycle'. We have also to recognize that the cycle of harvests comprises both reversible elements, such as the productive capacity of the soil, and irreversible, cumulative elements of a social nature such as the process of accumulation of rents and yields and changes in population structure relating primarily to long-term population dynamics.

Looking at some details of more particular interest to us, we may note that Kula did not provide an adequate historical account of the 'geographical' variables forming part of his system, which remains in essence an economic model. Some critics have in fact observed that Kula does not lay sufficient emphasis on the socio-spatial dimension of peasant society and tends to see it in terms of individual productivity. Thus he says nothing about the role of polyculture, or about the combination between agriculture and domestic industry, or about the community structures of the village (all of which, by the way, Marx highlighted). So he is in danger of 'modernizing' the feudal system. This failure to give enough of a historical dimension to the socio-spatial aspects of the peasant economy may also be responsible for the representation of the feudal system in the abstract economic terms of simple reproduction, that is to say of a system consisting of an agrarian society without any development, stagnating within an economic organization whose only aim is one of self-perpetuation, making up for any losses occasioned by war or weather but never managing to increase production and develop its own productive powers until they triggered a process of economic take-off.

In this sense Marx's prospect for an analysis of pre-capitalist society, which with its rigorous historicism has no room for mere self-perpetuation, remains largely unfulfilled, though Kula's rigorous work on models has certainly gone some way to reopen an avenue of research already vigorously trodden by Marx but nowadays more noted for historical erudition than for reasoned historicism.

Geographical conditions of reproduction and accumulation in pre-capitalist societies

> In economic forms of society of the most different kinds, there occurs not only simple reproduction, but, in varying degrees, reproduction on a progressively increasing scale. By degrees more is produced and more consumed, and consequently more products have to be converted into means of production. This process, however, does not present itself as an accumulation of capital, nor as the function of a capitalist, so long as the labourer's means of production, and with them, his product and means of subsistence, do not confront him in the shape of capital. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 560)

Marx here introduces two basic ideas – that of simple reproduction (self-perpetuation or regeneration) and that of reproduction on an extended scale. The former seems, at least on first sight, to be an abstraction (like the concept of the simple work process); for in real life there can never be 'pure and simple repetition of the productive process on the same scale', because 'this mere repetition, or continuity, gives a new character to the process, or, rather, causes the disappearance of some apparent characteristics which it possesses as an isolated discontinuous process.' The second idea has to do with the process of reproduction on a progressive scale, becoming larger and larger. To borrow Sismondi's metaphor, the *cycle* of reproduction is changed into a *spiral*. This idea, although connected with the former, does not at first sight appear to have the same degree of abstraction inasmuch as, for example, it corresponds to the historical expansionary tendency of capital, which in practice sets in motion the process of accumulation by transforming part of the social surplus product into fresh capital (new means of production and new means of subsistence). But just as the simple work process is not to be confused with the socially determined form of the work process, which produces surplus value, so neither is accumulation to be confused with capitalist accumulation, which involves a specifically social productive relationship of historical origin. And in fact Marx, referring to observations made by the English economist Richard

Jones, admits that even in the 'stagnant' Asiatic mode of production, expanding reproduction is found, and that it occurs without capital being employed:

> Since the great mass of the Hindu population are peasants cultivating their land themselves, their products, their instruments of labour and means of subsistence never take 'the shape of a fund saved from revenue, which fund has, therefore, gone through a previous process of accumulation'. On the other hand, the non-agricultural labourers in those provinces where English rule has least disturbed the old system, are directly employed by the magnates, to whom a portion of their agricultural surplus-product is rendered in the shape of tribute or rent. One portion of this product is consumed by the magnates in kind, another is converted, for their use, by the labourers, into articles of luxury and suchlike things; while the rest forms the wages of the labourers, who own their implements of labour. Here, production and reproduction on a progressively increasing scale go on their way without any intervention from that queer saint, that knight of the woeful countenance, the capitalist 'abstainer'. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 561)

We are obviously confronted here with the problem of the internal dialectic of pre-capitalist systems and of their process of dissolution and melding with 'modern society' by way of transitional forms. This therefore involves the problem of original or initial accumulation. In other words, at this point we must evaluate the interpretation that Marx only had bourgeois society in mind when using the term *cumulative history*, and that all history before that must not only be regarded as *repetitive* history but would fall squarely into the category of natural history or that of the prehistory of nature.

It is in the *Grundrisse* that Marx discusses the possibility of a development, a cumulative history, a dialectic within pre-capitalist societies. After examining the more general aspects of the Marxist definition of pre-capitalist societies and their dialectic between nature and society as one phase of the history of the relations between labour/productivity and nature/territory, we are now in a position to understand its definition in terms of economic structure (with the

relevant typology) of the *pre-capitalistic forms* set out by Marx in the well-known chapter in the *Grundrisse*. Marx arrives at this definition by distinguishing these forms from capitalist society. There is no doubt that both the typology and the substance of a *history* of *forms* emerge within the enigma of the historical formation of the capitalist relationship and hence within the history of primitive accumulation, a fact which Marx indicates in the very title of his chapter in the Grundrisse: 'Forms which precede capitalist production (concerning the process which precedes the formation of the capital relation or of original accumulation) (Marx *1973a*, p. 471).

> A presupposition of wage labour, and one of the historic preconditions for capital, is free labour and the exchange of this free labour for money, in order to reproduce and to realize money, to consume the use value for money. Another presupposition is the separation of free labour from the objective conditions of its realization – from the means of labour and the material for labour. Thus, above all, release of the worker from the soil as his natural workshop, hence dissolution of small, free landed property as well as of communal landownership resting on the oriental commune. In both forms, the worker relates to the objective conditions of his labour as to his property; this is the natural unity of labour with its material presuppositions . . . In both forms, individuals relate not as workers but as proprietors – and members of a community, who at the same time work. The aim of this work is not the *creation of value* – although they may do surplus labour in order to obtain *alien*, i.e. surplus products in exchange – rather, its aim is sustenance of the individual proprietor and of his family, as well as of the total community. The positing of the individual as a *worker* in this nakedness is itself a product of history. (Marx *1973a*, pp. 471–472)

Let us tease out the most important points from this complex definition. To begin with, the concept of a *free labourer* contrasted with the figure of the *proprietor and member of the working community* takes us back to the idea whereby the further we go back in history the more the individual – and therefore the individual worker who produces - is characterized as being deprived of autonomy, part of a wider system.

Secondly, the distinction between the production of *surplus value* and the production of simple *surplus work*, which lies at the heart of the difference between capitalist society and pre-capitalist societies, is clarified and supplemented by the distinction between the production of use values and the production of exchange value (that is, between production for auto-consumption and production for generalized exchange). The distinction becomes even clearer when it is phrased as 'production directed to the maintenance of the individual proprietor and his family just as much as of the community as a whole' and production based on 'the exchange of free labour for money with the object of reproducing money and employing it to advantage'. This latter distinction brings home to us the full significance of a statement (to which we shall return later) which illustrates Marx's independence of judgement with regard to the ethnocentric prejudices of his time:

> Thus the ancient conception, in which man, in spite of his various narrow national, religious or political determinations, still nevertheless appears as the aim of production, seems to be very superior to the modern world where production is the aim of man and wealth the aim of production. (Marx *1973b*, p. 139)

The definition of pre-capitalist forms, founded not only upon the fact that in them production is for man, not man for production, but more specifically upon *land ownership* (in the two forms of *free* and *collective* land ownership) *as the basis and result of the community* and upon *the natural unity of labour with the materials it needs, that is with the earth as its natural workplace*, also explains why Marx dwells not only upon forms of ownership but also upon the *territorial structures* of the social and economic organization of the community. This is at once apparent if we 'tabulate' the main features of the three types or models of pre-capitalist societies which Marx constructed.

(1) *The Oriental or Eastern form*

(Sometimes called Asiatic or Slavic, this form is also recog-

nized by Marx, in spite of ethnographic constraints and geographic illogicality, in pre-Columbian America.) Here ownership of land is *collective* (individuals *possess*, but there is no private *ownership* of land). Production is based on:

> A combination of manufactures and agriculture within the small commune, which thus becomes altogether self-sustaining, and contains all the conditions of reproduction and surplus production within itself. A part of their surplus labour belongs to the higher community, which exists ultimately as a *person*, and this surplus labour takes the form of tribute, etc., as well as of common labour . . . The communal conditions of real appropriation through labour, *aqueducts*, very important among the Asiatic peoples; means of communication etc. then appear as the work of the higher unity – of the despotic regime hovering over the little communes. Cities proper here form alongside these villages only at exceptionally good points for external trade; or, where the head of the state and his satraps exchange their revenue (surplus product) for labour, spend it as labour-fund. (Marx *1973a*, pp. 473–474)

On the basis of information so far produced, we can say that, under this system, the potential for enlarged reproduction is employed mainly outside the basic economic unit (the village) and is expressed as investment by the state power of amounts of labour in fresh means of production and prerequisites for it, such as irrigation and communications, and in fresh sources of *urban* craft labour (which means of course that the city grows in size and complexity).

(2) *Ancient, or Graeco-Roman forms*

> The second form – and like the first it has essential modifications brought about locally, historically, etc. – product of more active, historic life, and of the fates and modifications of the original clans – also assumes the *community* as its first presupposition, but not, as in the first case, as the substance of which the individuals are mere accidents, or of which they form purely natural component parts – it presupposes as base not the countryside, but the town as an already created seat (centre) of the rural population (Owners of land). The cultivated field here appears as

> a *territorium* belonging to the town; not the village as mere accessory to the land . . . The difficulties which the commune encounters can arise only from other communes, which have either previously occupied the land, and soil, or which disturb the commune in its own occupation. War is therefore the great comprehensive task, the great communal labour which is required either to occupy the objective conditions of being there alive, or to protect and perpetuate the occupation. Hence the commune consisting of families organized in a warlike way – as a system of war and army, and this is one of the conditions of its being there as proprietor. The concentration of residences in the town, basis of this bellicose organization. (Marx *1973a*, p. 474)

From the point of view of the economic organization of the community, land ownership is divided between community-owned land (public property or *ager publicus*) and private property:

> The survival of the commune is the reproduction of all of its members as self-sustaining peasants, whose surplus time belongs precisely to the commune, the work of war, etc. The property in one's own labour is mediated by property in the condition of labour – the hide of land, guaranteed in its turn by the existence of the commune, and that in turn by surplus labour in the form of military service etc., by the commune members . . . Property is *quiritorium** of the Roman variety: the private proprietor of land is such only as a Roman, but as a Roman he is a private proprietor of land . . . Concentration in the town, with the land as *territorium*: small agriculture working for direct consumption; manufacture as domestic side occupation of wives and daughters (spinning and weaving) or, independently, in individual branches only (*fabri*† etc.,). (Marx *1973a*, pp. 475–476)

To conclude, then: compared with the Oriental form the potential for enlarged reproduction is deployed directly by the community of farmers (landed proprietors) who, in the classical form of this community, invest their surplus labour mainly in war, which in turn creates new prerequisites for labour and new productive forces.

*The property of the *quirites*, i.e. the Romans.
†Craftsmen, workers.

(3) *The Germanic form*

The Germans too had the *ager publicus* or communal property distinct from the property of individuals, but the common land does not appear (as it did under the Ancient system) as the economic property of the State, but only as an integrated form of individual properties. Among the Germans, the community could not exist as a territorial state entity, because it did not exist as a city and was restricted to being simply 'a unification made up of independent subjects' expressed in the assembly of free landowners held from time to time.

> In the Germanic form the agriculturist [is] not a critizen of a state, i.e. [he is] not an inhabitant of a city; [the] basis [is] rather the isolated, independent, family residence, guaranteed by the bond with other such family residences of the same tribe, and by their occasional coming together to pledge each others' allegiance in war, religion, adjudication etc. . . . The commune exists only in the interrelations among these individual landed proprietors as such. (Marx *1973a*, p. 484)

As regards economic organization Marx (*1973a*, p. 484) wrote: 'The economic totality is, at bottom, contained in each *individual household*, which forms an independent centre of production for itself (manufactures purely as domestic secondary task for women etc.) dotted about the countryside.' Under this system, in which the individual and the land are even further and more decisively removed from the primitive community, the potential for enlarged reproduction is deployed directly by the producers principally as independent families and, to a lesser extent, on the occasions when they meet together.

To summarize: from the viewpoint of the 'total economy' the three systems may be distinguished as follows:

In the Eastern form the total economy consists of the self-sufficient village, the city being simply an outgrowth of the real economic structure.

In the Graeco-Roman form the total economy consists of the

city, which however performs the office of a state rather than having economic functions different from those of the countryside.

In the German form the total economy consists of peasant families and rural dwellings scattered throughout the countryside, and there is no city.

These thumbnail sketches are sufficient to indicate how central was the relation of the city to the country. This was described by Marx in a very interesting passage:

> The history of classical antiquity is the history of cities, but of cities founded on landed property and on agriculture; Asiatic history is a kind of indifferent unity of town and countryside (the really large cities must be regarded here simply as royal camps, as works of artifice (superfetation) erected over the economic construction proper); the Middle Ages (Germanic period) begins with the land as the seat of history, whose further development then moves forward in the contradiction between town and countryside; the modern [age] is the urbanization of the countryside, not ruralization of the city as in antiquity. (Marx *1973a*, p.479)

In conclusion, although the relations between the city and the countryside appear to be very different in the three forms, fundamentally they all lack the contrast between the city and the country, which Marx saw as a necessary premise of 'modern history – namely a reversal of the relation between landownership and capital, between agriculture on the one hand and industry and trade on the other. Although these do not coincide exactly with the relation between the city and the country, the town–country division took place in the wake of the widening of the social and territorial division of labour. The separation between city and country is the major spatial expression of this progressive division of labour.

We shall return to the conflict between city and country and to the territorial division of labour in the next chapter. Now we must continue our study of the ingredients of the dynamics of pre-capitalist systems. Marx often emphasized that 'the economic objective of all these systems was . . . the reproduction of the individual in his relations with the

community and in his relations with the earth and with the objective conditions of labour'; and this leads us to think that in the view of Marx these economic systems exhibit a tendency to simple reproduction, to be static – what we nowadays call stagnation or even underdevelopment. (On this last point, some scholars have drawn attention to the special interest of Marx's theory of the Asiatic mode of production.)

Marx does not speak explicitly about enlarged reproduction or accumulation but rather of development: 'the reproduction of pre-existing relations . . . is the basis of development.' Development is, therefore, restricted at the outset by the limits of the system, but 'once these natural barriers are breached symptoms of ruin and decay can appear.' This rather sibylline passage becomes clearer if we identify the limiting basis of development with the community and hence if we see development or accumulation and the dissolution of the community as two historical processes that are inextricably linked:

> The survival of the community as such in the old mode requires the reproduction of its members in the presupposed objective conditions. Production itself, the advance of population (this too belongs with production), necessarily suspends these conditions little by little; destroys them instead of reproducing them, etc., and, with that, the communal system declines and falls, together with the property relations on which it was based. (Marx *1973a*, p.486)

If we write the equation: *reproduction of the primitive community* = *simple reproduction* (meaning reproduction of the same conditions of production, of the same productive potential for the same social needs) and hence the equation *dissolution of the primitive community* = *accumulation or enlarged reproduction* (i.e. production on an ever-increasing scale), we give a real, historical meaning to the concept of simple reproduction. In doing this we can assign a more definite meaning to the essential difference already underlined by Marx between the nature of production in the primitive community – the only purpose of which is the reproduction of man and the community – and the nature

of production born of the dissolution of the community, in which man is no longer the purpose of production, that purpose having become riches, accumulation, production for production's sake.

> We never find in antiquity an enquiry into which form of landed property, etc., is the most productive, creates the greatest wealth. Wealth does not appear as the aim of production. . . . The question is always which mode of property creates the best citizens. Wealth appears as an end in itself only among the few commercial peoples – monopolists of the *carrying trade* – who live in the pores of the ancient world . . . Now, wealth is on one side a thing, realized in things, material products, which a human being confronts as subject; on the other side, as value, wealth is merely command over aliens not with the aim of ruling, but with the aim of private consumption etc. (Marx *1973a*, p. 487)

It also makes it easier to understand why, in Marx's types of pre-capitalist society, the greater possibilities of accumulation exist in cases where society has already been undermined by the development of the individual and of private property, namely in the Graeco-Roman and the German forms and not (or at any rate less) in the Asian form which is the most durable because the community (whether at a lower or higher level) still includes within itself the individual, and property is still common property. It is of course undeniable that accumulation does take place under the Asian system of society, but it is equally undeniable that there is less of it than in the other forms. Perhaps because it originates and in large part occurs outside the basic productive structure, in practice it is by no means incompatible with the preservation of the basic community (the village community), the structure of which in fact manages to absorb the additions to the productive forces such as the increase of population, reproducing and multiplying without changing the essential structure (the village) on a territory which is not showing any signs of scarcities.

This also verifies Marx's statement, supported by the sinologist F. Tolkei, that the key to stagnation in Asia is to be found in a 'too limited civilization on a too extensive

territory', where civilization ought in fact to set about breaking the chains of the primitive community and to develop private property and the division of labour within the productive structure of the village. Marx subsequently confirmed this historical-geographical statement when writing about Russia in 1881:

> There is a special characteristic of agricultural communes in Russia which weakens them . . . It is their isolation, the lack of communications between the different communes, a localized microcosm that is not *peculiar* to this type of community, but wherever it is found it generates over the communes a *more or less* centralized despotism. The federation of the Russian republics of the North demonstrates that this isolation, *which appears originally to have been the result of the vast size of the country*, was largely *consolidated* by the *political* destiny imposed upon Russia by the Mongol invasion. (Marx, draft of a letter to Vera Zasulič)

It is no accident that Marx expressed the view that the reproduction of the members of the community (and hence the preservation of the relations of production and of the community) is 'at the same time new production and destruction of the old system', especially in relation to the process of dissolution of the ancient or Graeco-Roman community:

> For example, where each of the individuals is supposed to possess a given number of acres of land, the advance of population is already under way. If this is to be corrected, then colonization, and that in turn requires wars of conquest. With that, slaves, etc. Also, e.g., enlargement of the *ager publicus*, and therewith the patricians who represent the community, etc. Thus the preservation of the old community includes the destruction of the conditions on which it rests, turns into its opposite. If it were thought that production on the same land could be increased by developing the forces of production, etc. (this precisely the slowest in all traditional agriculture), then the new order would include combinations of labour, a large part of the day spent in agriculture, etc., and thereby again suspend the old economic conditions of the community. Not only do the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g. the village becomes a town, the wilderness a cleared field, etc., but the producers

> change too, in that they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production, transform themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new language. (Marx *1973a*, p. 494)

Although this dialectic refers primarily to the Graeco-Roman community, for which the researches of B.G. Niebuhr furnished Marx with a wealth of historical material, that does not exhaust the validity of its application to this specific case. For it expresses the more general dialectical conception of the relation between nature and work, and of the relationship *between productive forces and relationships of production*, which, I stress, is not to be interpreted with the schematic rigidity with which it is formulated by Soviet disciples of Marxism. Marx's remark concerning the simple work process – that when man is changing external nature he is also changing himself – is extremely apposite.

In substance, Marx saw the historical process as a succession of temporary relationship systems, specific *economic-social systems* or *particular modes of production*, between the productive forces (nature, population, instruments of production, etc.) and the relations of production (meaning the entire organization of society including its administrative and territorial aspects). These determined the temporary equilibria, which were constantly being modified by man in the creation of his livelihood and in work, that is to say in the very activities in which men, changing not only external nature (creating new forces and new ideas, new needs and a new language – in a word, new types of relationships) set the scene for overcoming the inertia of the preceding social and spatial organization. Marx explicitly wrote that even pre-capitalistic systems regarded as types or models can be reduced to modes of *production* and that their dialectic is the fundamental dialectic between productive forces and relations of production:

> The original unity between a particular form of nature, community (clan) and the corresponding property in nature, or relation to the objective conditions of production as a natural being, as an objective being of the individual mediated by the

> commune – this unity, . . . has its living reality in a specific *mode of production* itself, a mode which appears both as a relation between the individuals, and as their specific active relation to inorganic nature, a specific mode of working (which is always family labour, often communal labour). The community itself appears as the first great force of production; particular kinds of production conditions (e.g. stock-breeding, agriculture), develop particular modes of production and particular forces of production, subjective, appearing as qualities of individuals, as well as objective. In the last analysis, their community, as well as the property based on it, resolves itself into a specific stage in the development of the productive forces of working subjects – to which correspond their specific relations amongst one another and towards nature. Until a certain point, reproduction. Then turns into dissolution. (Marx *1973a*, p. 495)

Although such statements may call to mind Hegel's dialectic of negation (as when Marx says that reproduction changes into its opposite, disintegration and so on), only by donning the distorting spectacles of the philosopher can we deny that Marx sees the transition from one social system to another in a distinctly more complex fashion, incorporating a great number of historical and geographical factors (cf. also Sofri 1969, p. 72).

The concept of the mode of production, which we find again in the passage quoted above, expresses this complexity, since it establishes:

(a) a definition of the mode of production as a living reality expressing the union between the relation of the individuals one to another, the specific relation which such a social organization establishes with inorganic nature, and the particular mode of work;
(b) that 'in all forms of society there is a certain form of production which predominates over all the rest, and whose condition therefore determines the rank and influence of all the rest' (as Marx put it in his Introduction of 1857);
(c) the very complexity of the concept of productive force, which is not reducible to a technological conception of the means of production; the community itself appears

in its totality as a productive force combined with relations of production; even the region has the dual role of productive force and of relations of production as a spatial organization; and every factor that determines the mode of production is manifested during the course of history as a dynamic force urging production forward, but also as an inertial, retarding force.

Marx has expressed the difficulty of singling out the multiplicity of links that are formed between the various components and levels of an organic whole in the following passage dealing with the fundamental linkages of the economy as a whole:

> A definite form of production thus determines the forms of consumption, distribution, exchange and *also the mutual relations between these various elements*. Of course, production *in its one-sided form* is in its turn influenced by other elements, i.e. with the expansion of the market, i.e. of the sphere of exchange, production grows in volume and is subdivided to a greater extent.
>
> With a change in distribution, production undergoes a change; as for example in the case of concentration of capital, of a change in the distribution of population in city and country, etc. Finally the demands of consumption also influence production. A mutual interaction takes place between the various elements. Such is the case with every organic body. (Marx *1973b*, p. 44)

A relationship between production and distribution is none other than the relationship between productive forces and relations of production seen from the economic aspect. So this too tells us that distribution has a double face and acts in two ways: first as something intervening between producers and consumers; and secondly, on the basis of social laws, as something which determines what share of the mass of products belongs to the producer.

> But before distribution means distribution of products, it is, first, a distribution of the means of production, and secondly, which is another determination of the same relationship, it is a distribution of the members of society among the various kinds of production (the subjection of individuals to certain relationships of production). (Marx *1973b*, p. 40)

There is still another factor to be taken into account in order to reach an assessment of the historic significance and the historical limits of the dialectic between the productive forces and the relations of production. This is something that Marx brings out when introducing the master–servant relationship based on labour rent:

> The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers – a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity – which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis – the same from the standpoint of its main conditions – due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, pp. 791–792)

My reason for including this long quotation was not to illustrate yet again the empirical limits of Marx's reasoned historicism, but to show how indispensable a part of the dialectic between productive forces and the relations of production is 'the direct relationship between the owners of the means of production and the direct producers', i.e. the relationship and the dialectic between the classes, the basic element in the whole social system.

This said, however, it should be noted that where (as in the primitive community) the separation between the direct producers and ownership of the means of production has not yet taken place, the conditions for the separation of the

community into classes do not exist, and therefore the concept of social relationships of production, and its dialectic, cannot be used in the same sense. We can also arrive at the same result by a different route. If the primitive community in its 'pure form' excludes accumulation, which, as we have seen, is expressed in history as the dialectic between productive forces and relations of production, it has to be acknowledged that for the 'primitive' phases of human social systems we need to construct a social dialectic different from the one based on the class struggle. This might be, for example, a dialectic between the individual and the community (whether family, tribe or territory) or between independent producers and communal ownership.

With this proviso we now enter the special territory of social anthropology and, particularly, of that branch which has undergone considerable development of late, partly by virtue of the injection of some Marxist concepts: economic anthropology. Our only object in doing so is to point out a number of guidelines for research, which may conveniently be introduced by a passage from Lévi-Strauss which at first sight appears to have some affinities with Marx's thinking. This is what Lévi-Strauss says about so-called primitive societies:

> Although they exist in history, these societies appear to have developed or maintained a special wisdom which encourages them to desperately resist any change in their structure which would allow history to break into it. Those that, almost up to the present, had best preserved their distinctive character, appear to us as societies inspired by the dominant urge to remain as they are. The way in which they exploit their environment offers them both a modest living and the protection of their natural resources. Notwithstanding the diversity of their rules concerning marriage, according to demographers such societies all have one thing in common, which is to place strict limits upon the birth rate and keep it, as near as possible, constant. Lastly, a political life based on consensus, all decisions requiring unanimity, appears deliberately designed to exclude that dynamic factor in society which makes use of tensions between power and opposition, majority and minority, exploiters and exploited.

> In short, these societies, which might be called 'cold', because their internal historical temperature is near zero, are distinguished from 'hot' societies by their small number of components and by the mechanical way in which they work. The 'hot' societies came into existence in many parts of the world following the neolithic revolution; they exhibit an unremitting differentiation between castes and classes, and the resulting tension produces energy and development. (Lévi-Strauss 1952)

It would require much space to comment fully on the above, not only because of Lévi-Strauss's wide reputation in the social sciences, but above all because of the methodological implications his works have for a number of themes touched upon earlier in this book, among which may be mentioned the relationship between structural anthropology and history. Therefore, though I will touch indirectly upon some of these themes both in this chapter and the next, I will only comment here on the lack of attention paid so far to these problems in geographical literature.

In some of the textbooks on general geography in current use we still find the old distinction between destructive economy and productive economy which goes back to the French geographer Jean Brunhes who wrote at the beginning of the century. By *destructive economy* is meant the primitive economy, that is, the economies of 'primitive human groups or natural populations' in which 'man takes no trouble at all to reconstruct or replace that which he consumes, so that there is no continuity of production and indeed often the resources are consumed until there are no more left.' By *productive or preservative economy* characteristic of 'civilized peoples', he means 'an economy which aims to use vegetable and animal resources without endangering them, indeed often increasing them, using the varied practices of agriculture, silviculture and husbandry . . .' (Almagià 1955, vol. 2, pp. 137–138).

Leaving aside the rather contradictory meaning of an expression such as 'non-productive economy' (all economy is production, including the act of harvesting), and the non-critical distinction between 'primitive' and 'civilized' (which does not seem to raise any problems), what strikes one most

forcibly about this definition is its absolute generality, which once again turns out to serve the purpose of a definite ideological meaning: to place the whole history of economics, from the dissolution of primitive communities to imperialism, under the label not only of 'productive' but even of the preserver of natural resources. With these ideological foundations it is not surprising that the exhausted body of geography – at least in Italy – has been unable to nourish any lively and serious interest in what is currently known as the ecological question. It would appear that, for geographers at least, there are no ecological or territorial contradictions either in the past or the present; all, save for the remote past of humanity, vanishes and dissolves in the shadows of the 'preservative economy'.

So, then, geographers who make do with distinctions of this kind – and how many of them there are! – fall into an error equal but opposite to that of Lévi-Strauss in the passage quoted above, the error of idealizing primitive societies. In this case it is not difficult to understand how such a result derives from a scientific method which, although it may succeed in isolating some differences between 'cold societies', or primitive ones, and 'hot' ones, meaning pre-modern and modern ones (though the latter concept embraces an extreme diversity of forms of society, from neolithic to capitalist), does not manage to pinpoint the transformation, or passage, from one society to another. The net effect is to produce 'a dull, lifeless structuralism' that is unable to think about 'the relations between the various levels [of a given society] in terms of efficacy, determination and reciprocal action'. In consequence the method 'appears, at its various levels, like a system of mirrors sending back and forth to each other their own more or less distorted image' (Terray *1972*, p. 38).

On this subject let me give the following illustration. As we saw a short while ago, Marx points out the part played by the demographic factor in the dissolution of the primitive community. Lévi-Strauss, dealing with the same problem, emphasizes the capacity of the system to adapt and preserve, and deduces therefrom a general law, valid for all the models of primitive society: 'demographic evolution can shatter the

structure but . . . if the structural orientation survives the shock it has, after each upheaval, several means of re-establishing a system, which may not be identical with the earlier one but is at least formally of the same type' (Lévi-Strauss *1966*, p. 68).

By not acknowledging the existence of an interaction and a hierarchy among the various power centres in a given social reality, structuralists like Lévi-Strauss put themselves in the position of being unable fully to explain the transformation or passage from one social system to another – the process of history itself. That is why the recent rediscovery of Morgan is really a regrafting of Marxism. It has been said of Morgan that with a 'transformist vocabulary' (misleading for modern readers who refuse to make concessions to eighteenth-century positivism) he is endeavouring to define concepts which lead him along paths which 'are those that social anthropology has trodden up to the present, and also some along which it hesitates as yet to venture'. These trends are connected, for, as Engels wrote, Morgan's 'Ancient Society' is only a re-discovery of 'the materialist conception of history which was discovered forty years earlier by Marx'. Nevertheless, they are proving to be of great assistance in the scientific development of economic anthropology.

From pre-capitalistic systems to feudal society as a transitional form to capitalism

There are many stimuli to reflection about the process of dissolution of pre-capitalist forms of society, both of a general nature and those arising from the stimulating palette of historical hypotheses put forward by Marx. All we can do here is to list the factors involved: increase of population, migrations, wars, conquests, the rise of slavery, concentration of private ownership of land, trade, financial relationships, etc.

Neither can we dwell for long on the role that Marx assigned to the social relationship of *slavery* which, in so far as it comes in for consideration as a factor in the dissolution of pre-capitalist systems, does not appear as an autonomous

mode of production but as a *secondary social form*, 'a necessary and inevitable result of ownership based on the community and on work in the community', even when it 'falsified and modified the primitive forms of all communities and even became their basis'. In other words, both of these social relations still fall within the general 'formula of appropriation of the instruments of production' typical of primitive communities, though modified by the fact that, besides inorganic nature, *labour* itself is also counted as one of the *objective conditions* of *production* (Marx *1973a*, pp. 489–490).

Leaving out the various historical differences, it seems certain that the three basic pre-capitalist systems which we have already looked at produce a dialectic which leads to similar forms of *feudal societies*, even though with local differences, as was also recognized by Kula (*1976*) when he said: 'Feudalism is in some sense a universal phenomenon: all societies that have emerged from the stage of the primitive community know it in one form or another.'

An evolution towards feudal types of society is traceable even in the Oriental form, defined by Marx as that which holds on most tenaciously to the substance of community relationships. In the Oriental form 'the individual does not become independent over against the community (as he partly does both in the Roman and Germanic forms); the sphere of production is self-sufficient, agriculture is joined to manufacture and so on.' It is also the Oriental system that contains, according to Marx, 'the first occurrence of the lord's *dominium* in the most original sense' – as verified by Romanian and Slav communities, among others. Japan, also, with its purely feudal organisation of landed property and its highly developed small-scale peasant agriculture, gives a much truer picture of the European Middle Ages than all our history books dictated by bourgeois prejudices (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 672; and *1973a*, p. 473).

A good starting-point for describing feudalism from a Marxist point of view is given by Kula's definition of feudalism as 'a socio-economic system which is predominantly agrarian, and characterized by a low level of productive

forces and of commercialization . . . a corporate system in which the basic unit of production is a large landed estate surrounded by the small plots of peasants who are dependent on the former both economically and juridically, and who have to furnish various services to the lord and submit to his authority' (Kula *1976*, p. 9). By its agrarian nature and by the power exercized by the landed estate, feudalism can still be regarded as one of the forms of society in which 'the relationship with nature' is still powerful and in which 'the natural unity of labour with its material prerequisites' still exists. Our previous remarks about slavery coming within the 'formula of appropriation of the instruments of production' typical of the primitive community also apply to feudal servitude:

> In the relations of slavery and serfdom this separation (between the producer and the conditions of production) does not take place; rather, one part of society is treated by the other as itself *merely* an *inorganic and natural* condition of its own reproduction. The slave stands in no relation whatsoever to the objective conditions of his labour; rather, *labour* itself, both in the form of the slave and in that of the serf, is classified as *an inorganic condition* of production along with other natural beings, such as cattle, as an accessory of the earth. (Marx *1973a*, p. 489)

Although the social conditions of slavery, especially *the master–servant relation*, do not amount to that separation of the producer from the conditions of production which is the necessary condition for the formation of the capitalist relationship, they nevertheless constitute a necessary ferment for the development, decline and fall of all original relations of property and of production. This 'ferment of development' is, in my opinion, represented by the fact that by introducing a greater or lesser degree of monopoly of the means of production by one class (landed proprietors, owners of slaves, feudal lords) these relationships introduce the class struggle into history, and that is a dialectic different from the one that characterized the primitive community. That is why Marx sees it as continuous with capitalist society: 'Still these (relationships of mastery and servitude) are reproduced – in

mediated form – in capital, and thus likewise form a ferment of its dissolution and an emblem of its limitation' (Marx *1973a*, p. 501).

In this connection, we should not lose sight of the fact that feudal society is the only pre-capitalist social system to have nurtured modern, bourgeois or capitalist society spontaneously, that is to say independently of an already existing capitalism. Since, therefore, it is the form of transition to capitalism *par excellence*, it must also be characterized on the basis of the conditions that enable the age-old structures of what are known as the 'natural' societies to be overcome. For this reason we put the emphasis on feudal society as a 'transitional form'. Marx, on the other hand, rather than giving a self-sufficient definition of the feudal mode of production (and it may be doubted, as in the case of production by slaves, whether Marx had in fact thought out such a definition), sees it as an instance of original accumulation and in that sense as the historical genesis of the capitalist relationship:

> The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former. The immediate producer, the labourer, could only dispose of his own person after he had ceased to be attached to the soil and ceased to be the slave, serf or bondman of another. To become a free seller of labour-power, who carries his commodity wherever he finds a market, he must further have escaped from the regime of the guilds . . . (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 668–669)

Here we can no longer postpone consideration of the problem of *primitive accumulation* and of the conditions or the historical causes of the transition from pre-capitalist systems to capitalist society. In recent years this problem has not only been at the centre of a well-publicized international debate among Marxist economists such as M. Dobb and P. Sweezy, but has also been a subject of dispute among historians of industrialization, in which, as is known, liberal historians have criticized writings by Gramsci about the Risorgimento. Generally speaking, these debates have not

been very fruitful: not only have they usually failed to throw light on the actual historical features of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, but the protagonists have also often lost sight of the overall direction of the process. Marx, however, brought this direction out clearly when he wrote:

> The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage-labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 668)

Marx approached this problem from several angles. After stating that 'capital formation thus does not emerge from landed property . . . but rather from merchant's and usurer's wealth', he observes:

> The mere presence of *monetary wealth* and even its achievement of a kind of supremacy is in no way sufficient for this *dissolution into capital* to happen. Otherwise Ancient Rome, Byzantium, etc., would have ended their history with free labour and capital, or rather, begun a new history. There too, the dissolution of the old property relations was bound up with the development of monetary wealth – of trade, etc. But, instead of leading to industry, this dissolution led in fact to the supremacy of the countryside over the city. (Marx *1973a*, p. 506)

Implicit in this analysis is a conception of original accumulation that we should like to highlight, since it is usually passed over, even by such authoritative writers on industrialization as A. Gerschenkron:

> The *original formation* of capital does not happen, as is sometimes imagined, with capital *heaping up* necessaries of life and instruments of labour and raw materials, in short, the *objective* conditions of labour which have already been unbound from the soil and animated by human labour. Rather, its *original formation*

> is that, though the historic process of the dissolution of the old mode of production, value existing as money wealth is enabled, on one side, *to buy* the objective conditions of labour; on the other side, to exchange the money for the *living labour* of the workers who have been set free. All these moments are present; their divorce is itself a historic process, a process of dissolution, and it is *the latter* which enables money to transform itself into *capital*. Money itself, to the extent that it also plays an active role, does so only in so far as it intervenes in this process as itself a highly energetic solvent, and to that extent assists in the creation of the *plucked*, objectless, *free workers*; but certainly not by *creating* the objective conditions of their existence; rather by helping to speed up their separation from them – their propertylessness. . . . *Capital proper does nothing but bring together the mass of hands and instruments which it finds on hand. It agglomerates them under its command*. That is its *real stockpiling*; the stockpiling of workers, along with their instruments, at particular points. (Marx *1973a*, pp. 506–507)

One is immediately struck by this territorial concentration which is a feature of capitalist accumulation, and about which I shall have more to say later. For the present, having sketched the outlines of the concept of original accumulation, I will simply mention that Marx touched upon the problem of the historical conditions of the transition to capitalism (even if only in passing) in relation to medieval Italy, where there already existed the potential for original accumulation, in that both monetary wealth and free labourers were available:

> In Italy, where capitalistic production developed earliest, the dissolution of serfdom also took place earlier than elsewhere. The serf was emancipated in that country before he had acquired any prescriptive right to the soil. His emancipation at once transformed him into a free proletarian, who, moreover, found his master ready waiting for him in the towns, for the most part handed down as legacies from the Roman time. When the revolution of the world market, about the end of the fifteenth century, annihilated Northern Italy's commercial supremacy, a movement in the reverse direction set in. The labourers of the towns were driven *en masse* into the country, and gave an impulse, never before seen, to the *petite culture*, carried on in the form of gardening. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 670 note)

It is not our present task to assess the adequacy of this interpretation of history. Of greater importance is to see how the history of original accumulation is expressed in profound and widespread changes of spatial structure, and of the relationship of city to country in particular. In these changes that separation of the producer from his conditions of production, to which we have repeatedly drawn attention, found its expression. Capitalist accumulation accentuates these processes and carries them, so to speak, to their ultimate conclusion.

In describing these changes, Marx took as his text the development of capitalism in Britain where these phenomena could be studied in their *classical form*, unaffected by other national capitalisms. In his well-known Chapter 24 of *Capital*, Marx reviews the process of 'so-called primitive accumulation', emphasizing its violent character and drawing from it a general deduction: 'violence is the midwife of every old society struggling to bring to birth a new one: this is itself an economic influence.' (Applied at the level of methodology, this principle means that artificial distinctions should not be drawn between a history of structures and a history of events.)

'Fundamental to the whole process' was the *expropriation of the rural population and its expulsion from the land*, an enormous phenomenon of separation of man from nature, of the producer from his workplace. This expropriation was effected by the following methods: the ending of the feudal courts, theft of common property, the fraudulent transfer of State lands, the theft of church property, and the usurped transformation of land belonging to feudal owners and clans into private estates. As a result of government action in the passing of laws about vagabondage, poverty, etc., the outlawed proletariat thus created, and largely urbanized, was changed into wage labourers.

Now that we have seen how the proletariat was created, the next thing is to find out 'where capitalists come from'. In the countryside there developed, 'by a slow process unfolding over many centuries', a class of capitalist tenant farmers that emerged from the ranks of the peasantry as a

result of the agricultural revolution of the sixteenth century, above all in consequence of constant rises in the price of corn, meat and wool. The effects of this agricultural revolution were not restricted to the countryside. It was a 'revolution in the relationships of land ownership accompanied by improvements in farming methods, by increased co-operation, greater concentration of the means of production, etc.' As such it made its effects felt in industry too, especially by creating or enlarging the domestic market (which helped to free not only labour power but also the means of subsistence and of labour), together with the crisis in rural subsidiary industry.

These conditions were favourable for the emergence of the *industrial capitalist*, whose sudden appearance was rather different from the gradual emergence of the capitalist tenant farmers. It did not come about by a slow evolution and transformation of master craftsmen or small independent artisans (or even of wage labourers) into capitalists. It should be seen mainly in relation to the growth of the world market created by the great geographical discoveries of the end of the fifteenth century, and hence above all in relation to commercial capital. The phases and methods connected with this second 'revolutionary road' (as Marx himself called it) to capitalism are the colonial system, the system of public debt and modern taxation and protectionist systems.

We have no space for detailed discussion of the problems of the applicability of this model of original accumulation worked out on the basis of experience in Britain and other countries. We touched upon this question in relation to the path of Russia to communism, where we saw that Marx was loath to construct historical models to be force-fitted over any country or historical or geographical situation. We now turn to the spatial aspects of original accumulation.

Taking the view that original accumulation is the history of the dissolution of the relations of production characteristic of natural or pre-capitalist societies (since only such a dissolution provides the necessary historical conditions for the capitalist relation of production), then this history will be normally described as a reversal of the ancient relation-

ships between man and environment, between city and country, between agriculture and industry and between landed proprietorship and business and industrial 'capital', on which the economic structure of pre-capitalist societies was based. Let us return for a moment to the reconstruction we gave in the last chapter of the three basic systems of pre-capitalist society; this too was connected with their spatial structure. Let us take a closer look at the role of the city and of the separation and antagonism between city and country in relation to the conditions and historical causes of original accumulation. In order to understand this, once more following Marx's method, we first have to see what is the *general* significance of the town–country relationship for society.

Marx criticized Proudhon, who, favouring a Hegelian type of dialectical history 'raised far above space and time', saw an everlasting law of history in the separation between city and country.

> Mr Proudhon has so little understood the problem of the division of labour that he never even mentions the separation of town and country, which took place in Germany, for instance, from the ninth to the twelfth century. Thus, to Mr Proudhon, this separation is an eternal law since he knows neither its origin nor its development. All through his book he speaks as if this creation of a particular mode of production would endure until the end of time. (Letter from Marx to Annenkov dated 28 December 1846)

It could be said that for Marx the whole economic history of society is summed up in the movement of this antithesis, i.e. of the separation between town and country, because this is the foundation of every division of labour brought about and developed by the exchange of commodities (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 333). Within these limits it can also be said that for Marx the relationship between city and country is from one point of view similar to the *leitmotif* which Cattaneo uses to 'reduce the thirty centuries of Italian history to a coherent, connected narrative' without getting lost in 'the maze of conquests, factions, civil wars and constant formation and

destruction of states'. This is a principle of the *histoire raisonée* which Cattaneo and Marx share.

From another point of view, however, in so far as it links up with the division of labour and with trade, such a relationship is seen by Marx in relation to the various modes of production that have succeeded one another during the course of history. To this end Marx drew a distinction between the division of labour *in manufacturing* and that *in society*. He noted that the material precondition for the former was co-operation, that is the concentration of different operations in proximity, whereas the material precondition for the latter was the size and density of the population – and density implied not only *distribution in space* but also *movement in space*: 'A relatively thinly populated country, with well-developed means of communication, has a denser population than a more numerously populated country with badly developed means of communication; and in this sense; the Northern States of the American Union, for instance, are more thickly populated than India'. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 333)

These two kinds of division of labour interact within the mode of production, or indeed any economic and social structure; the geographical relationship implies the social relationship and vice versa:

> Since the production and the circulation of commodities are the general prerequisites of the capitalist mode of production, division of labour in manufacture demands that division of labour in society at large should previously have attained a certain degree of development. Inversely, the former division reacts upon and develops and multiplies the latter . . . The territorial division of labour, which confines the special branches of production to special districts of a country, acquires fresh stimulus from the manufacturing system, which exploits every special advantage. The Colonial system and the opening out of the markets of the world, both of which are included in the general conditions of existence of the manufacturing period, furnish rich material for developing the division of labour in society. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 333–334)

Because of these historical conditions of production

based on trade, both these tendencies towards the division of labour, expressing as they do at two different spatial levels the same process of the concentration of labour, understandably lead to the enormous growth of cities that accompanies the development of the capitalist mode of production, and this in turn inevitably upsets the balance between city and country. We shall return to this point later. But historically these two trends are distinct, for whereas 'the division of labour within the whole of a society . . . takes place within many different economic groupings within that society' (so that we can speak of the separation of town and country as a feature common to the whole of economic history), 'manufacturing division of labour is a wholly specific creation of the capitalist mode of production.' Even at the level of social division of labour there are some specific differences peculiar to different modes of production. For example Marx discovered the reason for the relative lack of dynamism of cities under the Asiatic system to be based on a social division of labour that had nothing to do with trade in goods. He thus found 'the key to an understanding of the secret of the changelessness of Asiatic societies' in a view that is perfectly compatible with the role he assigned to the market and to commercial capital in the formation of the capitalist mode of production.

These illustrations, taken from *Capital*, by no means exhaust the wealth of discussion of the city–country theme. Although Marx never published a systematic treatment of it, the theme was always present in his writings, from his youthful works until old age – for example, from the *German Ideology* to his late reflections on the agrarian commune. Here we will simply sum up the main aspects and features of the town–country relationship in the history of original accumulation.

(1) The monetary wealth which, in certain historical circumstances to which we referred earlier, can be transformed into capital comes in the main from two sources: (*a*) from usury, which was practised especially in connection with landed property; (*b*) from profits of trade. The latter was largely of urban origin and already

implies a relationship of exploitation of the country by the city.

(2) The formation of a market for labour (which, as we saw earlier, results from the dispossession of the independent producer) is partly caused and chiefly accelerated by the development of the same monetary wealth, by the activities of the merchant class which developed 'in the pores of pre-capitalist societies'. These pores are in general represented by cities. There is then a further influence on the country emanating from the city by way of these activities, both on the landed proprietors impelled by the market to give up their feudal courts and to exert pressure on the peasants to extort more surplus product, and also on the development of productive forces in agriculture: 'a more developed agriculture is partly due to the increased marketing of agricultural products in the towns.'

(3) The formation of the necessary working capacity of the instruments of production that can be employed in the nascent capitalist production takes place mainly in the cities (corporations, manufactures, etc.), and also in rural industries including those that have relocated from the cities to the country in order to avoid the restrictions of corporate legislation. This formation, like that of the productive forces in agriculture, is seen both as something existing, which the capitalist can take over, and also as a development, which, especially in the cities, competes with the traditional relations of production.

(4) Historically, capital and wage labour made their joint appearance, at first sporadically, in the towns. The importance of capitalist forms of land ownership, such as capitalist tenant farmers, lies primarily in the part they played in encouraging original accumulation, not as a territorial base for the spread of capitalist relationships. For it is well established that only later did capital gain power over agriculture, and then not completely, even in its mature phase of penetration. The fact, too, that the first modern industries arose in

the country is ultimately another aspect of the subordination of the country to the city. By the incorporation of the countryside into the system of production of values and of goods for trading, capital gradually subordinated the whole land to itself and to its urban centres of power and accumulation.

The industrial revolution and the beginning of capitalist land rent

Plainly, the somewhat stylized sketch we have given of the part played by town and country in original accumulation does not do justice to a great number of historical and geographical variants. These I shall now seek to describe under the two aspects that I consider to be the most important: the location of manufacturing and of large-scale industry (in connection with the industrial revolution), and the beginnings of capitalist land rents.

In the *Grundrisse*, Marx concedes that manufacturing 'springs up where mass quantities are produced for export, for the external market – i.e. on the *basis of large-scale overland and maritime commerce*, in its emporiums like the Italian cities, Constantinople, in the Flemish, Dutch cities, a few Spanish ones, such as Barcelona, etc.' But more generally, Marx observes that 'manufacture seizes hold initially not of the so-called *urban trades*, but of the *rural secondary occupations*, spinning and weaving, the two which least require guild-level skills, technical training' and that, 'apart from these great emporiums, where the external market is its basis, where production is thus, so to speak, *naturally* oriented towards exchange value', it 'takes up its first residence not in the cities, but on the land, in villages lacking guilds, etc.' And he concludes: 'The rural subsidiary occupations have the broad basis [characteristic] of manufactures, while the urban trades demand great progress in production before they can be conducted in factory style' – a fact verified at least partly in the glass factories, paper mills, iron foundries and so on.

Nevertheless, manufacturing could not develop, in either

town or country, until the feudal system was out of the way – though in this respect the town had the advantage over the country. Hence the historical conditions of capital already mentioned had to be developed not only locally but on a large scale. 'Classical antiquity, which could never get beyond the urban artisan stage proper, could therefore never get to large industry. The first presupposition of the latter is to draw the land in all its expanse into the production not of use values but of exchange values.' (Marx *1973a*, pp. 510–511)

In other words, the necessary conditions for the first development of manufacture and then of its transformation into factory or large-scale industry could not be brought together in the old relations of property and production derived from the primitive community, whose territorial organization Marx described as the first phase of the social division of labour:

> The first division of labour (based on the family) then enlarges its materials by the expansion of the community, by the increase of the population, and more especially, by the conflicts between different tribes, and the subjugation of one tribe by another. On the other hand, as I have before remarked, the exchange of poducts springs up at the points where different families, tribes, communities, come in contact; for, in the beginning of civilization, it is not private individuals but families, tribes, etc., that meet on an independent footing. Different communities find different means of production, and different means of subsistence in their natural environment. Hence, their modes of production, and of living, and their products, are different. It is this spontaneously developed difference which, when different communities come into contact, calls forth the mutual exchange of products, and the consequent gradual conversion of those products into commodities. Exchange does not create the difference between the spheres of production, but brings what are already different into relation, and thus converts them into more or less interdependent branches of the collective production of an enlarged society. In the latter case, the social division of labour arises from the exchange between spheres of production that are originally distinct and independent of one another. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 332)

Hence we find again the idea that capitalism replaces a territorial organization, formed of small independent cells – the families, tribes or communities – yet dependent upon their *natural environments* which account for the diversity of their products, and unified only *a posteriori* by trade, with a territorial organization in which it is the *market* that determines the differences between the spheres of production and makes them dependent *in the beginning*.

Marx goes beyond generalizations. Writing about manufacture (i.e. of the sort of industry typical of the phase of transition to capitalism) he highlights the relationship this establishes with the territory. He says: 'The territorial division of labour, which confines special branches of production to special districts of a country, acquires fresh stimulus from the manufacturing system which exploits every special advantage.' He also develops this theme in drawing a distinction between integral manufacture and heterogeneous manufacture: the latter links together different kinds of work not necessarily undertaken in the same factory. Obviously, the two types of manufacture involve different requirements as regards premises and spatial division of labour, the former being based on concentration and the latter on dispersion of space, though both will have the effect of accentuating the division of labour between districts.

Historical evidence has amply confirmed Marx's principles which we have been enunciating. For example, Kula found (1972b) that when manufacturing begins alongside or even within the feudal system it is unable to find fertile ground for its development and transformation into large-scale industry. There was a high mortality among capitalist-type ventures that were started on the estates of nobles in Poland during the seventeenth century (and not only in Poland), under the feudal system. This might also be the reason for the failure of manufacturing to develop in Italy because of a halt in original accumulation which occurred, according to Marx, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Kula has also said, very appositely:

> During the manufacturing phase of the development of productive

> forces, special laws relating to the location of production come into play. They are different from those operating during the artisan period of production, but are not yet the same as those which apply in a time of capitalist industrialism. The presence and accessibility of raw materials such as wood, clay, minerals and so on are very important, as are also natural features favourable to the building of sluices which are indispensable for the harnessing of water power required to drive any new machinery in factories. (Kula 1972b, p. 1060)

However, to avoid the danger of deterministic interpretations Kula then distinguished 'what might be called *macro-location*', for which 'economic and social factors were of critical importance', from *micro-location* in which 'natural and technical factors played the decisive part'.

Therefore, if we wish to understand the geographical requirements for the location of industry we must, as always, distinguish between the different historical phases, since each phase has its own corresponding laws of location in which strictly geographical factors, operating at the micro level, have to be defined primarily on the basis of the technology characteristic of industrial settlement. This appears to have been Marx's view, judging by the way in which he embarked upon the study of large-scale industry, no longer founded solely on a reorganization of the labour force (co-operation), but on the revolution in the means of labour (machinery):

> At the same time manufacture was unable either to seize upon the production of society to its full extent, or to revolutionize that production to its very core. It towered up as an economic work of art, on the broad foundation of the town handicrafts, and of the rural domestic industries. At a given stage in its development, the narrow technical basis on which manufacture rested came into conflict with requirements of production that were created by manufacture itself. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 347)

The problems critical for the assessment of the industrial revolution, and hence of its geographical conditions, arise from the meaning and the very definition of the concept *machine*. Marx rejected the definition given by mathematicians and mechanical experts on the grounds that 'from the

economic point of view their definition is valueless, because it lacks the historical element.' But he also rejected the definition that distinguished a machine from an instrument on the basis of the type of non-human driving power, because that definition also did not take historical differences into account and did not enable a critical history of technology to be correctly assigned to periods as Marx envisaged – though with many reservations: 'neither geological epochs nor those of the history of society can be divided by rigidly abstract demarcation lines.'

It was neither from the motive power nor from the transmission mechanism but from the *tool or operating machine* that 'the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century started; and this still remains the starting-point whenever an artisan industry, whether based on a skilled trade or on manufacture, makes the transition to being a mechanized industry.' In other words, the revolution is embodied in 'that mechanism which, after the necessary power has been applied to it, executes by means of its tools the same operations that were formerly carried out with similar tools by the workman', and 'the question whether the motive power comes from a man or another machine is not critical.' This is shown by the fact that this replacement of human motive power, not only by natural forces but also by machines, was already in use to some extent during the early period of manufacture; and also by the fact that the steam engine, which was already in existence, did not of itself cause any revolution: 'it was rather the other way about – it was the invention of machine tools that made it necessary to revolutionize the steam engine.'

In fact, the progressive spread of machine tools and the increase in the number of implements fitted to them went hand in hand to stimulate the provision of ever more powerful and reliable driving forces:

> The use of water as the predominant motive power was [also] beset with difficulties. It could not be increased at will, it failed at certain seasons of the year, and, above all, it was essentially local. Not till the invention of Watt's second and so-called double-

> acting steam engine, was a prime mover found that begot its own force by the consumption of coal and water, whose power was entirely under man's control, that was mobile and a means of locomotion, that was urban and not, like the water-wheel, rural, that permitted production to be concentrated in towns instead of, like the water-wheels, being scattered up and down the country, that was of universal technical application, and, relatively speaking, little affected in its choice of residence by local circumstances. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 356–357)

The clarity with which Marx draws out the geographical consequences of localization from the technological features of the 'industrial revolution' relieves us of the need to linger on this aspect. We will also skip over facts introduced by Marx about further mechanical improvements in factories such as 'automatic manufacture' and 'machine-making machines', the advent of which completed a revolution in the use of labour which turned the co-operative and social features of the work process into a technical, objective necessity. We will, instead, just mention some other consequences which, still in terms of territorial organization, are produced by large-scale industry, and about which we shall have more to say in the next chapter, particularly as to their harmful and self-defeating U-turns.

Marx stresses that it is in the nature of capitalism to go on extending technical innovations to the whole of production and to create a system of production that overcomes the preceding social division of labour and progressively integrates the different centres of manufacture at local and regional level into a system of functionally interdependent units of increasing complexity and of greater economic and geographical extent:

> A radical change in the mode of production in one sphere of industry involves a similar change in other spheres. This happens at first in such branches of industry as are connected together by being separate phases of a process, and yet are isolated by the social divisions of labour in such a way that each of them produces an independent commodity . . . The revolution in the modes of production of industry and agriculture made necessary a revolution in the general conditions of the social process of

> production, i.e. the means of communication and of transport . . . In a society whose pivot was agriculture on a small scale, with its subsidiary domestic industries, and the urban handicrafts, the means of communication and transport were so utterly inadequate to the productive requirements of the manufacturing period with its extended division of social labour, its concentration of the instruments of labour, and of the workmen, and its colonial markets, that they became in fact revolutionized. In the same way the means of communication and transport handed down from the manufacturing period soon became unbearable trammels on modern industry, with its feverish haste of production, its enormous extent, its constant flinging of capital and labour from one sphere of production into another, and its newly-created connections with the markets of the whole world. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 362–363)

We conclude this chapter by mentioning the principal featues connecting the origins of capitalist land revenues with spatial structures and with the relations between town and country in particular. As he had already covered the case of original accumulation, Marx dealt in *Capital* with the history of the rise of capitalist relationships in the countryside only at the end of his section on land rent ('Transformation of Surplus Profit into Land Rent'), and after having made it clear right from the start that 'the analysis of land ownership in its various forms in history falls outside the scope of the present work'. Moreover Marx confirmed by implication, in the introduction to vol. 3 of *Capital*, that the chapter on the rise of capitalist land rent is not only linked to the chapter on original accumulation but actually has the same purpose:

> In the section dealing with original accumulation we saw that this mode of production presupposes, on the one hand, the separation of the direct producers from their position as mere accessories to the land (in the form of vassals, serfs, slaves, etc.) and, on the other hand, the expropriation of the mass of the people from the land. To this extent the monopoly of landed property is a historical premise, and continues to remain the basis of the capitalist mode of production, just as in all previous modes of production which are based on the exploitation of the masses in one form or another. But the form of landed property with which the incipient capitalist mode of production is confronted does not suit it. It

> first creates for itself the form required by subordinating agriculture to capital. It thus transforms feudal landed property, clan property, small peasant property in mark communes – no matter how divergent their juristic forms may be – into the economic form corresponding to the requirements of this mode of production. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 617)

Marx starts from the economic systems in which the rent 'appears in the normal form of unpaid surplus labour or surplus value', supplied to the owner of the conditions of production *in kind*, i.e. in work or in products. Clearly, we are here in the presence of pre-capitalist economic systems dominated by agriculture, in which the producer is only the *possessor* and in which the natural economy rules (it is not essential to sell the produce in order to pay the rent). These forms are liquidated when rent becomes payable *in money*, which in its ultimate development, ignoring all the intermediate forms such as that of the small tenant farmer, must lead to the transformation of the land into free *property* of the farmer or else to the form appropriate to the capitalist mode of production, with rent paid by the capitalist leaseholder.

In other words, and taking account of the social historical process,

> This transformation serves on the one hand . . . to expropriate more and more the old peasant possessors and to substitute capitalist tenants in their stead. On the other hand, it leads to the former possessor buying himself free from his rent obligation and to his transformation into an independent peasant with complete ownership of the land he tills. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 798)

Among the historical conditions that precede and accompany this process there is the differentiation between a class of propertyless day-labourers and a richer class or rent-paying tenant farmers, who represent a nursery of hothouse of capitalist tenants whose development is conditioned by the overall development of capitalist production outside the country proper. The city, and commercial capital, are now playing an explicitly causal role:

> As soon as rent assumes the form of money-rent, and thereby the relationship between rent-paying peasant and landlord becomes a relationship fixed by contract – a development which is only possible generally when the world market, commerce and manufacture have reached a certain relatively high level – the leasing of land to capitalists inevitably also makes its appearance. The latter hitherto stood beyond the rural limits and now carry over to the countryside and agriculture the capital acquired in the cities and with it the capitalist mode of operation developed – i.e. creating a product as a mere commodity and solely as a means of appropriating surplus-value. This form can become the general rule only in those countries which dominate the world market in the period of transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 799)

The result is not only to change the nature of rent from a normal form of surplus value and surplus labour to 'excess of this surplus labour beyond the part which the capitalist profiteer takes for himself in the form of profit' (rent = surplus profit) but this change is based upon 'a gradual transformation of the mode of production':

> This already follows from the fact that it is normal for the capitalist tenant farmer to produce agricultural products as commodities and that, while formerly only the excess over his means of subsistence was converted into commodities, now but a relatively insignificant part of these commodities is directly used by him as means of subsistence. It is no longer the land, but rather capital, which has now brought even agricultural labour under its direct sway and productiveness. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 800)

The result of this transformation is to make the agricultural sector wholly dependent upon the non-agricultural sector and the country wholly dependent on the city, inasmuch as the portion which the capitalist tenant makes over to the landowner is worked out on the basis of the average profit obtained by capital from non-agricultural production, and of the prices of non-agricultural goods regulated by this average profit:

> The average profit and the price of production regulated thereby are formed outside relations in the countryside and within the

> sphere of urban trade and manufacture. The profit of the rent-paying peasant does not enter into it as an equalizing factor, for his relation to the landlord is not a capitalist one. In so far as he makes profit, i.e. realizes an excess above his necessary means of subsistence, either by his own labour or through exploiting other people's labour, it is done behind the back of the normal relationship, and other circumstances being equal, the size of this profit does not determine rent, but on the contrary it is determined by the rent as its limit. The high rate of profit in the Middle Ages is not entirely due to the low composition of capital, in which the variable component invested in wages predominates. It is due to swindling the land, the appropriation of a portion of the landlord's rent and of the income of his vassals. If the countryside exploits the town politically in the Middle Ages, wherever feudalism has not been broken down by exceptional urban development – as in Italy – the town, on the other hand, exploits the land economically everywhere and without exception, through its monopoly prices, its system of taxation, its guild organization, its direct commercial fraudulence and its usury. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, pp. 800–801)

It is worth repeating that this influence of the city on the country was accentuated when rent in kind was transformed into money rent, that is, when

> capitalized rent, or the price of land, and thus its alienability and alienation, become essential factors; and thereby not only can the former peasant subject to payment of rent be transformed into an independent peasant proprietor, but also urban and other moneyed people can buy real estate in order to lease it either to peasants or capitalists and thus enjoy rent as a form of interest on their capital so invested; therefore, this circumstance likewise facilitates the transformation of the former mode of exploitation, the relation between owner and actual cultivator of the land, and of rent itself. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 802)

The existence of free peasant farmers owning land in separate parcels set limits to the expansion of money rent, to action by the towns, and to the penetration of capital for commerce and usury – in a word, to the economic dependence of the country upon the city. The main prerequisite for this is that 'the rural population should be much more

numerous than the urban population, so that the capitalist mode of production, even though generally dominant, should be relatively little developed, and hence that the concentration of capital in other branches of production should be contained within narrow limits, with a predominance of dispersed capital.' In other words, capital should be parcelled out in the city just as land is parcelled out in the country. In the second place, it requires that 'the greater portion of agricultural produce must be consumed as direct means of subsistence by the producers themselves, the peasants, and only the excess above that will find its way as commodities into urban commerce.' (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, pp. 804–805) The partial independence of distributed land ownership from the market mechanism of average profit and of the price of production described above derives from these characteristics. Thus, in order that a farmer working a parcel of land may cultivate his land or acquire land to cultivate, it is not necessary, as is usual under the capitalist mode of production, that the market price of the produce of the land should increase sufficiently to yield the average profit, or for a surplus of this profit to be available in the form of revenue. In other words,

> For the peasant owning a parcel, the limit of exploitation is not set by the average profit of capital, in so far as he is a small capitalist; nor, on the other hand, by the necessity of rent, in so far as he is a landowner. The absolute limit for him as a small capitalist is no more than the wages he pays to himself, after deducting his actual costs. So long as the price of the product covers these wages, he will cultivate his land, and often at wages down to a physical minimum. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, pp. 805–806)

Thus the system of small, parcelled peasant property has played a historically limited role. Compared with modes of production based on non-economic coercion and on the simple possession of land, it 'forms the basis for the development of personal independence' and as much 'is a necessary transitional phase for the development of agriculture itself'. But the very causes leading to its progressive dissolution expose its severe limitations. These causes are:

> Destruction of rural domestic industry, which forms its normal supplement, as a result of the development of large-scale industry; a gradual impoverishment and exhaustion of the soil subjected to this cultivation; usurpation by big landowners of the common lands, which constitute the second supplement of the management of land parcels everywhere and which alone enable it to raise cattle; competition, whether of the plantation system or large-scale capitalist agriculture. Improvements in agriculture, which on the one hand cause a fall in agricultural prices and, on the other, require greater outlays and more extensive material conditions of production, also contribute towards this . . . (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 807)

The limits are obvious:

> Ownership of land parcels by its very nature excludes the development of social productive forces of labour, social forms of labour, social concentration of capital, large-scale cattle-raising, and the progressive application of science. Usury and a taxation system must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital on the price of land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite fragmentation of means of production, and isolation of the producers themselves. Monstrous waste of human energy. Progressive deterioration of conditions of production and increased prices of means of production -- an inevitable law of proprietorship of parcels. Calamity of seasonal abundance for this mode of production. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 807)

We have said enough about the disadvantages inherent in the land-parcel economy. They become clearly apparent in structural terms, as in the formation of backward areas, a type of regionalization which is a peculiar feature of the process of late industrialization. They also manifest themselves in large population movements leading to the depopulation of the countryside, ultimately traceable to the tendency to make backward rural areas – through the mechanism of an underdeveloped market – pay a major share of the cost of industrialization without sharing in its benefits. Together with Engels, Marx had already described this mechanism when writing about Ireland in relation to industrialization in England. In the relevant chapter of *Capital* he provides a large number of pointers for an analysis of

economic structures of rural areas during the process of capitalist accumulation, and sums up this situation in a single sentence:

> The disadvantages of the capitalist mode of production, with its dependence of the producer upon the money-price of his product, coincide here therefore with the disadvantages occasioned by the imperfect development of the capitalist mode of production. The peasant turns merchant and industrialist without the conditions enabling him to produce his products as commodities. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 812)

CHAPTER 5

Capitalism and Ecological and Territorial Contradictions

I have structured the examination of Marx's thought around a distinction which I hold to be basic: 'In all the systems in which ownership of land predominates, the relationship with nature is still predominant; whereas in those where capital predominates, the social element, historically produced, predominates.' I have tried to define, and in part to verify on the basis of post-Marxian researches, exactly what Marx meant by 'natural societies' or 'on a natural basis' contrasted with 'historical societies' (meaning those based on historical foundations), and how all the economic systems that have not broken their umbilical cord with the primitive or originating community come within the first category. Lastly, we have seen how initial or original accumulation has to be understood in terms of the dissolution of natural societies as a reversal of the former bonds between man and nature and of the limited local environments, i.e. as a creation of universal history through the formation of the international market. I shall now pursue this aspect a little further.

When Marx said that 'universal history has not always existed: history as universal history is a result', this was not just a single brilliant phrase; it derives from the entire analysis in *Capital* and, in particular, from the discussion of capitalism as *a unitary process of production and as realization of surplus value bound up with particular historical conditions*:

> The creation by capital of *absolute surplus value* – more objectified labour – is conditional upon an expansion, specifically a

> constant expansion, of the sphere of circulation. The *surplus value* created at one point requires the creation of surplus value at *another* point, for which it may be exchanged . . . A precondition of production based on capital is therefore *the production of a constantly widening sphere of circulation*, whether the sphere itself is directly expanded or whether *more points within it are created as points of production*. While circulation appeared at first as a constant magnitude, it here appears as a moving magnitude, being expanded by production itself . . . The tendency to create the *world market* is directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome. Initially, to subjugate every moment of production itself to exchange and to suspend the production of direct use values not entering into exchange, i.e. precisely to posit production based on capital in place of earlier modes of production, which appear primitive from its standpoint. *Commerce* no longer appears here as a function taking place between independent productions for the exchange of their excess, but rather as an essentially all-embracing presupposition and moment of production itself. (Marx *1973a*, pp.407- 408)

Thus the first historic trend of capitalism consists in progressively creating the world market, in continuously enlarging the perimeter of circulation, undermining the isolation of the old modes of production based on use values and revolutionizing the means of transport and communication:

> Where production is directly orientated towards use, and only the excess product is exchanged, the costs of circulation appear only for the excess product, not for the main product. The more production comes to rest on exchange value, hence on exchange, the more important do the physical conditions of exchange – the means of communication and transport – become for the costs of circulation. Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it. (Marx *1973a*, p. 524)

But although one of the most prominent geographical effects of capitalism, spurred on by its need to produce absolute surplus value, is to abolish every spatial hindrance to

trade and to conquer the entire earth for its market, this is not its only propensity. Indeed, Marx infers even more revolutionary consequences from the production of *relative surplus value*.

> On the other side, the production of *relative surplus value*, i.e. production of surplus value based on the increase and development of the productive forces, requires the production of new consumption; requires that the consuming circle within circulation expands as did the productive circle previously. Firstly, quantitative expansion of existing consumption; secondly, creation of new needs by propagating existing ones in a wide circle; thirdly, production of *new* needs and discovery and creation of new use values . . . Hence exploration of all nature in order to discover new, useful qualities in things; universal exchange of the products of all alien climates and lands; new (artificial) preparation of natural objects, by which they are given new use values. The exploration of the earth in all directions, to discover new things of use as well as new useful qualities of the old; such as new qualities of them as real materials, etc; the development hence of the natural sciences to their highest point; likewise the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself; the cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being, production of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations – production of this being as the most total and universal social product, for, in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures, hence cultured to a high degree – is likewise a condition of production founded on capital. (Marx *1973a*, pp. 408–409)

So these are inevitable consequences, not a simple, peaceful creation, of capital. Yet we shall shortly see how capitalism, as a transitory social system, historically determined, militates against the development of these conditions. None the less, Marx did not refuse to celebrate the civilizing mission of capital:

> Hence the great civilizing influence of capital; its production of a stage of society in comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere *local developments* of humanity and as *nature-idolatry*: For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognized as a power for

> itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production. In accord with this tendency, capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of this, and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces. (Marx *1973a*, pp. 409–410)

This just praise of the civilizing effect of capital should be understood more in a retrospective sense than as a prophecy of the future of capitalism. The 'permanent revolution' of capital is clearly inimical to the ancient relationship between man and nature, to the former limits on development and to the continuation of the old ways of life characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. It is at this point that we find the greatest divergence between Marx's view of 'primitive societies' and that of Lévi-Strauss and authors of similar bent. And it is undeniable that Marx's differing assessment is based upon a comparison between modern bourgeois society and the pre-capitalistic societies.

> All previous forms of society – or, what is the same, of the forces of social production – foundered on the development of wealth. Those thinkers of antiquity who were possessed of consciousness therefore directly denounced wealth as the dissolution of the community. The feudal system, for its part, foundered on urban industry, trade, modern agriculture (even as a result of individual inventions like gunpowder and the printing press). With the development of wealth – and hence also new powers and expanded intercourse on the part of individuals – the economic conditions on which the community rested were dissolved, along with the political relations of the various constituents of the community which corresponded to those conditions: religion, in which it was viewed in idealized form (and both – religion and political relations – rested in turn on a given relation to nature, into which all productive force resolves itself); the character, outlook, etc., of the individuals. (Marx *1973a*, p. 540)

When Marx wrote all this, and in substance drew a distinction between the *community*, limited to the simple reproduction of the conditions of production and of individuals, and *capital*, which sets in train the creation of wealth itself and therefore of the universal development of productive forces as a necessary condition of its own survival, he was not contradicting what he had written, as we noted before when discussing the ancient conception of man as the purpose of production, contrasted with that of the modern world, 'in which production appears as the purpose of man and wealth as the purpose of production'. Indeed, the following observations by Marx constitute a defence of the ancient conception:

> But in fact, once the limited bourgeois system is gone, what is wealth but the universalization of needs, of capacities, of enjoyments, of the productive forces and so on of individuals, created by universal trade? What is it but the full development of man's control over the forces of nature, both of external nature and his own nature? What is it but the absolute externalization of his creative gifts, without any other premise than the preceding historical development, which makes this total development an end in itself, this development of all human powers *per se*, without any independent standard by which they are judged? . . . In the bourgeois political economy, and in the historical phase of production to which it corresponds, this complete externalization of the internal nature of man brings about a spiritual vacuum, this universal objectivization brings about total alienation, and the abolition of all personal guiding principles appears as the sacrifice of self-chosen goals to a completely external purpose. Therefore, on the one hand the childlike ancient world appears as a more elevated way of life; and, on the other hand, it is so wherever men look for a more perfect vision, a pattern, and an objective delimitation. It is satisfaction from a limited point of view, whereas the modern world leaves men unsatisified or, where modern man appears self-satisfied, he is *vulgar*. (Marx *1973a*, pp.310–311)

I shall not dwell on this passage, so characteristic of Marx's prose, so apparently 'philosophical'. The theory of alienation is not only the philosophy of Marx's younger

days. It is well founded in history and economics, and is a constant reference point in Marx's *oeuvre*, much of which develops themes laid down and verified earlier. I shall therefore simply call attention to the fact that the definition of the limits of 'natural societies' is never separated from the analysis of the limits and conflicts of bourgeois society and of capital, in which 'production moves between obstacles constantly overcome and as constantly renewed', in that each of the obstacles that capital overcomes diverts it from its destination. 'The universality towards which it irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature which will, at certain stages of its development allow it to be recognized as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence will drive towards its own suspension' (Marx *1973a*, p. 410). In other words,

> The barrier to *capital* is that this entire development proceeds in a contradictory way, and that the working-out of the productive forces, of general wealth, etc., knowledge, etc., appears in such a way that the working individual *alienates* himself; relates to the conditions brought out of him by his labour as those not of his *own* but of an *alien wealth* and of his own poverty. But this antithetical form is itself fleeting, and produces the real conditions of its own suspension . . . For this, however, [it is] necessary above all that the full development of the forces of production has become the *condition of production*; and not that specific *conditions of production* are posited as a limit to the development of the productive forces. (Marx *1973a*, p. 542)

Together with Engels, Marx devoted the whole of his life as a scholar and militant of the workers' movement to the analysis of the contradictions within capitalism. We therefore shall not attempt in these few pages to outline the contradictions by which capitalism is troubled at various levels. We will take just one, which we can define in modern terms as the ecological problem, namely the relations between man and nature, and the ecological contradictions that are apparent within the spatial organization of capitalism.

We have seen how vigorously Marx criticized the limits of the small agricultural holding, emphasizing the progressive nature of the capitalist agricultural estate. But that criticism

and judgement did not prevent Marx from analysing the fresh contradictions brought about by the spread of capitalist production, both in the countryside and in the whole relationship between the towns and the country. To begin with, when discussing the so-called industrial revolution, Marx was careful to point out some of the consequences of the revolution caused by large-scale industry in the countryside, comparing the lot of the urban industrial worker with that of the workers on the land. Marx's primary observation was that 'in the sphere of agriculture the most revolutionary effect of large-scale industry is to overthrow that bulwark of the old society, the *peasant farmer*, and to replace him by the *wage labourer*.' In this way 'the social needs of revolution and the antagonisms within society are made the same in the country as in the town.' Marx saw the possibility of building on these new social antagonisms a new, higher synthesis between agriculture and industry, and between town and country:

> Capitalist production, by collecting the population in great centres, and causing an ever-increasing preponderance of town population, on the one hand concentrates the historical motive power of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the circulation of matter between man and the soil, i.e., prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the soil. By this action it destroys at the same time the health of the town labourer and the intellectual life of the rural labourer. But while upsetting the naturally grown conditions for the maintenance of that circulation of matter, it imperiously calls for its restoration as a system, as a regulating law of social production, and under a form appropriate to the full development of the human race. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, p. 474)

This passage, so full of meaning, shows clearly that, unlike many modern ecologists, Marx did not divorce the ecological and territorial mismatches from the contradictions inherent in the relationships between society and labour force; that is to say, he did not see in the destruction of nature a convenient screen to shield his gaze from the ravages and sickness

among the labour force. But neither did he conceal behind the social disorders the territorial tensions and the destruction of nature, as some left-wing critics of ecology tend to do.

The growing concentration of population in the towns produced by the industrial revolution changed the organic interchange between man and nature (which in previous societies had been established by the circumstances of 'natural spontaneity'). It did so above all by preventing the return to the land of the residues of production and consumption which could have reconstituted its fertility. Marx noted elsewhere that under the capitalist economic order enormous waste of such residues takes place. In London, for example, the only use made of the excrement of four million people was to pollute the Thames, placing at great risk the health of the city dwellers. Urban concentration was mirrored by rural depopulation and the consequent thin scattering of rural workers over large areas, an arrangement which militated against the intellectual development of the rural population.

Marx never lost sight of this aspect and missed no opportunity of denouncing the crimes of capital against the physical and intellectual health of working men. For example, when discussing the *working day*, after having made careful use of a British government inquiry into the conditions of the working class, he broke into the following bitter invective which, even though it was directed against competitive capitalism, cannot be considered as outdated even today when at international level, in the so-called underdeveloped countries, there still exists the 'martyrdom of the producers' described by Marx when writing about the transformation of agriculture and manufacture in Europe under capitalism.

> Experience shows to the intelligent observer with what swiftness and grip the capitalist mode of production, dating, historically speaking, only from yesterday, has seized the vital power of the people by the very root – shows how the degeneration of the industrial population is only retarded by the constant absorption of primitive and physically uncorrupted elements from the country – shows how even the country labourers, in spite of fresh air and the principle of natural selection, that works so

> powerfully amongst them, and only permits the survival of the strongest, are already beginning to die off. Capital, that has such good reasons for denying the sufferings of the legions of workers that surround it, is in practice moved as much and as little by the sight of the coming degradation and final depopulation of the human race as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun . . . Hence capital is reckless of the health or length of life of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society. To the outcry as to the physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, it answers: Ought these to trouble us since they increase our profits? But looking at things as a whole, all this does not, indeed, depend on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws over every individual capitalist. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 256–257)

But besides the directly human and social dimension, to which we shall have occasion to return, Marx was also mindful of the dimension of nature:

> Moreover, all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility. The more a country starts its development of the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for example, the more rapid is this process of destruction. Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth – the soil and the labourer. (Marx *1965*, vol. 1, pp. 474–475)

Marx had gone deeply into this idea of the incompatibility of industrialized agriculture and the long-term maintenance of a healthy soil. He checked it out by a study of the literature on agronomy, particularly the works of J. Liebig, to whom he awarded 'the undying merit of expounding the negative side of modern agriculture from the point of view of the natural sciences'. Marx also referred to Liebig at the end of the section of *Capital* dealing with land rents, where he repeated:

> Large landed property reduces the agricultural population to a constantly falling minimum, and confronts it with a constantly growing industrial population crowded together in large cities. It thereby creates conditions which cause an irreparable break in the coherence of social interchange prescribed by the natural laws of life. As a result, the vitality of the soil is squandered, and this prodigality is carried by commerce far beyond the borders of a particular state. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 813)

This break in the nexus between society and nature is therefore seen as a direct consequence of the discrepancy between the increasing depopulation of the countryside and the growing concentration of the urban population, two processes affecting the land that are the obverse and reverse of the same phenomenon, namely capitalist accumulation. Hence, to understand how the rupture of the nexus between society and nature (which in pre-capitalist societies was largely entrusted to 'natural spontaneity') came about, we have to refer back to the history of the expropriation of the independent producer, to his expulsion from the land as his 'natural workshop'. But, as regards the unity of the territorial processes that bring about the rupture, we can turn to the closing words of Marx's chapter in *Capital* on the *origin of land rents under capitalism*:

> Large-scale industry and large-scale mechanized agriculture work together. If originally distinguished by the fact that the former lays waste and destroys principally labour-power, hence the natural force of human beings, whereas the latter more directly exhausts the natural vitality of the soil, they join hands in the further course of development in that the industrial system in the countryside also enervates the labourers, and industry and commerce on their part supply agriculture with the means for exhausting the soil. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 813)

In order to develop this view of Marx we should also have to refer to the works of Kautsky, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, for, although they hardly bothered to consider the 'ecological' aspect of the contradictions of capitalism, they none the less followed up Marx's researches into the agrarian question, paying special attention to the development of agriculture in the United States of America as well as Russia. We shall

therefore content ourselves with some general remarks.

Above all, it is plain that the ecological and territorial mismatches go back to the very deep social conflicts in the capitalist mode of production. We cannot really overcome these mismatches except by changing the relations of production and, with them, the whole social and territorial organization of capitalism, which with the implacable objectivity of a monstrous *second nature* sets itself up against both *nature* and man.

This was the conclusion reached by Engels in *The Housing Question*, in which he dealt with the housing crisis endemic in all the cities that had expanded under the impulse of industrialization:

> So it is plain for all to see that the bourgeois answer to the housing problem has run into the sand and has become bogged down in the face of *the antithesis between town and country*. And here we reach the nub of the problem. The housing problem can be resolved only as a result of social upheavals on a sufficient scale to justify an attempt to overcome the antithesis between town and country, which has been brought to a head by the present capitalist society. Far from being in a position to overcome this antithesis, capitalist society is forced to make it more acute every day. . . . It is not that the solution of the housing problem will bring with it the solution of society's problem; on the contrary, only when the social question, i.e. the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, is solved will it be possible simultaneously to solve the housing problem. To look for a solution to the housing problems whilst at the same time wishing to preserve today's great conurbations is a contradiction in terms. But these same great overcrowded cities will be done away with only by the abolition of the capitalist mode of production. (Engels *1942*)

Moreover, even 'completely conservative' agronomists, in Marx's words, can see that there is a basic contradiction between private property in land and the market structure developed by the capitalist mode of production, thereby compromising the possibility of a rational agriculture; but the only conclusion they can draw is that 'a nation's land should be cultivated as a whole.' Marx objects to this limited view:

> But the dependence of the cultivation of particular agricultural products upon the fluctuations of market prices, and the continual changes in this cultivation with these price fluctuations – the whole spirit of capitalist production, which is directed toward the immediate gain of money – are in contradiction to agriculture, which has to minister to the entire range of permanent necessities of life required by the chain of successive generations. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 617 note)

This need to 'take account of all the permanent factors affecting the lives of succeeding generations' was also the basis of Marx's criticism of private ownership of land, after he had demonstrated how it was bound up with the totality of the relationships of production.

> From the point of view of a higher economic system of society, private ownership of the terrestrial globe by individuals will seem just as unreasonable as the private ownership of one man by another. Even a whole society, a nation, indeed all the societies existing at a given time taken together, are not owners of the earth. They only possess it, enjoy the use of it and are responsible for handing it on better than they found it, as good fathers of families (*boni patres familias*), to succeeding generations. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 3)

Marx observed that capitalism itself undertook the task of demonstrating the *reductio ad absurdum* of private ownership of land, and that this was one of its greatest merits:

> One of the major results of the capitalist mode of production is that, on the one hand, it transforms agriculture from a mere empirical and mechanical self-perpetuating process employed by the least developed part of society into the conscious scientific application of agronomy, in so far as this is at all feasible under conditions of private property, that it divorces landed property from the relations of dominion and servitude, on the one hand, and, on the other, totally separates land as an instrument of production from landed property and landowner – for whom the land merely represents a certain money assessment which he collects by virtue of his monopoly from the industrial capitalist, the capitalist farmer; it dissolves the connection between landownership and the land so thoroughly that the landowner may spend his whole life in Constantinople, while his estates lie in Scotland. (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, pp. 616–617)

This passage clearly shows that, confronted by the ecological and territorial maladjustments of capitalism, Marx still did not indulge in idealizing a pre-capitalistic 'state of nature' to which some idealistic socialists and romantics contemporary with him looked back with yearning. Even today, some populist, reactionary ecologists try to turn the clock back and, at the cultural level of a Lévi-Strauss, hold out to mankind the hope of striving to regain a fictitious harmony between man and nature, a limited demographic and economic development which they imagine to have subsisted in the ancient rural, patriarchal societies.

Marx gave the clearest possible answer to 'ecological' ideas based on setting 'limits to growth' (to use the now well-known title of the Club of Rome proposal): to overcome the contradictions of capitalism it was 'necessary for the full development of the forces of production to have become a prerequisite of production, and not that certain conditions of production should be posited as limits to the development of the forces of production.' For it is plain from what we have just been saying that the limits of growth cannot coincide with capitalist conditions of production (if it is true that capitalism is production for the sake of production, and accumulation, etc.); neither can they aspire to freeze existing equilibria characterized at national levels, and still more at the global level, by riches contrasted with poverty, dissipation and hunger, and the like.

Even in their early *German Ideology* Marx and Engels had taken up the cudgels against the doctrines of the so-called 'true socialists' who, inspired by Feuerbach's exaltation of nature, adopted positions of this kind. They not only criticized wild talk about the 'unity of life, of movement and of happiness' of natural beings (into which the unnatural unhappiness of men ought to dissolve), contrasting with this a pre-Darwinian view of nature, but they also criticized the underlying 'pattern of simple-minded philosophical mystification'. In my opinion this pattern, and hence this criticism, is applicable not only to 'true socialists' who 'have substituted for nature the expression of a vain hope' to be brought to fruition in society, but also to many contemporary endeav-

ours to the same end. I think, for example, of those who seek in history a pedigree for the 'pious hope' of introducing into society a balanced relationship between man and nature *whilst retaining the social relationships of the capitalist mode of production*. Here are some extracts from Marx's criticism of the *'simple-minded philosophical mystification'* of the 'true socialists':

> The true socialist starts from the idea that the rift between life and happiness must cease. To find a proof for this sentence he calls nature in to help and assumes that this rift does not exist in nature, whence he concludes that, since man too is a natural body, this rift ought not to exist for him either. Hobbes was able to show much more convincingly, from nature, his *bellum omnium contra omnes*, and Hegel, on the framework of whose doctrine 'true socialism' was erected, could see in nature the rift . . . and could define the animal as the anguish of God in physical form. After having muddled up our conception of nature in this way, our true socialist makes a mystery of the human conscience, calling it the 'mirror' of nature thus mystified. And of course, once the manifestation of conscience has substituted for *nature* the ideal expression of a pious hope concerning human relations, it is thought that conscience is but the mirror in which nature contemplates itself. (Marx *1977b*)

Similarly with Marx's criticism in 1850 of Daumer whom he charged with 'uttering meaningless Christian-German-patriarchal rubbish about nature', of which the following verse was one expression:

> Sweet and holy nature,
> Let me trace your footsteps.
> Take and lead me by the hand
> Like a child in leading strings.

As Schmidt has written, this exhibited 'the idealogical nature of a sentimental feeling for nature, which today defends exactly the opposite of what it is talking about'. And here is an extract from Marx's criticism of Daumer:

> We see that this cult of nature is limited to the Sunday walks of an inhabitant of a small provincial town who childishly wonders at the cuckoo laying its eggs in another bird's nest, at tears being

> designed to keep the surface of the eyes moist, and so on. There is no question, of course, of modern sciences, which, with modern industry, have revolutionized the whole of nature, and put an end to man's childish attitude towards nature as well as to other forms of childishness. . . . For the rest, it would be desirable that Bavaria's sluggish peasant economy, the ground on which priests and Daumers likewise grow, should at last be ploughed up by modern cultivation and modern machines. (Marx, *On Religion*, cited in Schmidt *1971*, pp. 131–132)

With Daumer's verse in mind, we recall in passing that in *Capital* Marx rejected this romantic idea of nature as unhistorical, and expressed his preference for a dialectical interpretation: 'a too luxuriant nature holds mankind by the hand like a child in leading strings, instead of making it a necessity of nature that man should develop.' Marx criticized ideologically not only the deification of nature because of the reactionary rejection of technology and the wish to retain pre-capitalist systems of production; he also criticized the exaltation of nature as a refuge from the indiscriminate spoliation caused by the onward march of capitalist production. It is true that this second criticism is less explicit than the first one, for the simple reason that Marx lacked targets for criticism, since he denounced the spoliation of nature before a modern bourgeois ecological conscience was born. But just because he was able to identify and place in their historical setting these ecological misdemeanours of capitalism, even though they were much less evident then than now, he has provided us with all the tools we need to criticize a false exaltation of nature as well, since this too rests upon a dichotomy between man and nature.

Engels' criticism too applies to both these positions. In his *Dialectic of Nature* he said that all social systems left out of account the effects of human action upon nature, and that the remedy was to apply the scientific knowledge of nature between various relationships of production:

> Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third

places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first. The people who in Mesopotamia, Greece, Asia Minor and elsewhere destroyed the forests to obtain cultivable land never dreamed that by removing along with the forests the collecting centres and reservoirs of moisture they were laying the basis for the present forlorn state of those countries. When the Italians of the Alps used up the pine forests on the southern slopes, so carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by doing so they were cutting at the roots of the dairy industry in their region; they had still less inkling that they were thereby depriving their mountain springs of water for the greater part of the year, and making it possible for them to pour still more furious torrents on the plains during the rainy season. Those who spread the potato in Europe were not aware that with these farinaceous tubers they were at the same time spreading scrofula. Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature – but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly.

And, in fact, with every day that passes we are acquiring a better understanding of these laws and getting to perceive both the more immediate and the more remote consequences of our interference with the traditional course of nature. In particular, after the mighty advances made by the natural sciences in the present country, we are more than ever in a position to realize, and hence to control, even the more remote natural consequences of at least our day-to-day production activities. But the more this progresses the more will men not only feel but also know their oneness with nature, and the more impossible will become the senseless and unnatural idea of a contrast between mind and matter, man and nature, soul and body, such as arose after the decline of classical antiquity in Europe and obtained its highest elaboration in Christianity. (Engels *1976*, pp. 180–181)

The more strictly philosophical aspects need not detain us. They include the concept of nature (on which Schmidt's work quoted on several occasions gives more detail), the reassessment of the Graeco-Roman world and Engels' use of Hegel's theme of what is known as the heterogenesis of aims.

Here I shall just point out how Engels emphasized that the ability to foresee effects in nature is not different from the ability to foresee the effects on society of productive activity and that the former cannot be isolated from the latter, if only because its effects are often more dramatic and catastrophic. As an example of the former, Engels recalled that the people who spread the use of the potato around Europe were not aware that they were at the same time spreading scrofula with the floury tuber, and he hastened to add: 'but what is scrofula compared to the effect which the reduction of the workers to a potato diet had on the living conditions of the masses of the people in whole countries, or compared to the famine the potato blight brought to Ireland in 1847, which consigned to the grave a million Irishmen, nourished solely or almost exclusively on potatoes, and forced the emigration overseas of two million more?' (Engels *1976*, p. 181). After noting that 'in this field too, by long and often cruel experience and by collecting and analysing historical material, we are only gradually learning to get a clear view of the indirect, more remote social effects of our production activity, and so are afforded an opportunity to control and master these effects as well', Engels reached this conclusion:

> This regulation, however, requires something more than mere knowledge. It requires a complete revolution in our whole contemporary social order. . . . In relation to nature, as to society, the present mode of production is predominantly concerned only about the immediate, the most tangible result; and then surprise is expressed that the more remote effects of actions directed to this end turn out to be quite different, are mostly quite the opposite in character . . . (Engels *1976*, pp. 182–183)

I have already remarked that Engels' view of the long-term effects of human actions on nature betrays some traces of geographical determinism: for example, where Engels attributes the dissolution of collective ownership to the fact that the surplus of cultivable land was used up, and we cannot attempt to obtain historical proof of this. Here I would only add that Marx would probably have corrected

Engels' too generalized opinions by insisting on the need to adduce historical fact for statements about the relations between man and nature in different epochs of history and modes of production.

For example, in relation to woods, we have already quoted a hint given by Marx on the subject of the conflict between the general interest and private property. In his chapter, quoted above, about the circulation of capital, Marx takes up and develops the comments of the agronomist Kirchof, who emphasized the obstacles placed in the path of a controlled economy and the safeguarding of the woodland heritage by the capitalist economy and its break-up of land-holdings:

> The production time (which comprises a relatively small period of working time) and the great length of the periods of turnover entailed make forestry an industry of little attraction to private and therefore capitalist enterprise, the latter being essentially private even if the associated capitalist takes the place of the individual capitalist. The development of culture and of industry in general has ever evinced itself in such energetic destruction of forests that everything done by it conversely for their preservation and restoration appears infinitesimal. (Marx *1965*, vol. 2, p. 248)

But, apart from this remark connecting the destruction of the stock of woodland with the progress of capitalism ('civilization' in this context meaning the advance of the forces of production and of industry), Marx made another interesting observation connected with it: the capital invested in the purchase of forest land will not yield substantial returns until after a long period, and even then is only partially amortized. In the case of communal production capital becomes unnecessary, the question then being simply what acreage the community can spare from its arable and grazing area for forestry (Marx *1965*, vol. 2, pp. 247–248).

So Marx is firmly of the opinion that different kinds of ownership result in different economic conditions of exploitation of the same natural object. Only with this methodology can we measure the extent to which the various modes of production contribute to the destruction or the

preservation of natural resources and at the same time properly engage in debate on the specific difference of the 'environmental compromises' of past societies compared with contemporary ones. In this way we see the present in the light of the past after having seen the past in the light of the present, by studying the development of the most complex economic and social system.

The ecological evils of capitalism do not exist only in the countryside, in the spoliation of land, in the destruction of natural resources and so forth; they are even more visible in the urban environment as a direct consequence of industrialization. Obviously, Marx could not have foreseen that, for example, the problem of industrial and consumer waste would have reached the gigantic proportions with which we are all too familiar today – so much so that some ecologists and geographers speak of our epoch not as the steel, petroleum or atomic energy age, but as the age of rubbish and waste. Nevertheless Marx guessed that the problem would become particularly acute under the capitalist mode of production, and far more 'destructive' than under previous social systems. The capitalist mode of production extends the amount, and also the possibilities of utilization, of the excretions of production and consumption. By the excretions of production we mean the waste of industry and agriculture. By the excretions of consumption we mean partly the excretions produced by the natural exchange of matter in the human body and partly the residue of objects that remains after their consumption. Marx held that the residues of consumption (human natural secretions, remains of clothing, etc.) should be regarded as extremely important for agriculture, but in reality their utilization gave rise to 'enormous waste' and only served to worsen the hygenic conditions in large cities such as London. Marx also observed that, by contrast, considerable economies in this field were achieved in Chinese horticulture as in that of Japan and of Lombardy but, so as to avoid any possibility of idealizing this largely pre-capitalist agriculture, he hastened to add that on the whole, the productivity of agriculture under this system stems from the prodigious use of human labour-power,

which is withheld from other spheres of production (Marx *1965*, vol. 3, p. 101).

These remarks may help to show what Marx meant when he spoke about the inability of the capitalist economy to restore to the land the organic substances taken from it; they also bring us back to the critical position taken up by Marx and Engels *vis-à-vis* the modern industrial city. It would require much space to deal with what the founders of historical materialism thought about cities, not least because of the considerable links, on this subject more than on others, between their thought and utopian socialism in France and Britain.

We are approaching the end of this review of Marx's thinking as it bears on problems of ecology and geography. But we cannot leave it without saying something about the portentous presence of that 'geographical' object, the industrial city, which in fact has claimed our attention in nearly all the problems of spatial organization under capitalism. Marx's first striking reflection on the 'city of capital' occurs in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. A recent interpreter (Choay 1973, vol. 1, p. 194) has written that in them Marx 'traces in negative form the "ontological" constitution of the city' inspired by the formative role of authentic 'dwellings'.

> Even the desire for fresh air ceases to be a *clamant* need to the workers. Man goes back to dwell in caves, but now in caves foetid with the poisonous fumes of civilization; caves henceforth inhabited only *precariously*, because they are not his own; he lives in them from day to day and can be expelled if he does not keep up with the rent. Yes, he has to *pay* for this cavern. The *radiant* dwelling said by Prometheus in Aeschylus to be one of the greatest gifts with which he turned savages into men, is no longer for the worker. Light, air, etc. - the most elementary *animal* cleanliness – ceases to be an imperative need for man. *Filth*, that depravity and corruption of man, the *sewers* (literally) of civilization, become for him the element in which he lives. Total, unnatural, indifference, corrupted nature, become his *natural environment*. He no longer has any of his senses, even in an *inhuman, bestial* manner, to say nothing of a human one. . . . We

> said above that man goes back *to dwell in caves*, but with a sense of alienation and hostility. A savage does not feel strange in his cave; it gives him a joyful sense of peace and protection. He feels as secure as does a fish in water. But the underground dwellings of the poor are hostile dwellings, 'like an alien power, granted to him only for sweat and blood'. He cannot think of it as his hearth and home where at least he can say 'here I am in my own house'. Rather is he in *someone else's* house, in a *strange* house, whose owner is ever watchful to drive him out if he does not pay the rent. And he in turn knows that his house is qualitatively the opposite of the human habitation out there, in the heaven of the rich. (Marx *1977a*)

This passage, constructed as an example of the theory of estrangement or alienation (which, as we have indicated, is a constant element in the whole Marxian analysis), also seems to me to anticipate that dialectic of the urbanite and of the production of space (i.e. an artificial, manufactured space) which Henri Lefebvre has been developing in recent years, emphasising *inter alia* how in twentieth-century cities the faults in ninteenth-century cities to which Marx drew attention have really become a universal feature. For whereas goods that once were scarce, such as bread, have now become abundant, goods that once were freely available such as light, air, water and even space, have become scarce, have become 'values' (cf. Lefebvre 1972).

Later on in his economic and sociological analysis, Marx constantly refers to Engels' pages on the Great Towns of Britain in the *Condition of the Working Class in England*, where a relentless critical analysis highlights both the splendour and the extreme poverty in the first great city of capital:

> This colossal centralization, this heaping together of two and a half millions of human beings at one point, has multiplied the power of this two and a half millions a hundredfold, has raised London to the commercial capital of the world, created the giant docks and assembled the thousand vessels that continually cover the Thames. I know nothing more imposing than the view which the Thames offers during the ascent from London Bridge . . . But the sacrifices which all this has cost become apparent later.

After roaming the streets of the capital a day or two, making headway with difficulty through the human turmoil and the endless lines of vehicles, after visiting the slums of the metropolis, one realizes for the first time that these Londoners have been forced to sacrifice the best qualities of their human nature, to bring to pass all the marvels of civilization which crowd their city; that a hundred powers which slumbered within them have remained inactive, have been suppressed in order that a few might be developed more fully and multiply through union with those others. The very turmoil of the streets has something repulsive, something against which nature rebels. The hundreds and thousands of all classes and ranks crowding past each other; are they not all human beings with the same qualities and powers, and with the same interest in being happy? And have they not, in the end, to seek happiness in the same way, by the same means? And still they crowd by one another as though they had nothing in common, nothing to do with one another, and their only agreement is the tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the pavement, so as not to delay the opposing streams of the crowd, while it occurs to no man to honour another with so much as a glance. The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his private interest becomes the more repellent and offensive, the more these individuals are crowded together, within a limited space. And, however much one may be aware that this isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking is the fundamental principle of our society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced, so self-conscious as just here in the crowding of the great city. . . . Hence it comes, too, that the social war, the war of each against all, is here openly declared. (Engels *1892*, pp. 23–24)

CHAPTER 6

Towards a Marxist Geography

Seven years after

The first five chapters of this book were written in 1974 with the aim of providing, or at least setting in train, a 'geographical' interpretation of Marx and Engels. Sooner or later the stone of Marxist philosophy was bound to be thrown into the placid pond of geography in Italy, composed as it was of a pretty conservative academic body – though admittedly with some lively youthful fringes aware of developments in the historical and social sciences. In the light of subsequent events this 'provocative' gesture can be seen as part of a struggle going on within geography throughout Europe and indeed worldwide.

Outside Italy the so-called 'quantitative revolution' had broken surface several years previously, attracting many of the younger generation who were looking for a geography exhibiting more scientific rigour and commitment. Already in the late 1960s these people, initiators of the 'new geography', were progressively demonstrating both its theoretical inconsistency and its counter-revolutionary nature. In this connection, Bunge and Harvey may be mentioned.

New frontiers and fresh objectives were needed to give meaning and direction to the rejuvenation of geography. The exposure of the limitations, both of the idealistic historicism of the more conscious trends of classical geography, and of the lifeless neo-positivism of the 'quantitative revolution', inevitably ushered in an investigation of the possible

contribution of Marxism to geographical studies. Moreover, it was essential to close the time and opportunity gap that – incredible though it was and is – had been allowed to develop between geography and the other social sciences, which in consequence had been encroaching with increasing confidence and persistence on the 'territory' of geography. We should not overlook in this context the decisive part played by thinkers such as Henri Lefebvre, by sociologists like Manuel Castells or by economists such as André Gunder Frank, or indeed, the Marxist endeavours in the fields of historiography and urban studies, carried forward in nearly all countries.

Nevertheless, not until the mid-1970s was the Marxist point of view represented regularly and systematically in geographical journals. Before that time there were two possible areas of influence which may usefully be considered together: geography in the Soviet Union based on Marxism – Leninism; and geography in North America in which a strong 'radical' tendency first made its appearance at the end of the 1960s.

Before embarking on the examination of these two areas we may pertinently inquire into the reasons for the long delay that intervened before geographers in the West began to bring Marxist insights to bear upon the discussion of geographical problems. Some of these reasons were internal, others external to the discipline. Nowadays the internal reasons are generally recognized. Every honest geographer now agrees that until the end of the 1960s geographical research cultivated the university model of an empirical, concrete science, inclined to bring to the study of regional differences a method already fully developed and hallowed by tradition. *In short, a body of knowledge completely untroubled by doubts and questionings about political and social factors such as have induced in students of the social sciences an awareness of the shortcomings of the dominant patterns of thought.*

The external reasons have their origin predominantly in the history of the working-class movement itself and of Marxism in the West – fresh proof of a critical outlook

which, despite the persistent contrary opinion of academic geographers, is inseparable from the operations of Marxist research. In this connection it is pertinent to recall Braverman's analysis in *Labour and Monopoly Capital*, where he explains why the study of the work process and of the class structure of the capitalist mode of production has failed to progress since Marx to take account of the changes which have been taking place ever since the beginning of the twentieth century as commercial, administrative and technical work has increased in volume and importance:

> The unionized working class, intimidated by the scale and complexity of capitalist production, and weakened in its original revolutionary impetus by the gains afforded by the rapid increase of productivity, increasingly lost the will and ambition to wrest control of production from capitalist hands and turned ever more to bargaining over labour's share in the product. This labour movement formed the immediate environment of Marxism; and Marxists were, in varying degrees, compelled to adapt themselves to it. . . . The working philosophy of Marxism, as distinguished from its holiday pronouncements, focused increasingly not upon the profound inner nature of capitalism and the worker's position within it, but upon its various conjunctural effects and crises. In particular, the critique of the mode of production gave way to the critique of capitalism as a mode of distribution. (Braverman 1974, pp. 10–11)

In my view this is a highly relevant distinction, since there is no doubt that discussion of the problems relating to geography can be more easily linked to a Marxism centred upon the analysis of the work process and of the productive forces of labour (implying interaction between society and nature) than to a 'critique of capitalism as a mode of distribution'. Moreover this analysis, which reflects more than anything else the Marxism of the Second *Internationale*, can find indirect confirmation in the development of a 'revolutionary geography' on the fringes of the Marxist movement, in the anarchic currents of Reclus and Kropotkin.

The very rebirth of revolutionary Marxism in the communist movement after the Russian revolution inhibited reformist tendencies in many other fields but not, according

to Braverman, in this one. In Russia's economically backward situation Marxists increased their respect for, and even their admiration of, scientific technology, organized and standardized production systems, and the work-process characteristic of advanced capitalism. The ideological effect of this judgement was felt throughout Marxist territory: the technology of capitalism, which Marx had treated with cautious reserve, and the organization and administration of work, which he had treated with passionate hostility, became relatively acceptable.

Then in the 1960s a fresh wave of hostility arose, directed at the very bases of capitalism:

> The new wave of radicalism of the 1960s was animated by its own peculiar and in some ways unprecedented concerns. Since the discontents of youth, intellectuals, feminists, ghetto populations, etc., were produced not by the 'breakdown' of capitalism but by capitalism functioning at the top of its form, so to speak, working at its most rapid and energetic pace, the focus of rebellion was now somewhat different from that of the past. At least in part, dissatisfaction centred not so much on capitalism's inability to provide work as on the work it provides, not on the collapse of its productive processes but on the appalling effects of these processes at their most 'successful'. (Braverman 1974, p. 14)

Braverman's analysis provides us with some leads for the contrastive look at the Soviet and American radical left experiencees that we shall make presently. Inspired neither by Marxist orthodoxy nor by technological determinism, Braverman nevertheless finds such similarities between Soviet and traditional capitalist practices that he reaches more or less explicitly the conclusion that there is no other way to organize modern industry, and hence he leaves no freedom of manoeuvre to social creativity. Braverman's analysis also suggests to us how some of the roots of this attitude of technological determinism are to be found even in classical Marxist writings, especially in Engels, and how, significantly, they come out in his polemics against anarchism. For instance, in his 1873 statement against anarchism entitled *On Authority*, Engels wrote:

> Man with his science and inventive genius may have conquered the forces of nature, but the latter have taken their revenge on him by subjecting him, at the very moment when he is using them, to a veritable despotism independent of any social organization. To wish to do away with authority in large-scale industry is to wish to do away with industry itself – to destroy steam-driven textile machine processes and go back to the spinning-wheel.

Engels' mistake was to postulate a despotism of the forces of nature and an authority of the machine 'independent of any social organization', thereby introducing a determinism both of nature and of technology far removed from the spirit of Marxist socialism, which is historical and on the whole libertarian. The fact that this mistake was committed in the course of a polemic against anarchism is a further confirmation of the reason why the recovery of Marxism requires that the radical wave be left behind in favour of a libertarian interpretation of socialism and communism.

Any contribution of Marxism to geography today must be more than simply historical; it must also embody an interpretation of Marx. Seven years ago it may have been sufficient to put forward Marxism pure and simple, since geographers up till then had worked without it. Inevitably, however, the current debate on geography and Marxism, although still on the fringes of international geography, shows that there are a number of different interpretations. It is essential to say where one stands in relation to them and to make a clear and justified choice in relation to the approach to geography upon which an agreed programme can be based.

The interpretation put forward in this book in the Italian edition of 1974 was based essentially on that of Della Volpe (1962) and of Colletti (1961), especially as regards its theoretical foundations. Such an interpretation was to a large extent in agreement with the structuralist view of Althusser (*1969*). These two interpretations, however, have in common a basic idea of scientific rationality which now seems to be badly flawed and to be similar in many ways to the idea of rationality found in bourgeois science. It is, therefore, no accident that Althusser's ideas have been used as a new

theoretical orthodoxy by the reformist groups now dominant in official Marxism in France and Italy. And, as we shall see, this approach is now accepted in academic geographical circles too, in their obvious instrumentalization of Marxism.

I believe it is essential to apply the phenomenological interpretation which proved its worth back in the sixties in the critique of Marxist rationality of the Stalinist variety. In my opinion it represents a potentially valuable approach to a new geography of society. It is also worth emphasizing that interest in a link between phenomenology and Marxism in France, Italy, the United States and Hungary arose or developed under the influence of the events of 1968 – in the renewal and extension of the struggles and of the awareness of new needs.

Specifically, there is at the heart of the phenomenological interpretation of Marxism a critique of the scientific objectivism that is typical both of Marxism in Soviet Russia and of interpretations of Althusser's type, both of which tend to boil down to an ideology of the forces of production, in other words to reduce Marxism to an economic calculus. By contrast, the phenomenological hypothesis is about an idea of scientificness based upon real subjects and their praxis – not on the coherence of an objective model but on fidelity to the meaning of truth discoverable in actual use and hence able to be carried into effect and appropriated by the subjects in society (Rovatti 1973, p. 10).

Geography in Soviet Russia

It could be cogently argued that geography in Russia went through its most revolutionary phase before its institutionalization in the Russian state, and that it had links both with the populist movement and with the spread of Marxism and the birth and formation of the workers' movement in Tsarist Russia.

In any event, even though it claims to be of Marxist-Leninist inspiration, Soviet geography does not appear to have played a decisive part in persuading important groups of

geographers in the West to take a serious interest in Marxism. Only a superficial treatment, such as Claval's, could conclude that Soviet research had followed an identical line to that in the West, or even had a decisive influence (above all in Italy), simply because some Russian texts had been translated and published there (Claval 1977).

In reality the history of geography in the Soviet Union and of its relations with geography in the West is much more complex than Claval appears to believe. From the viewpoint under discussion here, geography in Soviet Russia looks like the construction of a national geography on a basis of free discussion, showing traces of influence by Western geography of a conservative stamp, and whose special features do not much lend themselves to application in a Europe-wide context, especially from a revolutionary point of view.

Even though Soviet geographers cannot be expected to say so, we now find the pre-Soviet tradition of geography in Russia of greater interest than current themes. In particular it represented a type of research which combined exploration with scientific analysis and which had a strong political bias in favour of improving the conditions of the lower classes, owing to the influence of the more progressive elements in the Russian Geographical Society (founded in 1845 to promote the 'collection of data among the populace'). Also important were the efforts in exploration and administration by Kropotkin in Siberia, and the major field surveys undertaken by V.V. Bexvi-Flezovskij concerning the situation of the working class in Russia in 1869.

There was a complete departure from this type of human geography during the 1930s under Stalin's rule, at which time geography in Soviet Russia acquired the characteristics which it retained until the 'thaw' under Kruschev. Geography followed the 'scientific dogmas' laid down by Stalin and the political and cultural bureaucracy in Soviet Russia. In September 1938 Stalin ruled that it was no longer permissible to speak of the influence of the environment upon society. This edict was not aimed at encouraging an anti-determinist human geography but at exploiting this concept as an instrument of propaganda for the triumphal glorification of

the achievements of the Soviet regime and of its plans for modifying nature.

As a result of these measures Soviet geographers took refuge *en masse* in specialist areas of physical geography, emphasizing the points of difference from the now compromised human geography, for fear of being accused of anti-Soviet activities, as happened to all those who took their cue from European human geography, from location analysis or from theories of environmental influence.

> The leaders of the discipline in the all-powerful Academy of Sciences, all of them physical geographers, proclaimed the doctrinal and ideological necessity of a 'legal' separation between physical geography and human (economic) geography, claiming of course that this distinction was rooted in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. In this way the integrated study of man in relation to his environment, which is a central theme of geography both within and outside Russia and a 'natural' theme for Marxism and for planning, was declared to be illegitimate at the theoretical level, if not outright heretical. Although the Stalinist period was characterized by a considerable expansion of geography as research and as a teaching subject and although in theory political control was absolute, the actual result was a parody not only of Marxist principles but also, from a practical point of view, of the usefulness of geography itself for the purpose of the state. (Hooson 1977)

It was only during the decade following Stalin's death that a wide-ranging debate developed. Owing to the preponderant influence exercised by the party bureaucracy, this resulted in a modification of the original 'paradigm' in the direction of paying more attention to economic geography and integrating it more with physical geography. The prime movers in this new trend were Baransky, Saushkin and Anuchin. And even this reorientation was justified by appeal to Marxist-Leninist principles. By the same token, these 'more Marxist' pioneers were of course accused by the geographical establishment of being 'anti-Marxist.

It is worth while briefly to recapitulate this controversy to which, sovietologists claim, the only comparable precedent was the even more notorious Lysenko controversy about

genetics. The discussion began with the publication in 1960 of *Theoretical Problems of Geography* by Anuchin. The theme of this book was the need for a unified geography and a critique of the indeterminism connected with Stalinist voluntarism. One of Anuchin's most vocal opponents was Gerasimov, the same who is now the spokesman abroad for the geography that has adopted Anuchin's principles! Baransky and Saushkin were among those who then took sides with Anuchin. However, the controversy would never have been resolved (nor would Anuchin have received his doctorate) had not the Party entered the debate. In October 1963 one Ilychev, clothed with the authority of an official ideologist, set out before the Praesidium of the Academy of Sciences the new Soviet conception of the relation between nature and society in the following words which, for all their imprecision, were enough to overturn the former paradigm: 'We cannot ignore the influence of nature upon society, just as we cannot ignore the influence of society upon nature. Stalin was mistaken when he claimed that the geographical environment was purely external to society. . .' The era of Stalinist triumphalism over nature was ended!

This rapid sketch of the course of events in Soviet geography shows that its connection with the philosophy of Marxism was more a matter of form and ritual than anything else. It is probable that the new trend was largely influenced not only by reasons of state but also by the heritage of geography in the pre-Soviet period, even though the latter is still interpreted too dogmatically by Soviet commentators. Equal importance, however, must be attributed to the influence of the neo-positivist trends in geography in the West. This is illustrated by the results of the most recent economic geography.

In discussion of the growing problems caused by progressive urbanization and territorial division of labour within Soviet society, problems manifested in increasing territorial and social inequalities, the almost ritual reference to the precepts of Marx and Engels and to Marxist dialectic on the one hand, and to the 'laws of socialist development' on the other, are increasingly being relegated to the background or

even replaced by the systematic use of quantitative description and prognosis, the construction of models and flow charts etc. (Hooson 1977).

This being so, we certainly cannot share Saushkin's opinion that

> international geography is powerfully influenced by the theoretical and practical results obtained by scholars in socialist countries, including those of Soviet geographers. This influence is particularly strong in the field of economic geography, and it emphasizes the differentiation between scholars of capitalist countries and strengthens the position of progressive geographers. (Saushkin 1972, p. 125)

In fact, this proposition is becoming less tenable every day, for the more geographers in the Soviet Union focus their attention on the problems of society, such as the division of labour and of the forces of production, the more closely do their findings tend to approximate to those of Western geography of the quantitative and technocratic type. Studies which identify the problems inherent in unbalanced industrial and urban growth are aimed more at controlling them in terms of bureaucratic manipulation than at overcoming them by means most clearly set out by Marx and Engels. These studies invariably throw up still more highly planned distribution 'models', more 'logical' town plans, and are used for forecasts of the spatial organization of production, territorial production complexes, productive regions the basic units for state intervention in land use (De Koninck 1980, p. 128).

This is Marxism Leninism reduced to economic calculus, the ideology of production. Rodolphe De Koninck justly concludes his unsparing analysis with the words: 'Far from helping to eliminate the problems of society the forward (or backward?) flight of technocratic discussion helps to sweep them under the carpet.' In the light of this observation Saushkin's judgement on the bourgeois approach to geographical and economic research applies equally to economic geography in the Soviet Union:

> The essence of the bourgeois approach to research on economic geography, even by eminent scholars, is precisely that in their

> works, in the complete and objective characterization of the forces of production and of their territorial combinations, and even in a complete description of the economic and social conditions of development of a country (which happens less frequently), any analysis of the tensions that arise within capitalism between the forces of production and the relations of production, of problems and tensions in the formation of the regions, etc., is absent. At best, some account is given of the partial problems involved in development, in other words, minor criticism. (Saushkin 1972, p. 147)

Clearly, the criticisms levelled by radical geographers in North America against quantitative geography are equally applicable to geography in the Soviet Union. It is also evident why conservative geographers in the West find more and more in common with Soviet geography with its liking for quantitative methods, its technocratic scientism, its academic formalism and, in certain of its aspects, a veritable return to the views of classical, integral, synthetic geography.

Contrary to Claval's view, it is in fact academic geography in the West that is making use of Soviet geography in order to gain new impetus and to get rid of the revolutionary bias of Marxism. It is no accident that the most radical criticisms of Soviet geography emanate from *Marxist* geographers, led by David Harvey.

Radical geography

Harvey has played a prominent part in the evolution of progressive geography in the United States towards Marxism. In an article originally published in 1971 (and subsequently incorporated in *Social Justice and the City*), Harvey intimated that he had accepted the Marxist philosophy; Soviet geography was classified among the counter-revolutionary theories and placed on the same level as the bourgeois social sciences:

> The counter-revolutionary cooptation of Marxist theory in Russia after Lenin's death, and a similar counter-revolutionary cooptation of much of Marxist language into Western sociology (so much so

> that some sociologists suggest that we are all Marxists now) without conveying the essence of Marxist thinking, has effectively prevented the true flowering of Marxist thought and, concomitantly, the emergence of that humanistic society which Marx envisaged. Both the concepts and the projected social relationships embodied in the concepts were frustrated. (Harvey 1973, p. 127)

Before discussing the cooptation of Marxist language in geography, it is pertinent to recall that for a long while any attempt to open up geographical discussion to revolutionary and Marxist perspectives was severely repressed, as is shown in examples provided by W. Bunge and as democratic and Marxist geographers in Europe have not failed to observe.

In any event, the emergence of a radical and Marxist geography in North America is a fact of great significance, especially because it has come about in an endeavour to solve the doubts and problems experienced by the most advanced thinkers. Harvey, for example, puts forward a convincing explanation of the emergence of the new trend by recourse to a materialist reinterpretation of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. Assuming that 'the motivation for the construction of a paradigm in social research is the wish to manipulate and control human activity and social phenomena in the interest of people', we can say that the quantitative paradigm, apart from its less savoury aspects (of a struggle for power within a discipline) came into existence as a response to external pressures that indicated the desirability of discovering ways of manipulation and control in that area that may be defined as the planning sector (Harvey 1973). The results very soon led to the realization, which spread rapidly among ever wider circles of geographers, of the obvious disparity between the sophisticated theoretical and methodological frame of reference they were using and their ability to make truly significant statements about the events taking place around them. 'There are too many anomalies between what we purport to explain and manipulate and what actually happens. There is an ecological problem, an urban problem, a problem of international trade, and yet we seem incapable of saying anything of depth or profundity about any of them. When we do say something,

it appears trite and rather ludicrous' (Harvey 1973, pp. 128–129).

Unlike the former analytical-quantitative formula, the Marxist approach begins by posing *the political problem of who is to control and who is to be controlled*. In the important argument between Berry and Harvey there is one point at which, beyond the differences about theory and research, the political difference between the two approaches is polarized. To Berry's objection that 'the greatest problem of modern society is not the class struggle, which is a secondary aspect of an overall competition in the field of wages, but the existence of an *uncontrolled* economic function, uncontrolled even when it is receiving economic assistance from the state', Harvey replies by erecting the alternative concept of *political control*: that of the people, regarded not as an object to be acted upon so as to control it, but as the totality of the subjects seeking to control the social conditions of their own existence.

Undoubtedly 'Bill' Bunge's experience has had considerable influence in this area. Apart from the typically American context in which it occurred and apart from some debatable aspects of theory, Bunge's personal and scientific pilgrimages are still an indispensable reference point for the critical consciousness of all democratic geographers. They act against the recurrent tendencies of academics to blur the issues, and in favour of a closer alignment between theory and practice (Bunge 1974).

Beyond this ethical level, Harvey draws his political conclusions from a reconstruction of Marx's ontology and epistemology, which he summarizes in these fundamental principles:

> Concepts and categories cannot be viewed as having an independent existence, as being universal abstractions true for all time. The structure of knowledge can be transformed, it is true, by its own internal laws of transformation (including those social pressures internal to science). But the results of this process have to be interpreted in terms of the relationships they express within the totality of which they form a part. . . . It is irrelevant to ask whether concepts, categories and relationships are 'true' or 'false'.

> We have to ask, rather, what it is that produces them and what is it that they serve to produce? Hence arises the distinction between revolutionary theories which are productive of change, *status quo* theories which are derived out of and help to preserve an existing situation, and counter-revolutionary theories which produce only confusion, obfuscation and frustration. (Harvey 1973, p. 298)

From this point of departure it is possible to sustain the theoretical superiority of the social sciences over the natural sciences. This is an important principle for geography, which has traditionally had a position of marked subjection in regard to the so-called 'exact sciences'. Apart from the purely disciplinary aspect, this also hints at an ambitious programme of restructuring of knowledge from a Marxist perspective:

> Questions of social action and social control, which the techniques of natural science frequently help to resolve, are not incorporated into natural science itself. In fact there is a certain fetishism about keeping social issues out of the natural sciences since incorporating them would supposedly 'bias' research carried out at the behest of the existing social order. . . . Therefore, it seems appropriate to conclude that the philosophy of social science is *potentially* much superior to that of natural science and that the eventual fusion of the two fields of study will come about not through attempts to 'scientize' social science but instead by the socialization of natural science (cf. Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*). This may mean the replacement of manipulation and control with the realization of human potential as the basic criterion for paradigm acceptance. In such an event all aspects of science would experience both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary thinking which would undoubtedly be associated with revolutionary changes in social practice. (Harvey 1973, pp. 127–128)

One important advance made by radical geography is its critique of *spatial fetishism* or positivist spatialism on which the 'new geography' has been built and which the reaction to a Marxist geography continues to take as its rallying-point. From Anderson (1973) to Gregory (1978) and De Koninck (1978) it is clearly evident that the last beachhead of reaction in geography consists in the claim to explain spatial configuration while remaining at the 'spatial' level

itself, arguing that spatial structures can be theorized about without bringing in the question of social structures. This exacts a heavy price: its exponents have to remain on the surface of empirical phenomena and to introduce surreptitiously only fragments of social theory; in other words, to introduce them as bias or prejudgement. Because of this, the 'new geography' is in danger of becoming more 'chaotic and tautological than the old geography, which did at least draw a distinction between 'hidden factors' and 'outer manifestations' in the structure of space (Hartshorne 1939), and did not claim to find the causes of the problems identified by spatial contrasts in the *results* of much deeper social causes (Peet 1978). What this means is that, in the endeavour to fix its constantly threatened place in the Pantheon of the humanities, geography takes its stand on the autonomy of objective space (i.e. of spatial facts, relations and structures), but ends up by denying or evacuating the object which is central and common to all the human sciences man himself.

From this point of view the Marxist interpretation operates at two levels. First it functions as a critique of all attempts at disciplinary fetishism. Here is Harvey's most explicit exposition of this critique:

> Reality has, therefore, to be approached directly rather than through the formulations of academic disciplines. We have to think in non- or meta-disciplinary terms if we are to think academically about our problems at all. Genuine revolutionary formulations cannot have a specific disciplinary basis – they must be located with respect to all relevant aspects of material reality. Unfortunately, most of us in academia have been trained to think in terms of (and to locate our identity with respect to) specific disciplines. Geography has less of a problem than most in this regard since most geographers have little idea as to what geography is and are forced to make heavy use of other disciplines in the course of their work. (Harvey 1973, p. 149)

Secondly, the Marxist interpretation, brought into play chiefly through the experience of the social and human sciences (which in course of time have assimilated from it various points of view and concepts), can be traced also in

that cultural platform which nowadays goes under the name of humanistic geography and is associated mainly with the phenomenological approach. For this outlook serves at the very least to keep us in contact with a conception of man as a being living in constant sensory contact with the social and natural realities that surround him (Harvey 1978). So, one of the most interesting aspects of the phenomenological school, even more than its theoretical limitations (which can be attributed both to idealism and to the most naive empiricism), is its attempt to bridge the gap (which the positivists had widened) between scientific geographical knowledge and the imagery and territorial culture of the social subjects.

Some anti-Marxist geographers, like Claval, try to contrast Marxist geography with humanistic geography. Harvey's more thorough analysis shows that both in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* and in the *German Ideology*, Marx endowed his system of thought with an effective and attractive phenomenological basis. Moreover, the móst recent developments in humanistic geography, in Great Britain for example, often lead to a rediscovery of historical materialism (Gregory 1978; Ley 1978).

In conclusion, radical geography has been performing since the late sixties the notable service of troubling the placid waters of geography with a series of 'provocations' such as Marxism and the anarchist tendency, the journal *Antipode* (started in 1969), William Bunge's rediscovery of exploratory geography, Marxist analysis of urbanization and the introduction of the concept of social justice. Some of these provocations have rebounded into Europe and, as we shall see, have helped to liven things up in European geographical circles. Others have not yet had much time and, seemingly, we have not yet succeeded in structuring them adequately, the 'Union of Socialist and Revolutionary Geographers' being a case in point. The overall impression is of a glowing magma showing signs of solidifying in two different directions which for the sake of brevity we may label Marxist and anarchist. Certain dangers lie in wait for each of them. The former must beware of sliding into a

Marxist orthodoxy liable to set up an objectivist model of theory and of science – the path taken by structuralism of the Althusser type and, partly, of the Soviet type too. The latter must beware of the limitations of an ethical choice and of an interventionism exposed to the risk of becoming an end in itself, lacking adequate political and theoretical motivation.

The original patterns for these two trends can perhaps be traced back to Harvey and Bunge, in whose most basic theoretical and political frameworks they can respectively be found. Bailly (1978) set them out schematically as shown below:

DAVID HARVEY'S APPROACH



WILLIAM BUNGE'S APPROACH


Critique of the process of consumption
Revolution at the grass roots
Self-management and modifications to the process of production

Marxism in European geography: a substantial yet invisible presence

In his pathetic attempt to write off endeavours to construct a Marxist geography as being outdated, irrelevant or down-

right silly and to erect an artificial ring-fence around humanist geography, Paul Claval does not appear to have been an honoured prophet even in his own country, even in that area which may be broadly defined as francophone and Mediterranean, where he is certainly not without influence. In France, for example, the phenomenologists who, beginning with Frémont, base their thinking on lived-in space, have with good reason rediscovered Marx's concept of alienation. *La Région, Espace Vécu* (Frémont 1976a) is one of the few manuals of geography which, at the present time, gives due weight to the essential contribution made by Marx to the redefinition of humanist geography, both by the direct use of the concepts of Marx's 'sociology', which are needed for an understanding both of 'space appropriation' and 'space alienation', and by reference to a whole body of his work which has since become the common basic heritage of the social and human sciences, to the point where most researchers are unaware of the Marxian or Marxist provenance of the material they are handling. To take just one example: Frémont's use of a 'geography of economic areas' developed within 'a unified system of time-space relationships' owes much (although the debt is not always directly acknowledged) to Marx's historicism and its construction of an organic sequence of the economic formation of society and models of spatial organization (as I sought to describe in Chapter 4).

In any event, for our present purpose the French experience is of more interest than the British or German. As far as I have been able to understand from the limited material available to me, social geographers in Germany do not appear to have embarked upon a debate about the potentialities of Marxism as a theory of society. Only Bartels appears to have picked up some of the ideas that undeniably are offered by the Frankfurt School. As regards human geography in Britain, although the paucity of links with Marxism in the West may perhaps be put down to the well-known 'insularity' of British thought up to the 1970s (cf. Anderson 1976), there is one aspect that seems interesting to me (though I cannot pursue it here), namely the connections between geography and Marxist historiography which form the basis

for a development of historical geography unparalleled in any other European country.

Although geographers in France were late in recognizing the shortcomings of neo-positivist geography (probably owing to the moderating influence of geographers like Pierre George, and because geographers there are by tradition state-oriented), since the mid-1970s they appear anxious to regain their former position as leaders in the international geographical debate. Even though little account seems to be taken of experiences elsewhere, new fora for discussion have been created, most notable of which are the journals, *Espace géographique* and *Hérodote*, launched respectively in 1971 and 1976.

The discussion of Marxism was opened in the pages of *Hérodote*, mainly in relation to Lacoste's theses, and then extended to the columns of *L'Espace géographique* in 1977, around one of Claval's writings. This discussion, in which geographers from Belgium and Holland are also taking part, and which is effectively still in progress, constitutes the most important engagement between Marxists and non-Marxists in geography at the present time.

Claval's position is already well known; we earlier labelled it spatialism or space fetishism. In substance, the reproach levelled by Claval at Marx is that he pushed his theories to the point of 'eliminating space', in the sense that space is said to play no part at all in the construction of Marx's theories. Concurrently he levels the criticism at present-day Marxist theoreticians in geography that 'they never take a *direct reflection* on space as a starting-point', and that they are incapable of putting forward 'a theory of space properly so-called'. The gravamen of Claval's complaint against Marx and the Marxists is that they do not see eye to eye with his own definition of geography as the 'science of space' which examines the configuration of space as the result of spatial elements (such as area, distance, presence of various factors, etc.) and of human activity: two orders of facts which interact in accordance with 'a subtle dialectic of action and of resistances offered by the natural and social milieux' (Claval 1977, pp. 160–164).

Thus Claval's position is characterized by an old-fashioned definition of geography not far removed from that of Sorre, and by a rigidly disciplinary, institutionalized and academic viewpoint. It aroused strong criticism as soon as it was promulgated. One geographer went so far as to stand Claval's viewpoint on its head and to ask whether the real problem 'might be not what contribution the classics of Marxism could bring to geography, but rather what contribution present-day geography could make to a Marxist debate'. (Frémont 1976b).

Claval's critique of Marxism has been completely demolished by participants in the debate in the pages of *L'Espace géographique* and elsewhere. The Bordeaux Collective of Researchers, P. Saey, C. Van Beunigen, R. De Koninck and others have shown that Claval's criticism applies not to Marx but to Althusser: 'It is not Marx who has been unmasked as dogmatic and anti-scientific, but one of Marx's expounders, namely Althusser. Claval has read Marx through Althusserian spectacles, and the Marx who emerged from that reading was tried and rightly found wanting because he was adjudged "too lightweight" for our discipline' (Van Beunigen 1977).

Bearing in mind that Claval goes well beyond Althusser's conclusions and that it would be unjust to attribute to the latter an interpretation that may well appear so 'lightweight' as positively to evaporate under the eyes of the reader, it seems to us that Claval's reasons for rejecting Marx stem from nearer home, and are geographical. For example, the fact that Claval rejects Marx's method as dogmatic and unscientific 'essentialism' aimed at discovering the 'underlying reality' beneath the deceiving surface of observable facts and empirical phenomena is the inevitable consequence of an empiricism typical of geography. This empiricism confuses 'the visible and commonly accepted evidence of things', i.e. the *geographical evidence*, with reality. In this connection Dematteis (1980) has recently observed that:

> Until the end of the 1960s geographical research and Marxist analysis . . . throughout the Western world seemed to be concerned with two completely different realities. Geography did

> not venture into that reality on which Marxist analysis was founded. Geography's strength had always been that it was based on the visible and commonly accepted evidence of things; its statements, largely couched in the present indicative of the verb 'to be', might appear to be excessively simple and not very 'scientific', but they were incontrovertible. Marx himself did not deny that kind of evidence, but he did deny that it represented the true shape of human affairs. He criticized 'this folly of confusing a given social relation of production that is represented in objects, in things, with a natural material property of these same objects, . . . these same things (unpublished Book VI of *Capital*). . . . The recent encounter of geography with Marxism has developed, in my opinion, as a sort of fissure produced in the *geographical evidence*, the result of pressures arising both within the discipline itself and from the crisis in the outer world.

The point is important, and is worth elucidating. 'To confuse a given social relation of production that is represented in objects, in things, with a natural material property of these same objects, these same things' means to conceive as *things* the *social relations* of capital and land monopolized by private ownership, and then to think of the characteristics of these things or objects as being natural properties, not historically conditioned. Capital is identified with *things* (the means of production) and land monopolized by private ownership is thought of as land *as such*. This is the fetishism of political economy and of geography, which fails to see the social relations behind the appearance of things. But Marx's analysis does not end there: this fetishism is not simply an ideological illusion or a theoretical error (transmuting historically determined social relations into natural, perennial ones), but also a *real process*. The fetishist concepts (which include what Dematteis calls 'geographical evidence') reflect that *real* operation produced by capitalist society which Marx calls *alienation* or those real processes known as *reification* and which make up the immanent stresses in society which dialectic endeavours to explain. For capitalist society *really* divides individuals and social relations and sets them one against another. Work and the conditions of work effectively take on the shape of things,

of inanimate objectivity which dominates the work process. The root cause of alienation is the opposition between wage labour and capital, and the concrete historical process of the expropriation of the producers which enabled the original accumulation of capital to take place 'Money cannot become capital without first having been exchanged for labour-power which the worker sells as a commodity; labour can appear as wage-labour only from the moment when *its own* objective conditions confront it as *autonomous powers*, owned by another, as a value existing *per se* and enclosed within itself – in short, capital.' (Unpublished chapter VI of *Capital*, in Marx *1973a*)

We have thus laid bare the theoretical and practical roots of spatial fetishism, which is simply a variant of the analysis of society which reduces social relations to relations between things, and which reduces *finitely determined* social relations to *natural* social relations of things. We have also explained why Claval's understanding stops short at the threshold of *Capital*, at the analysis of goods and at the concept of value.

In general terms what Claval, and many others who interpret Marxism, fail to understand is the distinction between *political economy* and the *critique of political economy*, which Marx took care to adopt as the subtitle of *Capital*. This distinction is basic to Marx's scientific programme; it is what distinguishes it from other research schemata. Moreover, as we shall see, it is also an essential element in the construction of a *critical paradigm* in geography such as is now being proposed by some workers in the field.

In 'political economy', which is the perspective in which both the classical economists and Sraffa and Robinson (cited by Claval in support of his arguments) work, the theory of labour-value is not critical and can be dispensed with; whereas in the 'critique of political economy', which goes beyond the strictly economic field and inquires not how exchange works but what it is (in other words what is *a society* based on exchange and why it exists), the theory of labour-value is an essential instrument. Only with these added questions does political economy become a critique of capitalist society and hold out the prospect of overcoming

this society by showing it to be neither a fact of nature nor an immutable order of things.

In other words, Claval sets economist Sraffa up against Marx because Sraffa carries out an operation similar to the one that Claval would like to see carried out for social geography. Sraffa manipulates the science of economics in a way which makes it very similar to natural science, that is to say a science of things. He does this by eliminating all the assumptions that by tradition have been included in theories of value; but in so doing he leaves the domain of the processes of reification completely unprotected. In other words he does not tell us how man managed to reify himself into the objects which Sraffa's economic science then examines as simple objects; he just stays within the ambit of that evidence of things which, in the words of Marx, conceals 'the personification of things and the reification of persons'.

But a high price is paid for this naturalistic reduction – one that affects even the scientific territory in which Claval operates. If it is true that the act of creation cannot be reproduced in the knowledge of the physical world, it is also true that if the processes and actions whereby a society was produced by men are not reproduced in the knowledge of that society, the objects of the social sciences are continually eluding capture; there no longer exist any specific social objects. If the process of reification is not reproduced in consciousness, as a specific process of construction of capitalist society, then bourgeois capitalist society and a slave society no longer exist as specific objects, different from one another; only society in general exists. Furthermore, even the more strictly methodological aspects of the relation between abstract and concrete are linked to the subject of the relation between appearance and reality, and, by a series of logical steps, to the theme of the relation between revolutionary theory and practice; and if this link is broken, the overall meaning of Marx's theory cannot be understood.

We have dealt at length with Claval's arguments for two reasons. First because, as we shall argue below, we are convinced that it is the very elements of theory which Claval has not understood, or that he would like to jettison, that can

form the basis of a critical paradigm in geography; and secondly because we find that some of the facets of Claval's criticism of Marxism are present not only in the writings of academic 'establishment' geographers (who, having tried the way of suppression are now essaying a comeback by means of dialogue though often with the rules bent) but also more surprisingly, in writings by *left-wing* geographers. The most surprising example is found in the review *Hérodote* or more accurately, in the theoretical stance of its founder, Yves Lacoste.

Briefly, Lacoste takes the view that Marx, by structuring his argument in constant reference to history, gave no attention at all to the problems of space, and that this has had a serious effect on the course taken by the class struggle. He holds that in some instances the lack of a *science of space* has led to political failure in the class struggle. His position is different from that of Claval – almost diametrically opposed, in fact. Lacoste is in favour of knowledge about space for the oppressed masses – a 'knowledge of space in order to transform it' – and yet there is no denying that they have some things in common in their approach to Marxism. They both rely on Althusser's interpretation, even though the use they make of it differs widely. In substance, both Claval and Lacoste agree with Althusser's interpretation where he maintains that Marx's epistemology embodies only a structural analysis of time, of duration, of history; but whereas Claval, for ideological reasons, reaches the conclusion that Marx's method leads to a negation of history as well as of geography, Lacoste takes the view that only the 'continent of history' has been or can be renewed in a deep sense by Marxism. The difference is that Lacoste has more in common with Althusser than Claval has, and this is not difficult to understand.

Yet it was not by accident, nor because of his philosophical training, that Marx subsumes space under time and not the other way round. Just because Marx's theory is a critical one and therefore dynamic and dialectical, just because we know that if we cannot reconstruct the processes we shall be confronted by false structures, history – time – *had* to be

given the pre-eminence. Hence from this point of view Marx's 'historical materialism' is a theory without which further progress in the discipline of geography cannot take place. We must either assign a determinative role to history and the processes of history or relapse into space fetishism, into spatialist concepts in geography.

This is the point on which the theoretical approach of *Hérodote* differs most markedly from that of *Hérodote/ Italia*, a review started at the end of 1978 following the breach in epistemology and policy that Lacoste and *Hérodote* undoubtedly represented in international geography. The work of Lucio Gambi is a sufficient reminder that Marxist geographers in Italy are not in danger of undervaluing history.

Other groups of progressive geographers in French-speaking areas are working along still other lines; their main concern is that geography should once more find its bearings amid the buffetings of ideological uncertainty and disciplinary boat-rocking. This is the direction followed by Racine, Bailly and the *Geo-point* group – a group which is open to all the winds of opinion at present blowing through geography. Such an attitude is to be welcomed, the more so as it is ready to go into the battle of ideas without wishing to bend the rules. Its starting-point is in fact a realistic assessment of the unsatisfactory anomalies in the geographical sciences, a recognition of the role of idealogy and of the importance of the contribution of Marxism in this respect. Perhaps Harvey's statement made back in 1971 can be taken as a convenient basic text for this approach: he wrote that in the present phase the most fruitful strategy is to explore that area of knowledge in which certain aspects of positivism, of materialism and of phenomenology are present and overlap, and which may provide satisfactory interpretations of the social reality in which we find ourselves (Harvey 1973, pp. 145–146). For this reason it is difficult to spell out the paradigm towards which this group appears to be working, divided as it is between the heritage of quantitative geography, acceptance of the 'behavioural revolution' and the influence of Marxist philosophy, with traces of radical anarchism. Be this as it may, one can only applaud the

constant reflection upon and discussion of the fundamentals of geographical discourse provided by Racine, Bailly and Raffestin in particular. One of the most recent fruits of this reflection is to be found in the proposal for a new *critical paradigm* (Ferrier, Racine and Raffestin 1978).

Noting the widespread demand for a closer link between theory and practice, these authors begin with the remark that the work of geographers is 'a production without consumers'. They go on to speculate about the possibility of a counter-production or anti-production – meaning the destruction of the useless deposit of geographical information: 'a form of anarchy that might be called a critical paradigm'. The reference point of this paradigm consists primarily of the 'underlying structures' which 'our production of geographers has buried under the accumulation of information'. These structures are 'the way men and women live, their daily praxis, their existential relations'. The reproof is directed at Bunge rather than at Harvey: 'William Bunge began with the existential relationships of the child. That is certainly a beginning, but what need to be studied are the relations of men and women in general, with one another, with things and with the way they see themselves, each other, and things.'

This fresh point of view looks all the more promising inasmuch as it represents a fresh start embodying features that are implicit in Marxist philosophy. It is evidently capable of criticizing some of the fundamentals of geographic discourse that have resisted all the 'scientific revolutions' which have been thought up by geographers since the 1960s (and which date, in fact, from the 1930s, when the first theories of space were introduced into geography).

> In all that has been written about geography, everything has been broken down into factors, as the term is used in political economy, or, if you will, into things. This revolution, the revolution of reification, was the work of Adam Smith and Ricardo. It simply took a long time to permeate works on geography. Only since the 1930s has it become widespread. The dominant pattern in geography is still a political economy pattern, and this is the antithesis of the critical paradigm because it rests on the economic order conceived as natural law. Even if this idea of natural law

> remains unconscious through lack of reflection, it is a fact that this law of the market is taken to be the *deus ex machina* that explains the cosmic order. The 'operators' for a false function of equivalence are assimilated to things. Significance is attached to groups of automated individuals, not to the men and women of whom they are composed. Centrality is never anything other than a centrality defined by the numbers of things and of people arriving at or departing from a point in space. And the same applies to flows of anything whatsoever – capital, services, what you will. Labour has become simply one factor among many, one sign among others, and flows have taken on a quite special importance. They are significant in themselves, almost irrespective of their constituents. Less attention is paid to the quality of resources that are circulating than to their movement. What is more, the designation of labour as a resource implies *ipso facto* the reification of labour and the interchangeability of human beings. The existence of space is defined by flows: it is formed, reshaped and transformed by them; and as flows have become larger and more widespread, so territories are being emasculated, some countries more quickly than others. What we have been witnessing is the triumph of classical political economy, which we geographers have taken a hundred years to adopt. (Ferrier, Racine and Raffestin 1978)

Although the authors do not say so explicitly, the attentive reader will perceive that the starting-point they have adopted for their critical paradigm is Marx's *Critique of Political Economy*. Moreover, the key part played by this critique becomes apparent as soon as it is recognized that the dominant pattern in geography is still that of classical political economy and that this is 'at the opposite pole from the critical paradigm'.

Up to the present this paradigm has not progressed beyond a preliminary definition of a programme of work, which nevertheless embodies some interesting suggestions. I conclude with a brief outline of these.

In so far as a critical paradigm is anything more than a comparative synopsis of current practice in different countries, it calls for an effort of historical perspective and requires the construction of 'a model of the geo-historical reality of its time'. The starting-point for this model should

be, not the industrial revolution, but the situation at the time when modern states came into existence, because 'then it was that powers were constituted characterized by enormous possibilities of increasing their strength and sphere of action and because it is the modern state . . . which, together with all its associated groupings, creates the human situation of territory as a universal unit.' This historical perspective has prompted a first definition of the critical paradigm as: 'an analysis of the territorial situation of human beings as related to changes in the means of increasing power'. This first definition is based upon the following considerations. In actual fact, as men and women individually or collectively see it, their behaviour is no longer primarily guided or conditioned by space or time but by powers which, because they have reached their critical mass, shape interpersonal relations, if only by inertia. At any given moment there is not a geo-history of human beings, even if there used to be one; instead there is a geo-history of powers, in which the human factor is one among many. In a world dominated by asymmetrical relations of interdependence, why should we not embark upon the attempt to discover for geography the equivalent of what the economist calls surplus-value? For surplus-value is not a purely economic concept; it expresses primarily a power relationship.

In my view these considerations entail in practice a total reformulation of the subject-matter of geography. I believe that in the search for this key concept of geographical analysis, this 'surplus-value', translated into terms of 'production of territory' and of the distribution of power within territory, an alliance between Marx's final conclusions and the researchers now being undertaken by Foucault and others may lead to interesting results.

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Haussmann, G. (1972) Il suolo d'Italia nella storia, in *Storia d'Italia*. Turin: Einaudi, vol. 1, 61–132.
Hegel, G. W. F. (*1975*) *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hooson, D. (1977) Idéologie politique et pensée géographique en Union Soviétique, *Travaux de l'Institut de Géographie de Reims*, 29–30, 39–46.
Kant, I. (*1974*) *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Korsch, K. (1938) *Karl Marx*. London: Chapman & Hall.
Kula, W. (*1972a*) *Problemi e metodi di storia economica*. Milan: Cisalpino.
Kula, W. (1972b) Le manifatture signorili in Polonia nel XVIII secolo, *Quaderni Storici*, 21, 1053–1070.
Kula, W. (*1976*) *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System*. London: New Left Books.
Lacoste, Y. (1965) *Géographie de sous-développement*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Lacoste, Y. (1973) La géographie, in F. Châtelet (ed.), *La philosophie des sciences sociales*. Paris: PUF, 242–302.
Lefebvre, H. (1972) *Le droit à la ville*. Paris: Seuil.
Lefebvre, J. P., ed. (1973) *K. Marx – F. Engels: Lettres sur les sciences de la nature (et les mathématiques)*. Paris: Éditions Sociales.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1952) *Race and History*. Paris: Unesco.
Lévi-Strauss, C. (*1966*) *The Savage Mind*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Ley, D. (1978) Social geography and social action, in D. Ley and M. S. Samuels (eds) *Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems*. Chicago: Maaroufa, 41–57.
Marx, K. (*1965*) *Capital*. Moscow: Progress Publishers and London: Lawrence & Wishart, 3 vols.
Marx, K. (*1973a*) *Grundrisse*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Marx, K. (*1973b*) *Marx's Grundrisse*. Trans. D. McLellan. London: Paladin.
Marx, K. (*1977a*) *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. Moscow: Progress Publishers and London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Marx, K. (*1977b*) *The German Ideology*. Moscow: Progress Publishers and London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (*1975*) *The Holy Family*. Moscow: Progress Publishers and London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Nicolas-Obadia, G. (1973) De l'autosatisfaction à l'interrogation ou la crise de la géographie, *Études rurales*, 51, 125–135.
Nicolas-Obadia, G. (1974) Introduction à la géographie générale cómparée, *Cahiers de géographie de Besançon*, 22.
Peet, R. (1978) The development of radical geography in the United States, in R. Peet (ed.) *Radical Geography*. London: Methuen, 6–30.
Ritter, K. (1822) *Erdkunde*. Berlin.
Rossi, P. (1970) Storia universale e geografia in Hegel, in *Incidenza di Hegel*. Naples: Morano, 369–407.
Rovatti, P. A. (1973) *Critica e scientificità in Marx: Per una lettura fenomenologica di Marx e una critica del marxismo di Althusser*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Saushkin, Y. G. (1972) *Introduzione alla geografia umana*. Milan: Cesviet.
Schmidt, A. (*1971*) *The Concept of Nature in Marx*. London: New Left Books.
Sofri, G. (1969) *Il modo di produzione asiatico: storia di una controversia marxista*. Turin: Einaudi.
Terray, E. (*1972*) *Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.
Van Beunigen, C. (1979) Le marxisme et l'espace chez Paul Claval: quelques réflexions critiques pour une géographie marxiste, *L'Espace géographique* 8(4), 263–271.
Vilar, P. (1970) *Sviluppo economico e analisi storica*. Bari: Laterza.

Marxist and Radical Geographical Literature in English: An Introduction

RUSSELL KING*

Approaches

A bibliographic guide to English language 'Marxist geography' can be too short or too long: short because the number of geographical studies written from an explicitly Marxist viewpoint is very small; long because the list of work which includes Marxist concepts, structures and terminologies is almost endless. In the annotated guide which follows I have attempted to steer a middle course, although I inevitably run the risk of falling between two stools. There are other difficulties. Most fundamental is whether a Marxist geography can exist other than as a contradiction in terms. Marxists are unlikely to be concerned about the fate of a particular discipline, except perhaps as a philosophical sideline. This means two things: that a Marxist who is (or was) a geographer must move beyond conventional geographic subject-matter; and that much material of geographic relevance is written by 'non-geographer' Marxists. The list of references which follows reflects both these circumstances. It has, therefore, proved particularly difficult to classify the literature. Quite apart from the fact that geography has always been something of a mongrel subject, using theories and methods derived from other disciplines, radical and Marxist geographers tend to break down disciplinary boundaries and frequently adopt a holistic approach.

I have also enlarged the scope of the bibliography somewhat to include other radical perspectives. 'Radical geography' is an ideological and philosophical catch-all for a variety of approaches characterized by a departure from previous paradigms and a desire to effect change in the real-world subject-matter. Much radical geography does not make

*Several people have assisted in getting this bibliography together by sending me reference lists and comments. Simon Duncan has been particularly helpful in this respect and I would also like to thank Joe Doherty, Barbara Harriss, Shlomo Hasson, Ray Hudson, Jim Lewis, Andrew Sayer and Nick Williams.

explicit a Marxist parentage; indeed much radical geography is probably confused on this issue. Nevertheless the links between 'radical' and 'Marxist' geography are so strong that I have included radical analyses, even though some of the authors may not be Marxists. I have included, too, a number of people, such as Berry and Chisholm, who are avowedly non-Marxist, because they have contributed to the general debate, either by being openly critical or by trying to put Marxist geography in its wider setting. It should also be realized that there are widely varying approaches, and disagreements, among Marxists and neo-Marxists.

At an introductory level, the historical emergence of radical perspectives and Marxism in geography can best be appreciated by looking at recent treatments of the evolution of the subject as a whole, such as:

Gregory, D. (1978) *Ideology and Science in Human Geography*. London: Hutchinson, ch. 3.

Johnston, R. J. (1979) *Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American Human Geography since 1945*. London: Arnold, ch. 6.

Students may also wish to consult David Harvey's essay 'Marxist geography' in *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (1981), ed. R. J. Johnston, Derek Gregory, Peter Haggett, David Smith and D. R. Stoddart. Oxford: Blackwell, New York: Free Press.

An entertaining way to appreciate some of the thoughts on Marxist and radical geography is to read the sequence of short articles published over the last ten years in *Area* (published by the Institute of British Geographers). Much of this is knockabout stuff but it provides a unique opportunity to follow the debate. The following, arranged chronologically, contains the most important of these short pieces:

Chisholm, M. (1971) Geography and the question of relevance, *Area*, 3(2), 65–68.

Smith, D. M. (1971) Radical geography – the next revolution? *Area*, 3(3), 153–157.

Dickenson, J. P., and Clarke, C. G. (1972) Relevance and the 'newest' geography, *Area*, 4(1), 25–27.

Berry, B. J. L. (1972) More on relevance and policy analysis, *Area*, 4(2), 77–80.

Blowers, A. T. (1972) Bleeding hearts and open values, *Area*, 4(4), 290–292.

Smith, D. M. (1973) Alternative 'relevant' professional roles, *Area*, 5(1), 1–4.

Eyles, J. (1973) Geography and relevance, *Area*, 5(2), 158–160.
Blowers, A. T. (1974) Relevance, research and the political process, *Area*, 6(1), 32–36.
Stoddart, D. R. (1975) Kropotkin, Reclus and 'relevant' geography, *Area*, 7(3) 188–190.
Lee, R. (1976) Surprise and counter-production in radical geography, *Area*, 8(1), 11–14.
Muir, R. (1978) Radical geography or a new orthodoxy? *Area*, 10(5), 322–327.
Manion, T. and Whitelegg, J.; and Duncan, S. S. (1978) Radical geography and Marxism, *Area*, 11(2), 122–126; reply by R. Muir, 126–127.
Walsmley, D. J. and Sorenson, A. D. (1980) What Marx for the radicals? *Area*, 12(2), 137–141.
Duncan, S. S., and Sayer, R. A. (1980) Debate on geography and the vampire trick, *Area*, 12(3), 195–197.
Lee, R. (1981) Aunt Sally and the Straw Men: comments on a non-critique, *Area*, 13(1), 25–28; reply by D. J. Walmsley and A. D. Sorenson, 28–30.

Indispensable sources

Three sources are crucial for the English-speaking, Marxist-oriented student of geography. The first of these is *Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography*, produced by a collective of geographers at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts and edited by Richard Peet (some issues have guest editors). Founded in 1969, *Antipode* appears irregularly but generally about twice a year. Secondly there is David Harvey's *Social Justice and the City*, which crystallized the emerging dissatisfaction with positivism and quantification in the early 1970s, and put forward Marxism as an alternative. Third is Richard Peet's edited collection of papers entitled *Radical Geography*, 12 of the 21 chapters of which are reprints from *Antipode*. Full details of these books:

Harvey, D. (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. London: Arnold, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
Peet, R. (ed.) (1978) *Radical Geography*. London: Methuen.

Other useful reference tools include: the non-geographical journals *Capital and Class, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, and *Review of Radical Political Economy*; the *Union of Socialist Geographers Newsletter* (issued several times a year, containing short articles and comments); the radical bibliography compiled by R. W. Barton (but with a bias towards urban matters); and Richard Peet's key overview article:

Barton, R. W. (1980) *Radical Geography: A Research Bibliography*. University of Leeds, School of Geography Working Paper 291.

Peet, R. (1977) The development of radical geography in the United States, *Progress in Human Geography*, 1(3), 240–263; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 6–30. This article was commented on in detail by G. L. Clark and M. Dear (1978) The future of radical geography, *Professional Geographer*, 30(4), 356–359; see also the reply by Peet, 360–364.

Key articles

The following articles and papers either opened up, summarized or criticized the radical–Marxist approach in geography. Several, such as the contributions by Burgess (1976), Eliot Hurst (1980), Harvey (1975), Sayer (1979) and Slater (1975), are, or were, crucial in advancing the radical stance; although some of these 'keynote' papers are now outdated their epistemological importance remains.

Anderson, J. (1973) Ideology in geography: an introduction, *Antipode*, 5(3), 1–6.

Anderson, J. (1977) Geography, political economy and the state, in N. Smith, M. Forbes and M. Kershaw (eds), *Geography, Social Welfare and Underdevelopment*, University of St Andrews: Journal of St Andrews Geographers Special Publication 2, 34–46.

Anderson, J. (1980) Towards a materialistic conception of geography, *Geoforum*, 11(2), 171–178.

Asheim, T. (1979) Social geography – welfare state ideology or critical social science? *Geoforum* 10(1), 5–18.

Blaut, J. M. (1979) The dissenting tradition, *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 69(1), 157–164.

Buch-Hanson, M., and Nielson, B. (1977) Marxist geography and the concept of territorial structure, *Antipode*, 9(1), 1–12.

Burgess, R. (1976) *Marxism and Geography*. University College London, Department of Geography, Occasional Paper 30; an abbreviated version of this paper was published as: The concept of nature and geography in Marxism, *Antipode*, 10(2), 1978, 1–11.

Duncan, S. S. (1978) *Alienation and Explanation in Human Geography*. London School of Economics, Graduate School of Geography, Discussion Paper 63.

Duncan, S. S. (1979) Qualitative change in human geography: an introduction, *Geoforum*, 10(1), 1–4.

Dunford, M. F. (1979) *Historical Materialism and Geography*. University of Sussex, Research Papers in Geography 4.

Eliot Hurst, M. E. (1980) Geography, social science and society: towards a de-definition, *Australian Geographical Studies*, 18(1), 3–21.

Gokhman, V. M., Lavrov, S. B., and Sdasyuk, G. V. (1980) Socio-economic geography in the West at a turning-point, *Soviet Geography*, 21(5), 284–293.

Harriss, B. (1978) *Some Questions of Philosophy, Methodology and Explanation in Geography*. London School of Economics, Graduate School of Geography, Discussion Paper 64.

Harvey, D. (1972) Social justice and spatial systems, in R. Peet (ed.), *Geographical Perspectives on American Poverty*. Worcester, Mass.: Antipode Monographs in Social Geography 1, 87–106; republished with modifications in Harvey's *Social Justice and the City*, ch. 3.

Harvey, D. (1972) Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary theory in geography and the problem of ghetto formation, *Antipode*, 4(2), 1–13; see also the subsequent 'commentary' articles in the same issue by S. Folke, 13–18; A. M. Hayford, 19–21; J. S. Campbell, 21–35; G. Olsson, 26–31; B. J. L. Berry, 31–33; and the reply by Harvey, 36–41. Harvey's main paper also appeared in expanded form in his *Social Justice and the City*, ch. 4.

Harvey, D. (1974) What kind of geography for what kind of public policy? *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, 63, 18–24.

Harvey, D. (1975) The geography of capitalist accumulation: a reconstruction of the Marxian theory, *Antipode*, 7(2), 9–21; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 263–292.

Lavrov, S. B., Preobrazhenskiy, V. S., and Sdasyuk, G. V. (1980) Radical geography: its roots, history and positions, *Soviet Geography*, 21(5), 308–321; and see the reply by R. Peet and D. Slater in issue 21(8), 1980, 541–545.

Leach, B. (1978) Geography, behaviour and Marxist philosophy, *Antipode*, 10(2), 33–37.

Ley, D. (1978) Social geography and social action, in D. Ley and M. S. Samuels (eds), *Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems*. Chicago: Maaroufa, 41–57.

Olsson, G. (1972) Some notes on geography and social engineering, *Antipode*, 4(1), 1–22.

Olsson, G. (1974) Servitude and inequality in spatial planning: ideology and methodology in conflict, *Antipode*, 6(1), 16–21; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 353–361.

Olsson, G. (1974) The dialectics of spatial analysis, *Antipode*, 6(3), 50–62.

Peet, R. (1975) Inequality and poverty: a Marxist-geographic theory,

Annals, Association of American Geographers, 65(4), 564–571; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 112–123.

Peet, R. (1978) Materialism, social formation and socio-spatial relations: an essay in Marxist geography, *Cahiers de géographie du Québec*, 22, 147–157.

Peet, R. (1981) Spatial dialectics and Marxist geography, *Progress in Association of American Geographers*, 69(1), 164–169.

Peet, R. (1981) Spatial Dialectics and Marxist geography, *Progress in Human Geography*, 5(1), 105–110.

Santos, M. (1975) Space and domination – a Marxist approach, *International Social Science Journal*, 27(2), 346–363.

Santos, M. (1977) Society and space: social formation as theory and method, *Antipode*, 9(1), 3–13.

Sayer, R. A. (1979) Epistemology and conceptions of people and nature in geography, *Geoforum*, 10(1), 19–44.

Slater, D. (1975) The poverty of modern geographical enquiry, *Pacific Viewpoint*, 16(2), 159–176; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 40–57.

Smith, N. (1979) Post-positivist modes of explanation in human geography, *Progress in Human Geography*, 3(3), 356–383.

Smith, N. (1981) Degeneracy in theory and practice: spatial interactionism and radical eclecticism, *Progress in Human Geography*, 5(1), 111–118.

Soja, E. (1980) The socio-spatial dialectic, *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 70(2), 207–225.

Soja, E., and Hadjimichalis, C. (1979) Between geographical materialism and spatial fetishism: some observations on the development of Marxist spatial analysis, *Antipode*, 11(3), 3–11.

Conceptual critiques

Several radical critiques have been aimed specifically at certain established branches and concepts of geography. See, for example:

Barnbrook, J. (1974) Prologomenon to a methodological debate on location theory: the case of von Thünen, *Antipode*, 6(1), 59–66.

Blaikie, P. (1978) The theory of the spatial diffusion of innovations: a spacious cul-de-sac, *Progress in Human Geography*, 2(2), 268–295.

Connell, J. (1971) The geography of development, *Area*, 3(4), 259–266.

Gray, F. (1975) Non-explanation in urban geography, *Area*, 7(4), 228–235.

Kongstad, P. (1974) Growth poles and urbanization: a critique of Perroux and Friedmann, *Antipode*, 6(2), 114–121; reply by J. Friedmann, 122–124.

Massey, D. (1973) Towards a critique of industrial location theory, *Antipode*, 5(3), 33–39; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 181–197.

Massey, D. (1977) *Industrial Location Theory Reconsidered*, in D204 *Fundamentals of Human Geography*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, Unit 25.

Massey, D. (1979) In what sense a regional problem? *Regional Studies*, 13(2), 233–243.

Mønsted, M. (1974) François Perroux's theory of 'growth pole' and 'development' pole: a critique, *Antipode*, 6(2), 106–113.

Peet, R. (1975) The geography of crime: a political critique, *Professional Geographer*, 27(3), 277–280; see comments by K. D. Harries, 280–282, by P. D. Phillips, 283–284 and by Y. Lee, 284–285; and the further comments by R. Peet in issue 28(1), 1976, 96–100, and K. D. Harries, 100–103.

Rieser, R. (1973) The territorial illusion and behavioural sink: critical notes on behavioural geography, *Antipode*, 5(3), 52–57; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 199–211.

Sayer, R. A. (1976) A critique of urban modelling, *Progress in Planning*, 6(3), 187–254.

Sayer, R. A. (1978) Mathematical modelling in regional science and political economy: some comments, *Antipode*, 10(2), 79–86.

Sayer, R. A. (1979) *Theory and Empirical Research in Urban and Regional Political Economy: A Sympathetic Critique*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 14; this paper includes a critique of Marxist approaches.

Slater, D. (1974) Contribution to a critique of development geography, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 8(2), 325–354.

Uneven development

Perhaps the most obvious geographic relevance of Marxism is the exposure and analysis of uneven spatial development. Along with urban studies (see below *Third World Urbanization*), the geography of development (or perhaps more correctly stated, the geography of *under*development) has been the main branch of the discipline to become infused with Marxist ideas. Two spatial scales may be recognized: the national, with a focus on regional inequalities; and the international, with a focus on imperialism – 'the highest form of

capitalism'. David Smith's books cover both scales. They are written from the point of view of human welfare and, in the context of other studies listed in this bibliography, are only mildly radical. See:

Smith, D. M. (1977) *Human Geography: A Welfare Approach*. London: Arnold, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Smith, D. M. (1979) *Where the Grass is Greener*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

An excellent overview of inequality at all levels – social, urban, regional and international – is provided in the Open University course D302, *Patterns of Inequality*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1976, 34 Units published in 16 vols.

The radicalization of human geography affected the geography of development before any other part of the discipline. This was partly due to the interdisciplinary nature of development studies, which forced its geographical practitioners into contact with Marxist and radical literature. It was also due to the fact that in the context of Third World underdevelopment and capitalist exploitation theory and practice cannot legitimately be separated. The work of Keith Buchanan, whose writings reveal great imagination if not a touch of genius, was crucial in placing development geography on an early radical path. See, for example:

Buchanan, K. (1964) Profiles of the Third World, *Pacific Viewpoint*, 5(2), 97–126; also in A. B. Mountjoy (ed.), *Developing the Underdeveloped Countries*. London: Macmillan (1971), 17–44.

Buchanan, K. (1970) *The Transformation of the Chinese Earth*. London: Bell.

Buchanan, K. (1972) *The Geography of Empire*. Nottingham, Spokesman Books.

Buchanan, K. (1974) Reflections on a 'dirty word', *Dissent*, 31, 25–31; also in R. Peet (ed.) *Radical Geography*, 363–377.

Buchanan, K. (1977) Factories in the fields, in N. Smith, M. Forbes and M. Kershaw (eds), *Geography, Social Welfare and Underdevelopment*. University of St Andrews: Journal of St Andrews Geographers Special Publication 2, 1–33.

The changing trends in development geography are clearly set out by Browett (1981) and Goodenough (1977) and can also be followed in 'Progress Reports' in *Progress in Human Geography*:

Brookfield, H. C. (1978) Third World development, *Progress in Human Geography*, 2(1), 121–132.
Browett, J. (1981) On the role of geography in development geography, *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 72(3), 155–161.
Foster-Carter, A. (1976) From Rostow to Gunder Frank: conflicting paradigms in the analysis of underdevelopment, *World Development*, 4(3), 167–180.
Goodenough, S. (1977) *Values, Relevance and Ideology in Third World Geography*, in D204 *Fundamentals of Human Geography*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, Units 27–28.
Harriss, B. and J. (1980) Development studies, *Progress in Human Geography*, 4(4), 577–588.
Harriss, J. and B. (1979) Development studies, *Progress in Human Geography*, 3(4), 576–584.

Dependency theory

More important from a theoretical perspective are those Marxist and radical studies which look at uneven development on a world scale, at 'the development of underdevelopment', at dependency theory and at centre-periphery relations. Of the following, only Brookfield is a professional geographer.

Amin, S. (1973) *Unequal Development*. New York: Random House.
Amin, S. (1974) *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Brookfield, H. C. (1975) *Interdependent Development*. London: Methuen.
Frank, A. G. (1969) *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Frank, A. G. (1981) *Reflections on the World Economic Crisis*. London: Macmillan.
Kay, G. (1975) *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis*. London: Macmillan.
Mandel, E. (1973) *Capitalism and Regional Disparities*. Toronto: Hogtown Press.
Melotti, U. (1977) *Marx and the Third World*. London: Macmillan.
Wallerstein, I. (1974) *The Modern World System*. New York: Academic Press.
Wallerstein, I. (1979) *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

In his forthcoming major account and extension of the Marxian analysis of capitalism, David Harvey includes a chapter on 'the dialectics of imperialism':

Harvey, D. (1982) *The Limits to Capital*. Oxford: Blackwell.

The following papers, mostly by geographers, include radical critiques and Marxist analyses of the development/underdevelopment/imperialism debate. Especially useful are the contributions of Blaut, Cannon, Connell and Slater.

Abdel-Malek, A. (1977) Geopolitics and national movements: an essay on the dialectics of imperialism, *Antipode*, 9(1), 28–36; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 293–307.

Blaut, J. M. (1969) Jingo geography, *Antipode*, 1(1), 10–13.

Blaut, J. M. (1970) Geographic models of imperialism, *Antipode*, 2(1), 65–85.

Blaut, J. M. (1973) The theory of development, *Antipode*, 5(1), 22–26; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 309–314.

Blaut, J. M. (1975) Imperialism: the Marxist theory and its evolution, *Antipode*, 7(2), 1–19.

Blaut, J. M. (1976) Where was capitalism born? *Antipode*, 8(2), 1–11; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 95–110.

Brookfield, H. C. (1973) On one geography and a Third World, *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, 58, 1–20.

Cannon, T. G. (1975) Geography and underdevelopment, *Area*, 7(3), 212–216.

Cannon, T. G. (1977) 'Natural' disasters and the Third World, in N. Smith, M. Forbes and M. Kershaw (eds), *Geography, Social Welfare and Underdevelopment*. University of St Andrews: Journal of St Andrews Geographers Special Publication 2, 73–87.

Cannon, T. G. (1978) Evaluating the development of the Third World, in J. Anderson, B. Leach and P. Williams (eds), *New Approaches to Geography and Planning*. London: IBG Social Geography Study Group, 25–36.

Connell, J. (1973) The geography of development or the development of geography, *Antipode*, 5(1), 27–39.

Coutsinas, G., and Paix, C. (1977) External trade and spatial organization – a typology, *Antipode*, 9(1), 97–109.

Dos Santos, T. (1973) The crises of development theory, in H. Bernstein (ed.), *Underdevelopment and Development: the Third World Today*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 57–86.

Foster-Carter, A. (1973) Neo-Marxist approaches to development and underdevelopment, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 3(1), 7–33.
McGee, T. G. (1974) In praise of tradition: towards a geography of anti-development, *Antipode*, 6(3), 30–47.
Slater, D. (1973) Geography and underdevelopment, *Antipode*, 5(3), 21–32.
Slater, D. (1975) Underdevelopment and spatial inequality, *Progress in Planning*, 4(2), 97–167.
Slater, D. (1976) Anglo-Saxon geography and the study of underdevelopment, *Antipode*, 8(3), 88–93.
Thompson, G. (1976) *Processes of Development: International Exploitation*, in D302 *Patterns of Inequality*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, Unit 21.

Specific Third World studies

Radical geographers' studies on specific parts of the Third World are rather scattered. Apart from Buchanan's *Transformation of the Chinese Earth* noted above, the following may be cited as examples:

Blaikie, P. M., Seddon, D., and Cameron, J. (1979) *Peasants and Workers in Nepal*. Warminster: Aris and Phillips.
Blaikie, P. M., Seddon, D., and Cameron, J. (1980) *Nepal in Crisis*. London: Oxford University Press.
Corraggio, J. L. (1977) Social forms of space organization and their trends in Latin America, *Antipode*, 9(1), 14–28.
Datoo, B. A. (1977) Peasant agricultural production in East Africa: the nature and consequences of dependence, *Antipode*, 9(1), 70–78.
Friedman, J. (1980) The territorial approach to rural development in the People's Republic of Mozambique, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 4(1), 97–115.
Gugler, J. (1980) 'A minimum of urbanization and a maximum of ruralization': the Cuban experience, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 4(4), 516–535.
Lacoste, Y. (1973) An illustration of geographic warfare: bombing of the dykes on the Red River, North Vietnam, *Antipode*, 5(2), 1–13; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 244–261.
Roder, W. (1973) Effects of guerrilla warfare in Angola and Mozambique, *Antipode*, 5(2), 14–21.
Santos, E., and Sayer, A. (1979) The political economy of agrarian reform and spatial organization in Chile, *Geoforum* 10(1), 59–80.
Slater, D. (1979) The state and territorial centralization in Peru 1968–1978, *Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, 27, 43–67.

Susman, P. (1974) Cuban development: from dualism to integration, *Antipode*, 6(3), 10–29.

Regional inequality in industrialized countries

Studies on regional inequality in advanced capitalist countries are numerous. The *Review of Radical Political Economy*, 10(3), 1978 was a special issue on 'Regional Uneven Development in Advanced Capitalism'. For specifically American material three issues of *Antipode* are of note: 2(2), 1970 on the Geography of American Poverty; 5(1), 1973 on Appalachia; and 7(3), 1975 on Rural America. *Antipode* 12(1), 1980 is a special issue containing 12 papers on Ireland. The following list of references contains mostly British, Irish and European case-studies.

Bluestone, B. (1972) Economic crises and the law of uneven development, *Politics and Society*, 2(1), 65–82.

Carney, J., and Hudson, R. (1978) Capital, politics and ideology: the North-east of England 1870–1946, *Antipode*, 10(2), 64–67.

Carney, J., Hudson, R., Ive, G., and Lewis, J. (1976) Regional underdevelopment in late capitalism: a study of the North-east of England, in I. Masser (ed.), *Theory and Practice in Regional Science*. London: Pion, 11–29.

Carney, J., Hudson, R., and Lewis, J. (eds) (1980) *Regions in Crisis*. London: Croom Helm.

Carter, I. (1974) The Highlands of Scotland as an underdeveloped region, in E. de Kadt and G. Williams (eds), *Sociology and Underdevelopment*. London: Tavistock Publications, 279–311.

Clark, G. (1980) Capitalism and regional inequality, *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 70(2), 226–237.

Dunford, M. F. (1977) *Regional Policy and the Restructuring of Capital*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 4.

Dunford, M. F. (1979) Capital accumulation and regional development in France, *Geoforum*, 10(1), 81–108.

Dunford, M., Geddes, M., and Perrons, D. (1980) *Regional Policy and Crisis in the United Kingdom: a Long-Run Perspective*. City of London Polytechnic, Department of Economics and Banking, Working Paper 31.

Geddes, M. (1979) *Uneven Development and the Scottish Highlands*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 17.

Holland, S. (1976) *Capital versus the Regions*. London: Macmillan.

Holland, S. (1976) *The Regional Problem*. London: Macmillan.

Holland, S. (ed.) (1978) *Beyond Capitalist Planning*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Laurençin, J-P., Monateri, J-C., Palloix, C., Tiberghien, R., and Vernet, P. (1977) The regional effects of the crisis on the forms of organization of production and industry in the Mediterranean Basin, in D. Massey and P. W. J. Batey (eds), *Alternative Frameworks for Analysis*. London: Pion, 7–18.

Lebas, E. (1977) Regional policy research: some theoretical and methodological problems, in M. Harloe (ed.), *Captive Cities: Studies in the Political Economy of Cities and Regions*. London: Wiley, 79–88.

Lee, R. (1976) Integration, spatial structure and the capitalist mode of production in the EEC, in R. Lee and P. E. Ogden (eds), *Economy and Society in the EEC: Spatial Perspectives*. Westmead: Saxon House, 11–37.

Lee, R. (1977) Regional relations and economic structure in the EEC, in D. Massey and P. W. J. Batey (eds), *Alternative Frameworks for Analysis*. London: Pion, 19–35.

Markusen, A. (1976) Regionalism and the capitalist state: the case of the United States, *Kapitalistate*, 7, 39–62.

Massey, D. (1978) Regionalism: some current issues, *Capital and Class*, 6, 102–125.

Massey, D., and Meegan, R. A. (1979) The geography of industrial reorganization: the spatial effects of restructuring the electrical engineering sector under the Industrial Reorganization Corporation, *Progress in Planning*, 10(3), 155–237.

Mingione, E. (1978) Capitalist crisis, neo-dualism and marginalization, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 2(2), 213–221.

Morgan, K. (1980) *The Reformation of the Regional Question, Regional Policy and the British State*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 18.

Peet, R. (1980) Capital accumulation and regional crisis in Western Europe, *Environment and Planning A*, 12(11), 1317–1324.

Perrons, D. (1978) *The Dialectic of Region and Class in Ireland*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 8.

Perrons, D. (1981) The role of Ireland in the new international division of labour: a proposed framework for regional analysis, *Regional Studies*, 15(2), 81–100.

Regan, C. (1978) The evolution of Ireland's economic and territorial structure before Partition, in J. Anderson, B. Leach and P. Williams (eds), *New Approaches to Geography and Planning*. London:

Institute of British Geographers Social Geography Study Group, 37–51.
Regan, C., and Walsh, F. (1976) Dependence and underdevelopment: the case of mineral resources and the Irish Republic, *Antipode*, 6(3), 46–59; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 315–337.
Walker, R. (1978) Two sources of uneven development under advanced capitalism: spatial differentiation and capital mobility, *Review of Radical Political Economy*, 10(1), 28–37.

Work on regional inequality in socialist countries is rather limited. *Antipode* has carried only two such articles, the paper by Susman on Cuba noted already and the paper by Murray on Poland noted below. Articles on spatial economic differentiation published in *Geographia Polonica* and *Soviet Geography* are largely of a technical nature. Most English language work on this topic is by non-Marxist Western geographers such as Fuchs and Demko. See:

Fuchs, R. J., and Demko, G. J. (1979) Geographic inequality under socialism, *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 69(2), 304–318; see the follow-up paper by R. Peet (1980) in the *Annals*, 70(2), 280–286, and the reply by Fuchs and Demko, 286–287.
Koropekyj, I. S. (1972) Equalization of regional development in socialist countries: an empirical study, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 21(1), 68–86.
Milagros de Gonzales, G. (1980) *Regional Planning under the Transition to Socialism*. University College of Swansea: Centre for Development Studies Monograph Series 11.
Murray, L. W. (1974) Socioeconomic development and industrial location in Poland: the merging of growth pole and growth center theories in a socialist economy, *Antipode*, 6(2), 125–141.

Urban analysis

Much of the important work on cities and urbanization has been done by non-geographers. Barton's Bibliography, mentioned at the beginning of this survey, is very useful here. Two sources are paramount, though now dated: Harvey's *Social Justice and the City* (1973) and Castells' *The Urban Question* (first published in French in 1972). They may be usefully supplemented by the excellent collection of essays edited by Pickvance and by detailed study of the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* which has a predominantly radical perspective. *Antipode* has published three important theme issues devoted to urban matters: 6(1), 1974 on 'Directions in Urban Geography'; 8(1), 1976

on 'Urban Political Economy'; and 11(3), 1979 on 'The Urban Problematic'. Details of the three books mentioned above are:

Castells, M. (1977) *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*. London: Arnold, Boston: M.I.T. Press.
Harvey, D. (1973) *Social Justice and the City*. London: Arnold.
Pickvance, C. (ed.) (1976) *Urban Sociology: Critical Essays*. London: Tavistock.

Three more of Manuel Castells' books have been translated into English. These range rather wider than urban polemics but can conveniently be mentioned here:

Castells, M. (1978) *City, Class and Power*. London: Macmillan.
Castells, M. (1979) *Monopolville: the Corporations, the State and Urban Process*. London: Macmillan.
Castells, M. (1980) *The Economic Crisis and American Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

A unique phenomenon in the early development of radical and advocacy geography in an urban context is the Detroit Geographical Expedition. At least in Britain, the Expedition has become part of the mythical folklore of the history of urban radicalism, partly because so few libraries seem to possess copies of W. Bunge's *Field Notes*. More accessible accounts can, however, be found in:

Bunge, W. (1978) The first years of the Detroit Geographical Expedition: a personal report, in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*. London: Methuen, 31–39.
Horvath, R. (1971) The 'Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute' experience, *Antipode*, 3(1), 73–85.

For Bunge's most recent statement of 'where he's at', which includes substantial reflections on 'where he's been', see:

Bunge, W. (1979) Comment on 'Theoretical Geography', *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 69(1), 169–174.

Important in the British context are the monographs and pamphlets issued by the National Community Development Project (CDP) and its various local offshoots like Benwell, Saltley and North Shields. The following are National CDP publications: *Local Government becomes Big Business* (1976, 2nd ed.); *Profits against Housing* (1976); *Whatever*

Happened to Council Housing? (1976); *The Costs of Industrial Change* (1977); *The Poverty of the Improvement Programme* (1977, 2nd ed.); *Gilding the Ghetto* (1978); and *The State and the Local Economy* (1979). Among the notable Local CDP reports are *Private Housing and the Working Class* (Benwell CDP Final Report Series, No. 3, 1978); *The Making of the Ruling Class: Two Centuries of Capital Development on Teesside* (Benwell CDP Final Report Series, No. 6, 1976); *Workers on the Scrapheap* (Birmingham CDP Final Report No. 2, 1977).

Other books which discuss various aspects of Marxist urban analyses include the following. Most of these are edited volumes and many include important papers by Marxist theoreticians such as Castells, Harvey and Mingione. See:

Cox, K. R. (1973) *Conflict, Power and Politics in the City: A Geographic View*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Cox, K. R. (ed.) (1978) *Urbanization Processes and Conflict in Market Societies*. London: Methuen.

Dear, M., and Scott, A. J. (eds) (1981) *Urbanisation and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society*. London: Methuen.

Gale, S., and Moore, G. (eds) (1975) *The Manipulated City*. Chicago: Maaroufa Press.

Gappert, G., and Rose, H. M. (eds) (1975) *The Social Economy of Cities*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Harloe, M. (ed.) (1975) *Proceedings of the Conference on Urban Change and Conflict, 1975*. London: Centre for Environmental Studies.

Harloe, M. (ed.) (1977) *Captive Cities: Studies in the Political Economy of Cities and Regions*. London: Wiley.

Harloe, M. (ed.) (1978) *Proceedings of the Conference on Urban Change and Conflict, 1977*. London: Centre for Environmental Studies.

Melling, J. (ed.) (1980) *Housing, Social Policy and the State*. London: Croom Helm.

Mingione, E. (1981) *Social Conflict and the City*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sandercock, L. (1975) *Cities for Sale: Property, Politics and Urban Planning in Australia*. London: Croom Helm.

Tabb, W. K., and Sawyers, L. (eds) (1978) *Marxism and the Metropolis*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Also important in Britain are historical urban studies such as:

Foster, J. (1974) *Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early*

Industrial Capitalism in Three English Towns. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Stedman Jones, G. (1971) *Outcast London: A Study of the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harvey again provides a starting-point for much of the article literature on radical urban geography. Also important is Gray's short paper: an early discussion of the limitations of empiricism and functionalism in urban geography. This was followed up by Sayer's critiques of urban modelling.

Ambrose, P. (1976) British land use planning: a radical critique, *Antipode*, 8(1), 2–14.

Gray, F. (1975) Non-explanation in urban geography, *Area*, 7(4), 228–235; also the comment by C. Hamnett in *Area* 9(2), 1977, 143–145.

Harvey, D. (1974) Class-monopoly rent, finance capital and the urban revolution, *Regional Studies*, 8(4), 239–255.

Harvey, D. (1975) Class structure and the theory of residential segregation, in R. Peel, M. Chisholm and P. Haggett (eds), *Processes in Physical and Human Geography: Bristol Essays*. London: Heinemann, 354–369.

Harvey, D. (1977) Labour, capital and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist societies, *Politics and Society*, 6(3), 265–295.

Harvey, D. (1978) The urban process under capitalism, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 2(1), 101–131.

Harvey, D., and Chatterjee, L. (1974) Absolute rent and the structuring of space of government and financial institutions, *Antipode*, 6(1), 22–36.

Lee, R. (1979) The economic basis of social problems in the city, in D. Herbert and D. M. Smith (eds), *Social Problems in the City*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 47–62.

Preteceille, E. (1976) Urban planning: the contradictions of capitalist urbanization, *Antipode*, 8(1), 51–57.

Sayer, R. A. (1979) Understanding urban models versus understanding cities, *Environment and Planning A*, 11(8), 853–862.

Housing

Some radical urban analyses have focused on particular aspects of the urban environment. One of these is housing which, because of its key

position in the urban problematic, has attracted more attention from Marxist-informed geographers than almost any other aspect of geography. The following list of references are mainly on housing in British cities. Bassett and Short provide the best overview from a general perspective. Also important are the three volumes issued by the Political Economy of Housing Workshop – *Political Economy and the Housing Question* (vol. 1, 1975); *Housing and Class in Britain* (vol. 2, 1976); and *Housing Construction and the State* (vol. 3, 1980) – as well as some of the National and Local Community Development Project papers mentioned earlier. Two rather more 'popular' books are Ambrose and Colenutt's *The Property Machine* and Boddy's *The Building Societies* – the latter's scope is wider than the title suggests. The articles are usually more place-specific.

Ambrose, P. (1976) *The Land Market and the Housing System*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 3.

Ambrose, P., and Colenutt, R. (1975) *The Property Machine*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Ball, M. J. (1978) British housing policy and the house building industry, *Capital and Class*, 4, 78–99.

Bassett, K., and Short, J. (1980) *Housing and Residential Structure: Alternative Approaches*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Boddy, M. (1976) The structure of mortgage finance: building societies and the British social formation, *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, 1(1), 58–71.

Boddy, M. (1976) Political economy of housing: mortgage-financed owner occupation in Britain, *Antipode*, 8(1), 15–24.

Boddy, M. (1980) *The Building Societies*. London: Macmillan.

Byrne, D. S. (1976) Allocation, the council ghetto and the political economy of housing, *Antipode*, 8(1), 24–29.

Colenutt, R. (1976) The political economy of the property market, *Antipode*, 8(2), 24–30.

Day, M. D. (1978) *A Dialectical Approach to State Intervention with special reference to Housing Policy*. University of London: King's College Department of Geography Occasional Paper 9.

Duncan, S. S. (1977) The housing crisis and the structure of the housing market, *Journal of Social Policy*, 6(4), 385–412.

Duncan, S. S. (1978) *Housing Reform, the Capitalist State and Social Democracy*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Papers 9.

Gray, F., and Boddy, M. (1979) The origins and use of theory in urban geography: household mobility and filtering theory, *Geoforum*, 10(1), 117–127.

Gray, F., and Dickens, P. (1978) Ideology and the state: the case of local authority housing, *Antipode*, 10(2), 38–44.
Harloe, M., Issacharoff, R., and Minns, R. (1974) *The Organization of Housing: Public and Private Enterprise in London*. London: Heinemann.
Lambert, J., Paris, C., and Blackaby, R. (1978) *Housing Policy and the State: Allocation, Access and Control*. London: Macmillan.
Merrett, S. (1979) *State Housing in Britain*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Paris, C. (1974) Urban renewal in Birmingham: an institutional approach, *Antipode*, 6(1), 7–15.
Paris, C., and Blackaby, R. (1979) *Not Much Improvement: Urban Renewal Policy in Birmingham*. London: Heinemann.
Paris, C., Blackaby, R., and Lambert, J. (1976) State urban policy and the housing problem, *Antipode*, 8(1), 51–57.
Pickvance, C. (1976) Housing, reproduction of capital, and reproduction of labour power: some recent French work, *Antipode*, 8(1), 58–68.
Saunders, P. (1977) *Housing Tenure and Class Interests*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 6.
Smith, N. (1979) Gentrification and capital: practice and ideology in Society Hill, *Antipode*, 11(3), 24–35.
Stone, M. E. (1976) The housing crisis, mortgage lending and class structure, *Antipode*, 7(2), 22–37; reprinted in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 144–179.
Walker, R. (1974) Urban ground rent: building a new conceptual framework, *Antipode*, 6(1), 51–59; see also the comment by G. Ive in *Antipode* 7(1), 1975, 20–30 and Walker's reply, 31–53.
Ward, C. (ed.) (1976) *Housing: an Anarchist Approach*. London: Freedom Press.

The inner city

Many of the above-mentioned touch on the question of the inner city, but specifically on this topic see:

Ernst, R. T., Hugg, L., Crooker, R. A., and Ayotte, R. L. (1974) Competition and conflict over land use change in the inner city: institution versus community, *Antipode*, 6(2), 70–97.
Forrest, R., Lloyd, J., Rogers, N., and Williams, P. (1980) The Inner City: in search of the problem, *Geoforum*, 10(1), 109–116.
Jones, C. (ed.) (1979) *Urban Deprivation and the Inner City*. London: Croom Helm.

Paris, C. (1978) 'The parallels are striking' – crisis in the inner city? GB 1977, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 2(1), 160–170.

Thrift, N. (1979) Unemployment in the inner city: urban problem or structural imperative? in D. Herbert and R. Johnston (eds), *Geography and the Urban Environment: Progress in Research and Applications*, vol. 2. Chichester: Wiley, 125–226.

Land

On land in general the definitive work is Massey and Catalano (1978) but there are also shorter articles by Ball and Massey:

Ball, M. J. (1977) Differential rent and the role of landed property, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 1(3), 380–403.

Massey, D. (1977) The analysis of capitalist landownership: an investigation of the case of Great Britain, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 1(3), 404–424.

Massey, D., and Catalano, A. (1978) *Capital and Land*. London: Arnold.

The socialist city

On the 'socialist city' see the collection of papers on Soviet, Polish and Czech urbanization in the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 3(2), 1979, and:

Ball, M. J. and Harloe, M. (1974) *Housing Policy in a Socialist Country: the Case of Poland*. London: Centre for Environmental Studies, Research Paper 8.

Bater, J. H. (1980) *The Soviet City: Ideal and Reality*. London: Arnold.

Doherty, J. (1979) Ideology and town planning: the Tanzanian experience, *Antipode*, 11(3), 12–23.

Farina, M. B. (1980) Urbanization, deurbanization and class struggle in China 1949–1979, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 4(4), 485–502.

Harris, N. (1972) China's cities, *Economy and Society*, 1(1), 106–115.

Jeffery, N., and Caldwell, M. (1977) Planning and urbanization in China, *Progress in Planning*, 8(2), 97–182.

Third World urbanization

The following refer to urban issues in a Third World or non-Western context:

Burgess, R. (1977) Self-help housing: a new imperialist strategy? A critique of the Turner School, *Antipode*, 9(2), 50–59.

Burgess, R. (1978) Petty commodity housing or dweller control? *World Development*, 6(9–10), 1105–1133.

Cohen, R. (1976) From peasants to workers in Africa, in P. C. W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*. London: Sage, 155–168.

Doherty, J. (1975) Urban places and Third World development, *African Urban Notes*, 3(2), 1–18.

Gugler, J. F., and Flanagan, W. G. (1977) On the political economy of urbanization in the Third World: the case of West Africa, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 1(2), 272–292.

McGee, T. G. (1971) *The Urbanization Process in the Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory*. London: Bell.

McGee, T. G. (1976) The persistence of the proto-proletariat: occupational structures and planning the future of Third World cities, *Progress in Geography*, 9, 1–38.

McGee, T. G. (1979) Conservation and dissolution in the Third World city: the shanty town as an element of conservation, *Development and Change*, 10(1), 1–22.

Roberts, B. (1978) *Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of Urbanization in the Third World*. London: Arnold.

Santos, M. (1979) *The Shared Space: the Two Circuits of the Urban Economy in Underdeveloped Countries*. London: Methuen.

Slater, D. (1978) Towards a political economy of urbanization in peripheral capitalist countries: problems of theory and method with illustrations from Latin America, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 2(2), 26–52.

Migration, labour and minorities

An important component both of uneven spatial development and of urban social issues is migration. Radical material on migration by geographers and others is, however, rather scattered. The following include articles on European labour migration, immigration and race relations in British cities, the black ghetto, North American Indians and Australian Aborigines in urban settings, and race and space in

South Africa. *Economic Geography*, 48(1), 1972 was a special issue on Black America.

Carney, J. G. (1976) Capital accumulation and uneven development in Europe: notes on migrant labour, *Antipode*, 8(1), 30–38.

Castles, S., and Kosack, G. (1973) *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. London: Oxford University Press.

Cooper, M. J. (1979) The urban experience of Aborigines: a structural analysis, *Antipode*, 11(3), 67–76.

Cummings, H., and Harrison, M. (1972) The American Indian: the poverty of assimilation, *Antipode*, 4(2), 77–87.

Doherty, J. (1973) Race, class and residential segregation in Britain, *Antipode*, 5(3), 45–51.

Donaldson, F. (1969) Geography and the black American: the white papers and the invisible man, *Antipode*, 1(1), 17–33.

Earickson, R. (1971) Poverty and race: the bane of access to essential public services, *Antipode*, 3(1), 1–8.

Eglie, R. A. (1974) Geography, racial equality and affirmative action, *Antipode*, 6(2), 34–41.

Flad, H. K. (1972) The urban American Indians of Syracuse, New York: human exploitation of urban ethnic space, *Antipode*, 4(2), 88–99.

Gorz, A. (1970) The role of immigrant labour, *New Left Review*, 61, 28–31.

Katznelson, I. (1973) *Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics and Migration in the United States 1900–30 and Britain 1948–68*. London: Oxford University Press.

Leach, B. (1973) The urban geographer and black people: can geography contribute to race relations? *Race*, 15(2), 230–241.

Leach, B. (1974) Race, problems and geography, *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, 63, 41–47.

Lloyd, J. (1977) *Immigrants in Britain: New Occupational Communities or Urban Social Movements?* University of Birmingham: Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Papers in Urban and Regional Studies 1.

Massey, D. (1976) Class, racism and housing in Boston, *Antipode*, 8(2), 37–49.

Morrill, R. L., and Donaldson, O. F. (1972) Geographical perspectives on the history of Black America, *Economic Geography*, 48(1), 1–23.

Nikolinakos, M. (1975) Notes toward a general theory of migration in late capitalism, *Race and Class*, 17(1), 5–17.

Piore, M. J. (1979) *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rex, J. (1973) *Race, Colonialism and the City*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Rex, J., and Moore, R. (1967) *Race, Community and Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Seig, L. (1971) Concepts of 'ghetto': a geography of minority groups, *Professional Geographer*, 23(1), 1–4.
Smith, D. M. (1974) Race-space inequality in South Africa: a study in welfare, *Antipode*, 6(2), 42–69.

Other minority groups examined by radical geographers include tramps, gypsies, old people, the mentally ill and North American Indians:

Duncan, J. (1978) Men without property: the tramp's classification and use of urban space, *Antipode*, 10(1), 24–34.
Evans, D. M. (1978) Alienation, mental illness and the partitioning of space, *Antipode*, 10(1), 13–23.
Foraie, J., and Dear, M. (1978) The politics of discontent among Canadian Indians, *Antipode*, 10(1), 34–45.
Goodey, B. (1970) The role of the Indian in North Dakota's geography, *Antipode*, 2(1), 11–24.
Sibley, D. (1976) The location and layout of gypsy caravan sites, *Antipode*, 8(1), 83–87.
Sibley, D. (1981) *Outsiders in Urban Societies*. Oxford: Blackwell, New York: St. Martin's Press.
Smith, C. J. (1978) Problems and prospects for a geography of mental health, *Antipode*, 10(1), 1–12.
Wolpert, E., and J. (1974) From asylum to ghetto, *Antipode*, 6(3), 63–76; see also the follow-up article by C. J. Smith, *Antipode*, 7(2), 1975, 53–59.

Women

There has recently been a substantial increase in literature on the geography of women, which includes tentative moves towards a Marxist interpretation of gender role and space.

Burnett, P. (1973) Social change, the status of women and models of city form and development, *Antipode*, 5(3), 57–62; and see the comment by I. Bruegel, 62–63.
Hayford, A. (1974) The geography of women: an historical introduction, *Antipode*, 6(2), 1–19.
Helms, J. (1974) Old women in America: the need for social justice, *Antipode*, 6(2), 26–33.

MacKenzie, S. (1980) *Women and the Reproduction of Labour Power in the Industrial City: A Case Study*. University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper 23.
MacKenzie, S., Foord, J., and McDowell, L. (1980) Women's place – women's space, *Area*, 12(1), 47–51.
Madden, J. (1977) A spatial theory of sex discrimination, *Journal of Regional Science*, 17(3), 369–380.
McDowell, L. (1979) Women in British geography, *Area*, 11(2), 151–154.
Tivers, J. (1978) How the other half lives; the geographical study of women, *Area*, 10(4), 302–306.
Turshen, M. (1978) Women and health – lessons from the People's Republic of China, *Antipode*, 10(1), 51–63.

Transport

This is a relatively neglected field of radical geography; but see:

Briggs, R., and McKelvey, D. (1975) Rural public transport and the disadvantaged, *Antipode*, 7(3), 31–36.
Eliot Hurst, M. (1973) Transportation and the societal framework, *Economic Geography*, 49(2), 163–180.
Feldman, M. A. (1977) A contribution to the critique of urban political economy: the journey to work, *Antipode*, 9(2), 30–50.
Ives, R., Lloyd, G. and Sawyers, L. (1972) Mass transit and the power elite, *Review of Radical Political Economy*, 4(2), 68–77.
McCall, M. K. (1977) Political economy and rural transport: a re-appraisal of transportation impacts, *Antipode*, 9(1), 56–68.
Sweezey, P. (1973) Cars and cities, *Monthly Review*, 22(11), 1–18.
Tyme, J. (1978) *Motorways versus Democracy*. London: Macmillan.

Environment and population

Literature on ecological and environmental perspectives ranges from interpretations of Marx's views on the concept of nature to the more diluted, conventional and practical ecological radicalism. Only a few examples of the latter are given here. There were special issues of *Antipode* on 'Ideology and Environment' – 5(3) 1973 and 10(2) 1978 – and on 'Human–Environment Relations', 11(2) 1979. The most important general articles from these theme issues are included below; those excluded are mostly case-studies of, for example, national parks, industrial-ecological conflicts etc.

Bookchin, M. (1979) Ecology and revolutionary thought, *Antipode*, 10(3)/11(1), 21–32.

Bunge, W. (1973) The geography of human survival, *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 63(3), 275–295.

Bunge, W. (1975) Ethics and logic in geography, in R. J. Chorley (ed.), *Directions in Geography*. London: Methuen, 317–331.

Burgess, R. (1978) The concept of nature in geography and Marxism, *Antipode*, 10(2), 1–11.

Coates, K. (ed.) (1979) *Socialism and the Environment*. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

Mumy, G. E. (1979) Economic systems and environmental quality: a critique of the current debate, *Antipode*, 11(2), 26–33.

O'Keefe, P., and Wisner, B. (eds) (1979) *Land Use and Development*. London: International African Institute.

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Some radical authors focus specifically on the population question; they point out that theories of population explosion and resource limitation are not neutral, but ideological. See:

Buchanan, K. (1973) The White North and the population explosion, *Antipode*, 5(3), 7–15.

Harvey, D. (1974) Population, resources and the ideology of science, *Economic Geography*, 50(3), 256–277; reprinted in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 213–242.

Maza Zavala, D. F. (1977) Population and natural resources: structural limits and the paradox of technology, *Antipode*, 9(1), 93–96.

Perelman, M. (1979) Marx, Malthus and the concept of natural resource scarcity, *Antipode*, 11(2), 80–90.

Geography and anarchism

Finally, anarchist literature is becoming quite abundant now, following on from appreciation of the work of two nineteenth-century anarchist geographers, the Russian Peter Kropotkin and the Frenchman Elisée Reclus. Richard Peet dedicated his book *Radical Geography* to Peter Kropotkin, 'revolutionist and geographer'. *Antipode*, 10(3)/11(1) 1979 was a special double issue on anarchism and the environment, the most useful and general papers from which are included below:

Breitbart, M. (1975) Impressions of an anarchist landscape, *Antipode*, 7(2), 44–49.

Breitbart, M. (1979) Spanish anarchism: an introductory essay, *Antipode*, 10(3)/11(1), 60–70.

Breitbart, M. (1981) Peter Kropotkin, the anarchist geographer, in D. R. Stoddart (ed.), *Geography, Ideology and Social Concern*, Oxford: Blackwell, 134–153.

Dunbar, G. (1981) Élisée Reclus, an anarchist in geography, in D. R. Stoddart (ed.), *Geography, Ideology and Social Concern*, Oxford: Blackwell, 154–164.

Fielding, A. J. (1980) *What Geographers ought to do: the Relationship between Thought and Action in the Life and Work of P. A. Kropotkin*. University of Sussex, Research Papers in Geography 1.

Galois, B. (1976) Ideology and the idea of nature: the case of Peter Kropotkin, *Antipode*, 8(3), 1–16; also in R. Peet (ed.), *Radical Geography*, 66–93; and see the comment by C. M. Rodrigue in *Antipode*, 9(2), 1977, 96–100.

Garcia-Ramon, M. D. (1979) The shaping of a rural anarchist landscape: contributions from Spanish anarchist theory, *Antipode*, 10(3)/11(1), 71–82.

Horner, G. M. (1979) Kropotkin and the city: the socialist ideal in urbanism, *Antipode*, 10(3)/11(1), 33–45.

Kropotkin, P. (1974) *Fields, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow* (ed. C. Ward). London: Allen & Unwin.

Kropotkin, P. (1979) What geography ought to be, *Antipode*, 10(3)/11(1), 6–15.

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Marx's concept of history (the time dimension) is, not surprisingly, far better known than his view of the spatial dimension, geography. Yet he had much to say that is of interest to the geographer. More important still, the analytical tool he developed, the dialectic of historical materialism, offers a social theory that can stimulate radical reinterpretation of local, regional and global imbalances in people's access to wealth, food and culture.

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